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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of tax policy on hous-
ing markets and elderly homeowners. Chapter One examines the potential lock-in
effect of capital gains taxation on home sales, using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(TRA97) as a policy instrument. Before 1997, homeowners were subject to capital
gains taxation when they sold their houses unless they purchased replacement homes
of equal or greater value. Since 1997, homeowners can exclude $500,000 of capital
gains when they sell their houses. Using zip-code level housing price indices and sales
data from 1982 to 2006 on single-family houses in 16 aﬄuent towns within the Boston
metropolitan area, I find that TRA97 reversed the lock-in effect for houses with low
and moderate capital gains. However, the semiannual home sale rate of houses with
capital gains above $500,000 declined after TRA97, suggesting that TRA97 generated
an unintended lock-in effect for houses with capital gains over the maximum exclusion
amount.
Chapter Two studies the relationship between property taxes and elderly mobil-
ity. This is the first study using an instrumental variable approach to address the
endogeneity problem associated with property taxes in analyzing elderly mobility. Us-
ing household-level panel data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a
newly-collected dataset on state-provided property tax relief programs, I find evidence
suggesting that higher property taxes raise mobility rates among elderly homeowners.
Eligibility for relief programs lowers mobility rates, and the impact of these programs
appears to vary with program types, program generosity, and implementation strat-
egy.
Chapter Three investigates the effect of property taxes on elderly homeowners
labor supply decisions, using similar data and empirical strategy employed in Chapter
Two. I examine both the extensive margin - whether elderly homeowners’ delay
retirement or reenter the labor force in the face of rising property taxes, and the
intensive margin - whether elderly homeowners work longer hours when property
taxes increase. I find little evidence that property taxes have a significant impact on
elderly labor supply.
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Introduction
In the United States, federal income tax system subsidizes investment in owner-
occupied housing through four major provisions. First, imputed rent implicitly re-
ceived by homeowners is untaxed. Second, mortgage interest payments are deductible
for homeowners who choose to itemize their deductions. Third, capital gains on
owner-occupied houses are largely untaxed. Lastly, property tax payments are de-
ductible for homeowners who choose to itemize their deductions. Because housing
wealth is often the most important wealth component for many American homeown-
ers, these tax provisions may have significant economic impact on housing markets
and homeowners. This thesis consists of three empirical studies that provide new evi-
dence on the link between housing tax policy and homeowners’ behavioral responses.
In particular, the first paper considers the effect of housing capital gains taxation on
homeowners’ decisions to sell their homes. The second and third papers study how
rising property taxes may have affected elderly homeowners in their mobility and
labor supply decisions.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) is one of the most sweeping reforms in
the history of housing capital gains taxation. Before 1997, homeowners were subject
to capital gains taxation when they sold their houses unless they resort to the “roll-
over rule” or the “age-55 rule.” The roll-over rule allowed home sellers to postpone
their capital gains provided that they purchase replacement homes of equal or greater
value. The age-55 rule allowed home sellers of age 55 or above to claim a one-time
exclusion of $125,000. Since 1997, home sellers can exclude $500,000 of capital gains
and such exclusions can be used as often as every two years. Previous research on
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TRA97 has solely relied on the age-55 rule for identification due to data limitations
in public surveys.
In Chapter One, I use zip-code level housing price indices and sales records on
single-family houses in 16 aﬄuent towns within the Boston metropolitan area between
1982 and 2006 to construct a unique panel of single-family houses. By exploiting the
cross-sectional variation in accumulated capital gains and the arguably exogenous
change in exclusion levels introduced by TRA97, I am able to identify the effect of
capital gains taxation on home sales. Both non-parametric analysis and regression
results show that the home sale rate increased after 1997 for homeowners with capital
gains between $0 and $500,000, suggesting that TRA97 reversed the lock-in effect of
capital gains taxes for these homeowners. In contrast, home sale rate declined after
1997 for homeowners with capital gains above $500,000, suggesting that TRA97 may
have generated an unintended lock-in effect for these homeowners by eliminating the
roll-over rule.
This paper is the first study that examines the effect of TRA97 on home sales for
houses with capital gains over $500,000. It is also the first study that estimates the tax
elasticity of home sales using post-TRA97 data. Because capital gains exclusions are
defined in nominal terms rather than in real terms, a growing number of homeowners
start to find themselves with more than $500,000 housing capital gains, especially
during housing market booms similar to the one we experienced in the early 2000s.
Moreover, capital gains tax rates may rise significantly after the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) expires in 2011, which will increase
tax liabilities for home sellers with capital gains over $500,000. Thus, the findings of
this paper have important implications to housing market dynamics in the future.
The housing market boom during late 1990s and early 2000s has caused sharp
increases in residential property taxes in the United States. Housing-rich but income-
poor elderly homeowners often complain about rising tax burdens, and anecdotal
evidence suggests that some move to reduce their tax burden. There has been little
systematic analysis, however, of the link between property tax levels and the mo-
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bility rate of elderly homeowners. Chapter Two of this thesis investigates this link
using household-level panel data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and a
newly-collected dataset on state-provided property tax relief programs. These relief
programs generate variation in property tax burdens that is not due solely to ar-
guably endogenous local community choices about taxes and expenditure programs.
The findings of this paper provide robust evidence that higher property taxes raise
mobility among elderly homeowners. A reduced form analysis of mobility rates and
property tax relief programs suggests that eligibility for relief programs lowers mobil-
ity rates. The impact of relief programs appears to vary with program types, program
generosity, and implementation strategy.
Using the same data and empirical strategies as in Chapter Two, Chapter Three of
this thesis empirically tests whether rising property taxes have led elderly homeowners
to increase their labor supply. This is the first study that estimates the wealth effect
of property tax on elderly homeowners’ labor supply behavior. To obtain a compre-
hensive picture of elderly homeowners’ labor supply response to rising property taxes,
I examine both the extensive margin - whether elderly homeowners delay retirement
or reenter the labor force to pay for higher property taxes, and the intensive margin -
whether elderly homeowners work longer hours when property taxes increase. Across
various sub-samples and alternative specifications, I find little evidence that property
taxes have a significant impact on elderly homeowners’ decisions to retire, to reenter
the labor force, or to increase working hours. Taken together, findings in Chapter
Two and Chapter Three imply that elderly homeowners have chosen to lower their
property tax burdens by moving to lower tax areas or downsizing rather than by
increasing their labor supply.
15
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Chapter 1
Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on
Home Sales: Evidence from the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 19971
1.1 Introduction
In the United States, capital gains are generally taxed upon realization and appreci-
ated assets enjoy basis step-up when transferred by bequest. Economists have long
recognized the potential lock-in effect of capital gains taxation in financial markets.
However, very few empirical studies have examined the lock-in effect of capital gains
taxation in housing markets. The Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) has gen-
erated the most drastic changes in the tax treatment of housing capital gains since
the late 1970s, and therefore, serves as a natural experiment for researchers to study
the impact of capital gains taxation on housing markets. For example, Bier, Maric
and Weizer (2000), Farnham (2006), Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007), and Biehl
1I thank Joe Nugent, Karen MacTavish, Knorr Maryanne, David Stiff, Tim Warren Jr, and
especially Alan Pasnik and Jim Shaughnessy for generously providing me with data and patiently
answering my questions.
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and Hoyt (2008) use TRA97 as a policy instrument to examine the effect of housing
capital gains taxation on homeowners’ moving decisions.
Prior to TRA97, homeowners had to pay capital gains taxes when they sold their
houses unless they resorted to the “roll-over rule” or the “age-55 rule.” The roll-
over rule allowed a home seller to postpone his capital gains taxes provided that he
bought another home of equal or greater value within two years. The age-55 rule
allowed home sellers of age 55 or older to claim a one-time exclusion of $125,000
against their capital gains. TRA97 abolished both the roll-over rule and the age-55
rule. Instead, homeowners can exclude $500,000 (or $250,000 for single filers) capital
gains when they sell their houses after TRA97, and they can potentially claim such
an exclusion as often as every two years.
Existing studies on TRA97, including Farnham (2006), Cunningham and Engel-
hardt (2007), and Biehl and Hoyt (2008), have found that capital gains taxes during
the pre-TRA97 period locked in many homeowners and that TRA97 released such
lock-in effects. These studies, however, have two major limitations. First, because
survey datasets that are publicly available often do not have sufficient information on
house values for researchers to infer accumulated capital gains, most existing studies
on TRA97 have relied on the age-55 rule for identification. Second, even when it is
possible to impute accumulated capital gains, nationally representative surveys usu-
ally do not capture enough high-end houses for researchers to study homeowners with
capital gains above $500,000. For example, Farnham (2006) uses 1989-2003 American
Housing Survey (AHS) data where the median house value is only $101,257 and the
median capital gains are only $34,856 in 2000 dollars.
Due to these data limitations, several important aspects of TRA97 remain unad-
dressed or understudied by the existing literature, including whether TRA97 differ-
entially affected homeowners with different levels of accumulated capital gains, how
the repeal of the roll-over rule affected homeowners with capital gains over $500,000,
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and what the tax elasticity of home sales has been after 1997. These unanswered
questions have important economic and policy implications for a number of reasons.
First, capital gains exclusions are defined in nominal terms and a growing number of
homeowners start to find themselves with more than $500,000 housing capital gains,
especially during the 2000-2005 housing market boom. Second, capital gains tax
rates may increase after the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
(JGTRRA) expires in 2011, which can potentially affect housing markets nationwide.
Third, tens of millions of baby-boomers are entering retirement age and considering
selling their big houses to reduce housing consumptions. Capital gains taxes will
become relevant to many of them since they tend to have lived in their homes for
decades and have accumulated sizable capital gains.
In this paper, I construct a panel of single-family houses using zip-code level
semiannual housing price indices and 1982-2006 sales records in 16 aﬄuent towns
within the Boston metropolitan area. Because the sales data originally come from
local registries of deeds, they are not subject to top-coding, and they are more accurate
than self-reported housing values found in most survey datasets. To identify the
effect of capital gains taxation on home sales, I exploit the cross-sectional variation
in accumulated capital gains and the arguably exogenous change in exclusion levels
introduced by TRA97. I also exploit legislative changes in capital gains tax rates in
2001 and 2003 to estimate the tax elasticity of home sales during the post-TRA97
period. This paper is the first study to look at how TRA97 affects houses with capital
gains exceeding $500,000. It is also the first study to estimate the tax elasticity of
home sales using post-TRA97 data.
A number of interesting findings emerge from this paper. First, the semiannual
home sale rate increased after TRA97 among homeowners with capital gains between
$0 and $500,000, suggesting that these homeowners were locked in by housing capital
gains taxes before 1997 and TRA97 reversed such a lock-in effect. Second, for houses
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with capital gains over $500,000, the semiannual home sale rate declined after TRA97.
This finding suggests that TRA97 may have unintentionally locked in homeowners
with capital gains exceeding the maximum exclusion level. Furthermore, the releasing
effect of TRA97 on homeowners with capital gains between $0 and $500,000 appears
to be short-lived, whereas the locking-in effect of TRA97 on homeowners with capital
gains above $500,000 appears to be long-lasting. Lastly, estimation results on the tax
elasticity of home sales during the post-TRA97 period suggest that a $10,000 increase
in capital gains taxes lowers semiannual home sale rate by 0.16-0.25 percentage points.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the background on
housing capital gains taxation and TRA97, illustrates how TRA97 may affect home
sales, and gives an overview of the existing literature. In section 3, I describe the
data used in this paper. I then explain my empirical strategies, discuss estimation
results, and show robustness checks and extensions to the main model in section 4.
The last section concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Tax Law
TRA97 greatly simplified the tax treatment of housing capital gains. Before 1997,
a home seller was subject to capital gains taxation if the selling price net of selling
expenses exceeded the adjusted basis of the home. The adjusted basis is defined as
purchase price plus purchase costs (e.g. settlement fees and closing costs) and the cost
of improvements and additions.2 However, if the home seller bought a replacement
home of equal or greater value within a four-year window, which started two years
before and ended two years after the date of sale, he would postpone the capital
2According the IRS rules, the cost of improvements and additions can be added to the adjusted
basis, whereas the cost of repairs cannot. IRS publication 523 has more details on the distinction.
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gains taxes.3 If the replacement home value was between the purchase price and
the selling price of the current home, the difference between the replacement home
value and the selling price of the current home would result in immediate taxes, and
the difference between the replacement home value and the purchase price of the
current home would be postponed. The amount of postponed capital gains would
be subtracted from the basis of the newly purchased replacement home. This tax
provision, unofficially called the “roll-over rule,” had been in the Internal Revenue
Code since 1951.
In addition to the roll-over rule, which provided preferential tax treatment for
home sellers who bought more expensive replacement homes, the Internal Revenue
Code also featured preferential tax treatment for older home sellers before TRA97.
Beginning in 1964, homeowners aged 65 and over who had lived in their homes for at
least five years during the past eight years could claim a once-in-a-lifetime exclusion
of up to $20,000 against taxable capital gains.4 The maximum exclusion amount
was raised to $35,000 in 1976. In 1978, the age requirement was lowered to 55, the
residence requirement was changed from living in the home for at least five out of
previous eight years to three out of previous five years, and the maximum exemption
amount was raised to $100,000.5 Finally, in 1981, the maximum exclusion amount
was raised to $125,000. This “age-55 rule” remained unchanged until TRA97.6
3In fact, IRS Publication 523 explicitly says that “Generally, you must postpone tax on the gain
on the sale of your main home if you buy and live in a new main home within the replacement period
and it costs at least as much as the adjusted sales price of the old home.”
4The exclusion amount equaled the total capital gain if the sale price was less or equal to $20,000.
For homes selling for more, the excludable portion was calculated by multiplying the capital gain
by the ratio of $20,000 to sale price.
5This $100,000 exclusion did not depend on the sale price.
6This one-time exclusion was $125,000 for both single filers and married joint filers. Married
separate filers, however, had a one-time exclusion of only $62,500. In addition, the exclusion could
only be used once in a lifetime and no balance could be carried forward for a future sale.
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Figure 1-1: TRA97 Flow Chart
TRA97 was signed into law on August 5, 1997. Effective for sales after May
6, 1997, it fundamentally altered the tax treatment of housing capital gains. First,
TRA97 eliminated the roll-over rule. After 1997, the tax treatment of housing capital
gains no longer depended on whether a home seller bought a replacement home or the
value of the replacement home. Second, it eliminated the age-55 rule. Older home
sellers now face the same tax treatment as their younger counterparts. Third, it
allowed home sellers to exclude $500,000 (or $250,000 for single filers) housing capital
gains if they have owned and lived in their homes for at least two years during the
past five. There is no limit on how many times one can claim such exclusions during
one’s lifetime, as long as the ownership and use tests are met. Finally, TRA97 lowered
the long-term capital gains tax rates from 15% and 28% to 10% and 20%.7 Figure
7Capital gains tax rates have been changed many times since 1981. Before the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, the top marginal tax rate was 20%. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 raised it to 28%, although
effective tax rates exceeded 28% for many high-income taxpayers because of interactions with other
tax provisions. TRA97 reduced capital gains tax rates and introduced a separate rate schedule for
long-term gains. Beginning May 7, 1997, the top rate on long-term capital gains was 20%. Beginning
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1-1 summarizes the key changes in housing capital gains taxation between 1981 and
now.
1.2.2 Theoretical Predictions
To evaluate the impact of TRA97 on home sales, we need to analyze how homeowners
who have accumulated different levels of capital gains and who desire to purchase
different replacement homes are affected by TRA97 differently. Suppose a homeowner
bought his house at time 0 when the per-unit housing price was p0. Let H denote
the amount of housing purchased by this homeowner. At time t, the per-unit housing
price is pt, and the homeowner considers selling his house. In the event that he
sells his house at time t, he would like to purchase a replacement home of quantity
H ′ at price pt. If his replacement home is actually a rental housing unit, H ′ = 0.
For ease of exposition, I make two simplification assumptions. First, I assume this
homeowner is younger than 55 or he has used the one-time capital gains exclusion
under the pre-TRA97 tax regime if he is 55 or older. Under this assumption, we can
ignore the age-55 rule for the moment. Second, I assume away purchase expenses and
selling expenses when imputing capital gains. Without imposing these assumptions,
the qualitative conclusions drawn in this section remain the same, but the notation
would have been far more complicated.
Given the tax law described above, this homeowner’s tax liability under the pre-
TRA97 tax regime is
Taxpret =

τ pret (ptH − p0H) if ptH ′ ≤ p0H
τ pret (ptH − ptH ′) if p0H < ptH ′ < ptH
0 if ptH
′ ≥ ptH
in 2001, the top rate on assets held for at least five years was 18%. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 lowered the top capital gains tax rate to 15%.
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Figure 1-2: Tax Liability as a Function of Capital Gains
where τ pret is the capital gains tax rate faced by the homeowner under the pre-TRA97
tax law. Similarly, his tax liability under the post-TRA97 tax regime is
Taxpostt =
 0 if ptH − p0H ≤ $500Kτ postt (ptH − p0H − 500K) if ptH − p0H > $500K
where τ postt is the capital gains tax rate faced by the homeowner under the post-TRA97
tax law.
Figure 1-2 illustrates the difference between Taxpret and Tax
post
t graphically. The
bold solid line represents Taxpostt , which does not depend on replacement home values
ptH
′. Taxpostt is zero before capital gains ptH − p0H reach $500,000. As ptH − p0H
continues to rise above $500,000, Taxpostt increases linearly in (ptH − p0H − 500K)
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with a slope of τ postt . On the other hand, capital gains taxes depend on replacement
home value ptH
′ before TRA97. When the homeowner with positive capital gains
chooses not to purchase a replacement home, H ′ = 0 and Taxpret is a linear function of
ptH− p0H with a slope of τ pret . The dotted line represents Taxpret in this case. As H ′
increases, the value of his replacement home, ptH
′, increases accordingly, which leads
Taxpret to shift parallelly to the right in Figure 1-2. The upward-sloping segment of
Taxpret is steeper than that of Tax
post
t because TRA97 reduced capital gains tax rates
and hence, τ postt < τ
pre
t .
All else equal, higher capital gains tax liabilities raise moving costs and reduce
the probability of home sales. To predict how TRA97 would affect home sales is
equivalent to comparing Taxpostt with Tax
pre
t for homeowners with different capital
gains and different desired replacement homes. If Taxpostt − Taxpret is positive, it
means that TRA97 raised tax burdens and home sale rates should decline after 1997.
On the other hand, if Taxpostt − Taxpret is negative, it suggests that TRA97 reduces
tax burdens and home sale rates should increase after 1997.
For homeowners with capital gains between $0 and $500,000,
Taxpostt − Taxpret =

−τ pret (ptH − p0H) if ptH ′ ≤ p0H
−τ pret (ptH − ptH ′) if p0H < ptH ′ < ptH
0 if ptH
′ ≥ ptH
In this case, Taxpostt −Taxpret is unambiguously negative, suggesting that homeowners
with capital gains in this range are more likely to sell their homes after TRA97, ceteris
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paribus. For homeowners with capital gains above $500,000,
Taxpostt − Taxpret =
(τ postt − τ pret )(ptH − p0H)− τ postt · 500K if ptH ′ ≤ p0H
(τ postt − τ pret )ptH + τ pret ptH ′ − τ postt (p0H + 500K) if p0H < ptH ′ < ptH
τ postt (ptH − p0H − 500K) if ptH ′ ≥ ptH
To simplify the discussion, I assume τ postt = τ
pre
t = τt and rewrite the above equation:
Taxpostt − Taxpret =

−τt · 500K if ptH ′ ≤ p0H
τt(ptH
′ − p0H − 500K) if p0H < ptH ′ < ptH
τt(ptH − p0H − 500K) if ptH ′ ≥ ptH
The sign of Taxpostt − Taxpret in this case is ambiguous because it depends on the
replacement home value ptH
′. For example, if the replacement home value is suffi-
ciently low, then Taxpostt − Taxpret is negative and home sale rates would be higher
after TRA97 among these homeowners. However, if the replacement home value is
sufficiently high, Taxpostt −Taxpret becomes positive and home sale rates would decline
after TRA97.
Figure 1-3 depicts the relationship between Taxpostt −Taxpret and ptH ′ graphically.
It shows that, a priori, we cannot predict how TRA97 would affect home sale rate
for homeowners with capital gains above $500,000. If most of these homeowners
move to significantly less expensive replacement homes after selling their houses,
then their tax burdens are lower under the post-TRA97 regime and home sale rates
would increase after TRA97. In contrast, if most homeowners with large capital gains
prefer living in relatively expensive replacement homes, then their tax burdens are
actually higher under the new tax regime, and TRA97 would cause home sale rates
to decline. The intuition behind this observation comes from the tradeoff between
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Figure 1-3: Tax Differences and Replacement Home Value for Home-
owners with Capital Gains over $500K
the elimination of the roll-over rule and the enactment of a more generous exclusion
provision. On one hand, the $500,000 exclusion would reduce the amount of capital
gains taxes owed, and hence, would reverse the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes.
On the other hand, the elimination of the roll-over rule implies that a home seller
could always avoid paying any tax by purchasing an equally or more expensive house
before 1997, but after 1997 he must pay tax on the portion of capital gains exceeding
$500,000 no matter what. If the latter effect overcomes the former effect, TRA97
might unintentionally lock in homeowners with capital gains over $500,000, and we
might observe a drop in home sale rates after 1997 among these people.
In summary, the above analysis predicts that TRA97 would increase home sale
rates among homeowners with capital gains between $0 and $500,000. The effect
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of TRA97 on home sales among homeowners with capital gains above $500,000 is
ambiguous in theory, and thus, only empirical investigation can determine the sign
and magnitude of the effect of TRA97 on these homeowners. Note that the above
analysis refers to married homeowners. For single homeowner, the exclusion level is
$250,000, and theoretical predictions differ for single homeowners with capital gains
between $0 and $250,000 from those with capital gains over $250,000.
1.2.3 Previous Studies
The pre-TRA97 capital gains taxation had been criticized for its complexity and
potentially large distortions of homeowners’ mobility and housing consumption de-
cisions. Using 1970-1981 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, Newman
and Reschovsky (1987) showed that that the annual mobility rate of homeowners
55 to 64 years old increased after the 1978 reform, which raised the exclusion level
from $35,000 to $100,000 and lowered the age requirement from 65 to 55. Hoyt and
Rosenthal (1990) first recognized that the roll-over rule generated “kinks” in home
sellers’ budget sets and encouraged them to consume more housing than they oth-
erwise would have. Such kinks were ignored by previous studies on housing demand
such as King (1980) and Rosen (1979). Using 1981 AHS data, Hoyt and Rosenthal
(1990) estimated the price elasticity of housing demand with non-linear budget sets.
Hoyt and Rosenthal (1992) performed policy simulations using the estimation results
of their previous paper. Their simulations suggest that by increasing capital gains
tax rates, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 enhanced the importance of the capital gains
kinks in home sellers’ budget sets and therefore produced a larger efficiency loss.
Using 1993 IRS Statistics of Income tax return data, Burman, Wallace and Weiner
(1996) showed that the tax raised little revenue: A total of $50.5 billion housing capi-
tal gains were reported on Form 2119 in 1993, but $18 billion was not taxable because
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of the age-55 rule and $30 billion was not taxable because of the roll-over rule. The
authors estimated a sequential-choice model and found that capital gains taxes had
a large and significant impact on the decision to buy or to rent. They also found that
capital gains taxes were a large but only marginally significant deterrent to moving
down (i.e. moving to less expensive houses), but they did not find any effect of taxes
on the amount of housing demanded by home sellers who chose to move down. Fur-
thermore, the authors argued that the housing capital gains taxation at the time was
regressive because it treated more favorably home sellers who could afford expensive
replacement houses, and the compliance cost was high because of record-keeping and
complex rules. Sinai (1998) applied a competing-risk duration model on 1970-1992
PSID data to estimate the effect of capital gains taxes on homeowners’ mobility deci-
sions. Unlike Burman, Wallace and Weiner (1996), he found that capital gains taxes
had a statistically significant but small impact on the likelihood of moving, the choice
of owning versus renting, and the choice of moving up versus down.
To my knowledge, only four papers have studied the impact of TRA97 on resi-
dential mobility. Using deed transfer data from nine years before to 17 months after
TRA97 in four Ohio metropolitan areas, Bier, Maric and Weizer (2000) found no ev-
idence that the probability of moving down increased after 1997. Instead, they found
that moving up dominated all four areas. Farnham (2006) used 1983-2003 AHS data
to study how the elimination of the age-55 rule affected residential mobility. He found
evidence suggesting that homeowners under age 55 were locked in before TRA97 and
the passage of TRA97 boosted residential mobility among the previously locked-in
households. Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007) used 1996 and 1998 Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) data to compare the mobility rates of homeowners just above age
55 (i.e. 56-58) and homeowners just below (i.e. 52-54). They found that the repeal
of the age-55 rule raised residential mobility of the 52-54 year olds by 22-31 percent
from the mean annual mobility rate of 4 percentage points. Biehl and Hoyt (2008)
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used 1995-1996, 1998-1999, and 2002-2004 AHS data to conduct a similar analysis.
They found that TRA97 increased mobility rates of homeowners aged 50-54 relative
to homeowners aged 55-65, but such a release effect dissipated a few years after the
passage of TRA97.
Overall, most existing studies on TRA97 have focused exclusively on the elimina-
tion of the age-55 rule. It is understandable that they have done so because of data
limitations. For example, CPS does not have information on house values. AHS top
codes house values at $300,000, which makes it impossible for researchers to inves-
tigate the impact of TRA97 on houses with capital gains over $500,000. Moreover,
housing values in survey datasets are self-reported. Goodman and Ittner (1992) and
Kiel and Zabel (1999) show that individual homeowners do not report their housing
values accurately in survey datasets. Even if such measurement errors in self-reported
values are random and do not systematically correlate with mobility outcomes, they
may still cause attenuation bias in empirical analysis. As a result, there has been
no research examining the mobility response to TRA97 of homeowners with capital
gains over $500,000. Nor have there been any studies that estimate the tax elasticity
of home sales using post-TRA97 data.
This paper fills these gaps in the literature. Instead of using public surveys where
the unit of observation is typically a homeowner, this paper uses a unique panel of
housing units constructed from zip-code level semiannual housing price indices and
1982-2006 sales records on single-family houses in 16 aﬄuent towns within the Boston
metropolitan area. These sales records are originally taken from local registries of
deeds and therefore are accurate and not subject to top-coding. This paper exploits
the variation in exclusion levels before and after TRA97 - $125,000, $250,000, and
$500,000 - to identify the effect of capital gains taxation on home sale rates. Both
nonparametric and regression analysis are used to study such an effect. It also exploits
legislative changes in capital gains tax rates introduced in 2001 and 2003 to estimate
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the tax elasticity of home sales in the post-TRA97 period. Because of the innovations
in both data and identification strategies, this paper complements the existing studies
on TRA97 and sheds new light on the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation in housing
markets.
1.3 Data
The backbone of the data analyzed in this paper is the sales records provided by
The Warren Group. These are single-family house sales in 16 cities and towns within
the Boston metropolitan area from 1982 to 2006. The 16 cities and towns are Bel-
mont, Brookline, Cambridge, Carlisle, Cohasset, Concord, Dover, Lexington, Lin-
coln, Needham, Newton, Sherborn, Sudbury, Wellesley, Weston, and Winchester. I
selected these places because their 2006 median single-family house sale prices were
over $625,000, they do not have active real estate markets for second homes, and they
are all located in the Middlesex and Norfolk counties. Homeowners living in these
cities and towns are mostly high-income and well-educated individuals. Table 1.1
shows that 61-83% of individuals 25 years and older who live in these places have at
least a Bachelor’s degree, compared with the average of 33% in Massachusetts. The
1999 median household income of homeowners in these places was around $100,000.8
Another important feature of these 16 cities and towns is that the number of single-
family houses has been roughly constant in each jurisdiction. Table 1.2 shows no
significant changes in the stock of single-family houses during the past 15 years in
these 16 cities and towns.
The sales data have two components. The first contains exhaustive records on
single-family house sales between 1987 and 2006.9 In other words, if there was a
8Brookline and Cambridge had much lower median household income because of the large renting
population in these two cities.
9Because the Newton data were extracted in 2006 and the rest were extracted in 2007, I only
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single-family house in any of the 16 cities and towns that was sold anytime between
1987 and 2006, the sale record would appear in the data. The raw data have a total
of 78,599 sales of 48,240 single family houses. Each record has information on parcel
ID, parcel location, sale date, sale price, buyer name, seller name, current assessment
value, house characteristics such as lot size, living area, year built, total number of
rooms, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and building style.10 The second
component contains sales records from 1982 to 1986. This dataset was compiled
initially by a company that was later acquired by The Warren Group. As a result, it
only has information on parcel location, sale date, sale price, buyer name, and seller
name. Moreover, it is unclear whether the sales records are exhaustive and whether a
sale was on a single-family house. The raw data have a total of 36,103 sales recorded.
To separate sales of single-family houses from sales of other properties in the 1982-
1986 dataset, I requested local assessment data from all 16 cities and towns. Based on
the assessment data provided by local assessors’ offices, I constructed a “universe” of
single-family houses for the 16 cities and towns. This constructed universe has a total
of 80,978 parcels, and it contains information on parcel ID, parcel location, parcel zip
code, current assessment value, and lot size.11 Merging this universe dataset with the
1982-1986 sales records by parcel location, I identified 11,458 sales of single-family
houses. Then I combined the 1982-1986 data with the 1987-2006 data. After a series
of data cleaning procedures, I obtained a sales dataset with a total of 82,884 sales
records on 50,369 parcels.12 Around 57% of these parcels were sold only once between
have sales between January 1, 1987 and June 23, 2006 for the city of Newton. For the other 15 cities
and towns, I have all sales between January 1, 1987 and December 31, 2006.
10Parcel and parcel ID are terms used in assessment practice. In this paper, a parcel means a
single-family house. A parcel ID is a unique ID that is attached to a single-family house. The
current assessment value refers to the FY2006 assessment value for the city of Newton and FY2007
for the other 15 cities and towns.
11I tried to obtain additional housing characteristics such as living area, year built, total number
of rooms, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and building style. But because each of
these variables was missing in at least one town’s assessment data, I had to exclude them from the
single-family house universe dataset.
12Such procedures include dealing with sales between non-individual parties (e.g. financial insti-
32
Figure 1-4: Semiannual Price Appreciation Rates
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Note: Each vertical bar represents the semiannual single-family nominal
housing appreciation rates of 26 zip code areas at a certain time. The circle
on each vertical bar indicates the mean of the 26 housing appreciation
rates.
1982 and 2006, while the remaining 43% of them were sold more than once during
the sample period. Table 1.3 breaks down the parcels in the universe dataset and the
sales data by city and town. It shows that approximately 62% of all single-family
houses in the 16 cities and towns are in the sales data. Table 1.4 displays the mean
and median sale prices and the number of sales by year.13 The relatively high prices
in the post-1997 period will allow me to examine the effect of TRA97 on homeowners
with capital gains above $500,000.
tutions, trusts, builders, and developers), multiple sales on the same date, sales with suspiciously
low prices, and other unusual cases.
13I do not convert the prices into real dollars because capital gains tax exclusions are in nominal
terms.
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Figure 1-5: Nominal Median Value of Single Family Houses
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Note: Each vertical bar represents the median single-family nominal house
values of 26 zip code areas at a certain time. The circle on each vertical
bar indicates the mean of the 26 median house values.
Once I had sales data with precise purchase prices, I used 1982-2006 zip-code level
semiannual housing price indices, which were provided by Fiserv Lending Solutions,
to impute nominal capital gains for these houses in subsequent years at half-year
intervals. Such indices, also called Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, are constructed
using repeated sales data on single-family houses.14 Figure 1-4 shows the semiannual
housing appreciation rates for the 26 zip codes in the 16 cities and towns during the
sample period. The vertical bars connect the maximum and minimum appreciation
14Case-Shiller HPI and the OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) HPI are the
two major housing price indices in the United States. The methodology behind these two indices
are very similar, but they rely on different underlying data: Case-Shiller uses purchase prices from
county records and OFHEO uses conforming mortgage data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Because houses in my dataset have relatively high values and OFHEO does not include sales in
which jumbo mortgages are used, Case-Shiller HPI is more appropriate in this application.
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rates, and the circles indicate appreciation rates averaged across the 26 zip codes at
any given time. From 1982 to 2006, the cities and towns under study experienced
significant ups and downs in the single-family housing market. Moreover, there ap-
pears to be substantial heterogeneity in housing appreciation rates across zip codes
at any given time. Combined with the policy shocks brought forward by TRA97,
such housing market movements provide useful variations for me to study the effect
of capital gains taxation on home sales. Using median assessment values of FY2007
and 1982-2006 zip-code level housing value appreciation rates, I extrapolated median
assessment values for all years between 1982 and 2006 by zip code at half-year inter-
vals. Figure 1-5 displays these extrapolated median house values. The vertical bars
connect the maximum and minimum median values, and the circles indicate median
values averaged across the 26 zip codes at any given time. The average median house
value increased from $116,000 in 1982 to $883,000 in 2006 in nominal terms. There
also appears to be substantial heterogeneity in median house values across zip codes
at any given time.
Putting together purchase prices from the sales data and semiannual appreciation
rates of the corresponding zip code area, I imputed current prices for each parcel
at half-year intervals for all subsequent years before the next sale. For example,
if a parcel was sold in the first half-year of 1990 at price P 01990 and then was sold
again in the second half-year of 2000 at price P 02000.5, I would derive current prices
{P 11990.5, P 11991, P 11991.5, ..., P 12000, P 12000.5} by applying 1990-2000 semiannual apprecia-
tion rates to P 01990. Similarly, I would derive current prices {P 12001, P 12001.5, P 12002, ..., P 12006, P 12006.5}
by applying 2000-2006 semiannual appreciation rates to P 02000. In the end, I created
a panel of single-family houses where each observation is a parcel-time combination,
each observation has information on purchase price and current price, and time is
measured in the unit of half-year. By law, selling expenses can be subtracted from
selling prices when calculating taxable capital gains. Because home sellers usually
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pay 6% of selling prices to realtors as commission fees, I define taxable capital gains
(TCG) as15
TCG = CurrentPrice− PurchasePrice− 0.06× (CurrentPrice).
In addition, because TRA97 required homeowners to have owned and lived in the
house for two years out of the previous five to qualify for capital gains exclusions, I
dropped observations that are within two years of the most recent sale for the post-
TRA97 records. To prevent extreme cases from driving the estimation results, I also
dropped observations where house prices are over $5 million or the difference between
the current price and the purchase price is below -$100,000 or above $3 million. The
final analysis sample has 1.16 million observations on 46,403 unique parcels.
Figure 1-6 shows histograms of TCG before and after TRA97. There are two key
differences between these two histograms. First, due to the housing market boom
between the late 1990s and mid 2000s, only a tiny fraction of parcels had negative
capital gains after 1997. Second, only a small fraction of parcels had capital gains
over $125,000 before 1997. Even fewer parcels had capital gains above $500,000
before TRA97. In contrast, a large number of parcels have accumulated more than
$500,000 capital gains after TRA97. Both the housing market boom and the fact
that the $500,000 capital gains exclusion level is written in nominal terms rather
than being indexed by inflation contribute to this pattern. When comparing home
sale rates of houses with capital gains above $500,000 before and after TRA97, we
need to be cautious because the houses that had more than $500,000 capital gains
before 1997 may be very different from their counterparts during the post-TRA97
period. In the regression analysis shown later in this paper, I control for as many
factors as the dataset allows and control for them as flexibly as possible. But the
15I define TCG in nominal terms because tax rules are written in nominal terms.
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Figure 1-6: Histogram of Taxable Capital Gains
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lack of observations with huge capital gains before 1997 poses a serious challenge to
any empirical strategy estimating the impact of TRA97 on houses with capital gains
above $500,000.
Table 1.5 shows summary statistics of some key variables for the pre-TRA97 and
post-TRA97 periods separately. The average semiannual home sale rate in the sample
is 2.4 percentage points during the pre-TRA97 period, and it is the same as the sale
rate during the post-TRA97 period. The number of observations is approximately
evenly split between the pre-TRA97 period and the post-TRA97 period. Consistent
with the pattern described in Figure 1-6, Table 1.5 indicates that only 0.2% of the
pre-TRA97 observations are in the category with capital gains over $500,000, whereas
20.5% of the post-TRA97 observations are in that same category. A mere 0.1% of the
post-TRA97 observations have negative capital gains. There is no significant change
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in the average lot size before and after TRA97. The average semiannual housing
appreciation rate after 1997 is 3.1% in real terms, which is significantly higher than
the average semiannual housing appreciation rate of 1.0% before 1997.
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Estimation Results
In this section, I first employ non-parametric approaches to illustrate the impacts
of TRA97 on home sale rates for homeowners with different levels of accumulated
capital gains. Then I use a simple difference-in-differences regression framework to
estimate the magnitude of such impacts. I also perform robustness checks and study
the dynamic aspect of the TRA97 effect. Lastly, I exploit legislative changes in the top
capital gains tax rate to estimate the tax elasticity of home sales in the post-TRA97
period.
1.4.1 Non-Parametric Approaches
As discussed earlier in this paper, TRA97 eliminated capital gains taxation on home
sales for homeowners with capital gains below $500,000. Thus, we expect home sale
rates of these homes to increase after 1997. The effect of TRA97 on homes with
capital gains above $500,000 is ambiguous. On one hand, TRA97 legislated a very
generous exclusion of $500,000. On the other hand, it took away the roll-over rule that
enables home sellers to avoid paying any tax at the time of a sale. Before formulating
a rigorous regression model, it is instructive to use non-parametric approaches to
compare home sale rates for houses with different levels of capital gains before and
after TRA97. The idea is to let the data speak for themselves without imposing any
functional form assumptions.
As shown in Figure 1-2, tax liabilities are continuous functions of housing cap-
ital gains in both the pre-TRA97 and the post-TRA97 periods, even though the
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first derivative of tax liabilities with respect to capital gains is discrete. Because
home selling is a binary decision, non-parametric smoothing techniques such as a lo-
cal polynomial regression are useful to illustrate the relationship between home sale
probabilities and taxable capital gains. A local polynomial regression is similar to
a kernel regression. While a kernel regression estimates the weighted mean locally,
a local polynomial regression estimates a weighted polynomial function locally. In a
kernel regression, we minimize
∑
i
K
(
xi − x0
h
)
(yi −m0)2
with respect to m0, where K(·) is a kernel weighting function and h is the bandwidth.
In a local polynomial regression, we minimize
∑
i
K
(
xi − x0
h
)(
yi − a0 − a1(xi − x0)− ...− ap (xi − x0)
p
p!
)2
with respect to (a0, a1, ..., ap), where p is preferably an odd number. Fan and Gijbels
(1996) list many attractions of local polynomial regressions, including that they have
better bias properties than kernel regressions.
I fit a local cubic polynomial model on the pre-TRA97 data and the post-TRA97
data separately, using the alternative Epanechnikov kernel function and a bandwidth
of $500,000. Figure 1-7 shows the estimation results. The scattered circles represent
the smoothed home sale probabilities at various capital gains levels before TRA97,
and the scattered triangles represent those after TRA97. Because only a tiny fraction
of parcels had capital gains over $500,000 before TRA97 or had negative capital
gains after TRA97, I can compare only parcels with capital gains between $0 and
$500,000 in the local polynomial framework. Figure 1-7 presents several interesting
patterns. First, home sale rates and taxable capital gains have an inverse U-shape
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Figure 1-7: Local Polynomial Regression of the Raw Data
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relationship within the $0 to $500,000 capital-gain range. When a homeowner has
lived in the house only for a short period of time, his accumulated capital gains
tend to be small and he is also unlikely to move since he has adjusted his housing
consumption recently. When the homeowner has stayed in the house for a long period
of time, his accumulated capital gains are usually large. But to the extent that there
is heterogeneity among homeowners in their moving propensities, living in the same
house for an extended period of time may indicate that this homeowner has a distaste
for moving. Thus, the home sale rate of this homeowner is low, as suggested by the
“mover-stayer” model in the literature. Second, the local polynomial regression result
suggests that home sale rates are higher after TRA97 for homes with relatively low
capital gains, but the order reverses right before capital gains reach $400,000. This
pattern is roughly consistent with the theoretical prediction that TRA97 increases the
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Figure 1-8: Sale Probability by Capital Gains Categories
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home sale rate of houses with capital gains between $0 and $500,000. Third, it shows
that home sale rates increase slightly near the $500,000 exclusion level during the post-
TRA97 period. Such a pattern may imply the presence of the “churning” behavior -
namely, homeowners sell their homes to reset tax basis when they accumulate $500,000
taxable capital gains after 1997.
To compare home sale rates before and after TRA97 for parcels with capital gains
below $0 or above $500,000, I also impute simple means of sale rates by capital gains
categories for the pre-TRA97 and post-TRA97 period respectively. Because the max-
imum exclusion amount was $125,000 before 1997 and $500,000 (for married couples)
or $250,000 (for singles) after 1997, I focus on five capital gains categories: less than
$0, $0 to $125K, $125K to $250K, $250K to $500K, and over $500K. Figure 1-8 dis-
plays the results, where circles represent the pre-TRA97 data and triangles represent
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the post-TRA97 data. Shaded areas cover the range between two standard errors
above and two standard errors below the point estimates. Thus, overlapping gray
areas imply that the point estimate using the pre-TRA97 data is not statistically dif-
ferent from the point estimate using the post-TRA97 data for that particular capital
gains category. Note that the standard errors of estimated semiannual home sale rates
for houses with capital gains over $500,000 before 1997 and for houses with negative
capital gains after 1997 are very large due to the lack of many observations in these
categories. In fact, there are only 830 observations that have negative capital gains
during the post-TRA97 period, compared with 158,598 such observations during the
pre-TRA97 period. Similarly, there are only 1,242 observations with over $500,000
capital gains before 1997, whereas there are 134,463 such observations after 1997.
The results shown in Figure 1-8 suggest that home sale rates of parcels with capital
gains between $0 and $125,000 increased after 1997 and the difference is statistically
significant, which is consistent with our prediction. Interestingly, for parcels with
capital gains above $500,000, sale rates declined after 1997 and the difference is also
statistically significant. This finding suggests that for homeowners with extraordinary
capital gains, the effect of eliminating the roll-over rule may have outweighed the effect
of providing the $500,000 exclusion. Lastly, for parcels with negative capital gains or
with capital gains between $125,000 and $500,000, average sale rates after TRA97 are
indistinguishable from those before TRA97 in this simple non-parametric framework.
1.4.2 A Difference-in-Differences Framework
Even though the non-parametric results seem to suggest that TRA97 had an impor-
tant impact on home sales and the impact varied with capital gain levels, they do not
take into account other factors that may have driven the difference in home sale rates
between before TRA97 and after TRA97. To control for these possible confounding
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factors and isolate the TRA97 effect, I use a simple difference-in-differences regression
model.
Because housing is both a consumption good and an investment good, I model
the home sale probability as
Prob(Saleit) = F
(
U∗it − Uit
U∗it
,MCit, rt, ht
)
(1.1)
where Saleit is the binary outcome variable that equals one if homeowner i sells his
home between time t and t + 1. Because housing is lumpy and costly to adjust, a
homeowner may not be able to change his housing consumption constantly. Thus,
his utility from consuming the present house, which presumably was bought years
ago, may be well below the utility from consuming a house that he would choose
to live in if housing consumption could be adjusted in a costless manner. The first
term within the F (·) function measures how the homeowner’s utility from consuming
the present home, Uit, compares with his utility from consuming his ideal home, U
∗
it.
The larger the difference between Uit and U
∗
it, the more likely he will sell his home
between time t and t + 1 and change his housing consumption bundle (i.e. F1 >
0). The second term within the F (·) function measures the moving cost associated
with changing one’s housing consumption. The higher the moving cost, the less
likely the homeowner will sell the house (i.e. F2 < 0). Because housing is also an
investment good, both the expected housing appreciation rate, ht, and the expected
return to alternative investment opportunities, rt, will influence the homeowner’s
selling decision. In this paper, I assume adaptive expectation and ht is measured by
the real housing appreciation between time t− 1 and time t.
Capital gains taxes affect home selling decisions by increasing the moving cost,
MCit. I specify MCit as
MCit = G(Xit, Zit, Taxit) (1.2)
43
where Xit are homeowner i’s characteristics and Zit are characteristics of the present
home. For example, moving costs may be higher for bigger houses or larger house-
holds. Taxit is the amount of capital gains taxes homeowner i will have to pay if he
sells his home between time t and t + 1. Thus, the higher Taxit is, the higher the
moving cost becomes, and the lower the sale probability will be.
∂Prob(Saleit)
∂Taxit
= F2 · ∂MCit
∂Taxit
< 0 (1.3)
TRA97 introduced arguably exogenous changes to tax treatment of housing capital
gains, and such changes were different for houses with different levels of capital gains.
Therefore, I can use these changes to identify the effect of capital gains taxes on home
sales. Specifically, I estimate the following Probit model16
Prob(Saleict) = Φ
(
α0 +
23∑
k=1
αk · 1(TCGict ∈ Ck) + β1 · 1(TCGict ≤ 0) · Aftert
+β2 · 1(0 < TCGict ≤ 125K) · Aftert + β3 · 1(125K < TCGict ≤ 250K) · Aftert
+β4 · 1(250K < TCGict ≤ 500K) · Aftert + β5 · 1(TCGict > 500K) · Aftert
+γ1hict + γ2log(lotsize)ict + δc + θt
+
4∑
j=1
ρ1j(RPPict)
j +
4∑
j=1
ρ2j(RCPict)
j +
4∑
j=1
ρ3j(Tict)
j
)
(1.4)
where Saleict indicates whether homeowner i in city c sells his house between time
t and t + 1. Function 1(·) returns one if the condition expressed in the parenthesis
is true and zero otherwise. Aftert indicates whether the observation is in the post-
TRA97 period. Because I do not observe homeowners’ characteristics in my dataset,
I use “time since purchase” - Tict - as a proxy for the difference between the utility
from consuming the desired house and the utility from consuming the present house
16I estimate a Probit model instead of a linear probability model because the average home sale
rate is only 0.023 and very far from 0.5. A linear probability model may be biased in this case.
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(i.e.
U∗it−Uit
U∗it
). The intuition is that the longer one stays in one’s home, the more
likely that he has experienced shocks that affect housing demand (e.g. change in
family size). I use the real purchase price of the present home, RPPict, as a proxy
for permanent household income. The rationale is that permanent household income
is a key determinant of housing demand - households with higher incomes can afford
more expensive homes. I also use the real current price, RCPict, as a proxy for wealth.
To control for these three variables as flexibly as possible, I put their polynomials
to the fourth order in the regression model as explanatory variables. In addition,
log(lotsize)ict measures how large the parcel is. Because larger parcels imply higher
moving cost, we expect γ1 to be negative. hict is the real housing appreciation from
time t − 1 to time t. δc and θt stand for city fixed effects and year fixed effects,
respectively.
Essentially, I want to compare home sale rates before and after TRA97 for five
capital gains categories: TCGict ≤ 0, 0 < TCGict ≤ 125K, 125K < TCGict ≤ 250K,
250K < TCGict ≤ 500K, and TCGict > 500K. Instead of controlling just for
these five capital gains categories, I assign capital gains into 23 categories: less
than -$50K, -$50K-$0, $0-$25K, $25K-$50K, $50K-$75K, $75K-$100K, $100K-$125K,
$125K-$150K, $150K-$175K, $175K-$200K, $200K-$250K, $250K-$300K, $300K-$350K,
$350K-$400K, $400K-$450K, $450K-$500K, $500K-$600K, $600K-$700K, $700K-$800K,
$800K-$900K, $900K-$1M, $1M-$1.5M, and more than $1.5M. In this way, I allow
for more flexibility in estimating the baseline effect of capital gains on home sales in
the pre-TRA97 period. These 23 categories are expressed as {Ck, k = 1, 2, ..., 23} in
equation (1.4). As discussed before, TRA97 should have no impact on houses with
negative capital gains since no taxes were due for these houses throughout the sample
period. TRA97 unambiguously reduced tax liabilities and should increase home sale
rates if capital gains were between $0 and $500,000. The effect of TRA97 is a pri-
ori ambiguous on houses with capital gains above $500,000. In summary, we expect
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β1 = 0, β2 > 0, β3 > 0, β4 > 0, and β5 Q 0. To the extent that there are many single
homeowners in the sample, β4 may be smaller in magnitude than β2 and β3 because
single homeowners can only exclude $250,000 capital gains.
Table 1.6 displays the estimation results with standard errors clustered at parcel
level. The numbers shown in the table are the marginal effects of corresponding ex-
planatory variables evaluated at means. For ease of exposition, I show these marginal
effects in percentage terms. In column (1), I include only year dummies, the 23 TCG
category dummies, and interactions of TRA97 with the five TCG category dummies
as explanatory variables. As predicted, the estimated coefficient βˆ1 is statistically
indistinguishable from zero at conventional confidence level, whereas βˆ2, βˆ3 and βˆ4
are all positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that TRA97 raised
sale rates of parcels with capital gains between $0 and $500,000, but did not change
sale rates of parcels with negative capital gains. On the other hand, the estimated
coefficient on the interaction between TRA97 and capital gains exceeding $500,000,
βˆ5, is negative and statistically significant. It implies that for parcels with capital
gains over $500,000, the elimination of the roll-over rule reduced sale rates by more
than the increase in sale rates induced by the large exclusion level. Therefore, we
observe a net decrease in sale rates among these parcels after TRA97.
In column (2), I add more controls to the regression model, including real semi-
annual housing appreciation rate, log of lot size, polynomials of real purchase price,
polynomials of real current price, polynomials of time since purchase, and city dum-
mies. The estimated coefficient on log of lot size is negative and statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting that larger houses have lower sale rates, possibly due to higher
moving costs. The estimated coefficient on housing appreciation rate is also nega-
tive and statistically significant, which is consistent with the notion that housing is
partly an investment good. For example, during a housing market boom, adaptive
expectation implies that homeowners extrapolate the housing price movement and
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expect the boom to continue. Therefore, they often hold on to their homes and defer
sales. Similar to the estimation results shown in column (1), βˆ1 is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero, βˆ2 and βˆ3 are positive and statistically significant, and βˆ5 is
negative and statistically significant. βˆ4 remains positive but is no longer statistically
significant.
Column (3) has the same specification as column (2) except that I control for
city×year fixed effects to allow for city-year specific shocks to the housing market. All
estimated coefficients remain almost identical to the results obtained using the column
(2) specification. The estimated marginal effects of the interaction terms suggest that
TRA97 increased semiannual sale rates by 0.33-0.54 percentage points for parcels with
capital gains between $0 and $500,000, representing a 13-22 percent increase from
the average sale rate during the pre-TRA97 period. In contrast, TRA97 reduced sale
rates of parcels with more than $500,000 capital gains by 0.79 percentage points,
representing a 24 percent decline from the average sale rate during the pre-TRA97
period. Taken together, the evidence shown in this section suggests that TRA97
reversed the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes for houses with low or moderate
capital gains. However, it may have generated an unintended lock-in effect for houses
with very large capital gains due to the elimination of the roll-over rule.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks and Extensions
In the previous section, I find that TRA97 appears to have an important effect on
home sales. In particular, home sale rates of parcels with capital gains between $0 and
$500,000 increased and home sale rates of parcels with capital gains above $500,000
decreased after TRA97. In this section, I present a set of robustness checks and
examine how the effect of TRA97 evolved over time.
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Potential Measurement Errors in Taxable Capital Gains
The empirical strategies used in this paper depend on taxable capital gains being
accurately measured. Compared with most public surveys, the data used in this
paper have much better measures of taxable capital gains because they are imputed
using actual sale records and zip-code level housing price indices. Nevertheless, to the
extent that home improvements and renovations affect taxable capital gains, the data
used in this paper may still contain measurement errors since I do not observe these
improvement and renovation activities. To ascertain that the estimates shown above
are not driven by such measure errors in taxable capital gains, I carry out several
robustness checks.
First, I drop houses that are likely to have had significant improvements and ren-
ovations during the sample period. Recall that the dataset is a panel of single-family
houses where I observe actual sale prices if they are sold and I also observe assessment
values at the end of the sample period. Suppose a parcel was first purchased in the
first half-year of 1990 at price P 01990 and then was sold in the second half-year of 2000
at price P 02000.5. I impute the values of this parcel at each point of time since 1990
using zip-code level semiannual housing appreciation rates. In other words, I use P 01990
as the base to obtain house values {P 11990.5, P 11991, P 11991.5, ..., P 12000, P 12000.5}. Similarly,
I use P 02000.5 as the base to obtain house values {P 12001, P 12001.5, P 12002, ..., P 12006, P 12006.5}.
If the actual sale price in the second half-year of 2000, P 02000.5, is very different from
the imputed house value at that time, P 12000.5, it is likely that the parcel experienced
significant modifications between 1990 and 2000. To reduce biases introduced by such
measurement errors, I drop all observations on this parcel for years between 1990 and
2000. In addition, if the FY2007 assessment value of this parcel, P avFY 2007, is very
different from the imputed house value at the end of the sample period, P 12006.5, it
is likely that the parcel experienced major changes between 2000 and 2006. In this
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case, I drop observations on this parcel for all years between 2000 and 2006.
Second, I change the cut-off point for the $500,000 capital gains exclusion. Sup-
pose that a homeowner purchased the house at P 0t , renovated the house during the
years when he lived in it, and then sold the house to someone else at price P 0t′ . Ac-
cording to IRS rules, the cost of renovation can be subtracted from the sale price P 0t′
when calculating the taxable capital gains. But the added value to the house due to
renovation also appreciated between the time of renovation and t′, which contributes
to actual taxable capital gains. Because I do not observe the timing of the renovation
and the amount of money this homeowner spent on renovating the house, the pre-
dicted taxable capital gains of this house at time t′ are lower than the actual taxable
capital gains. In other words, the homeowner may have accumulated $500,000 capital
gains before t′ even though my calculation suggests that his accumulated capital gains
reached $500,000 at time t′. To correct such a discrepancy, I change the cut-off point
from $500,000 to $450,000 as a robustness check.
Panel A in Table 1.7 displays the estimation results of the robustness checks
described above. In column (2), I drop observations if actual sale prices and predicted
sale prices differ by 100% or if FY2007 assessment values and predicted values at the
end of the sample period differ by 100%. Before this procedure, the correlation
between predicted values and actual values was 0.80. It increased to 0.91 after this
procedure. Column (2) shows that the estimated marginal effects of TRA97 on home
sales are very similar to the main results obtained from the original sample. In column
(3), I drop observations when actual sale prices and predicted sale prices differ by 50%
or when FY2007 assessment values and predicted values at the end of the sample
period differ by 50%. After this procedure, the correlation between predicted values
and actual values increased further to 0.95. In this case, the estimated marginal effects
of TRA97 change somewhat in magnitude, but they are not statistically different from
the main results shown in column (1). Column (4) shows the estimated marginal
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effects when the cut-off point is changed from $500,000 to $450,000. The results
remain largely the same. The results of robustness checks shown in panel A of Table
1.7 suggest that the measurement error problem associated with taxable capital gains
is unlikely to be severe and the main findings shown in the previous section are robust
to potential measurement errors.
Alternative Sample and Specification
The results shown in Table 1.6 may have over-estimated the effect of TRA97 if home-
owners in 1996 anticipated the passage of TRA97. If they indeed knew that TRA97
was going to pass, homeowners who intended to sell their homes might have delayed
selling their homes until after May 7, 1997 if their capital gains were relatively low.
Alternatively, if they had huge capital gains, they might have accelerated selling their
homes to take advantage of the roll-over rule. Under these circumstances, the findings
presented in Table 1.6 would be artificial rather than real. To deal with such “an-
ticipation” effects, I drop the 1996 observations and re-estimate equation (1.4). The
estimation results are shown in column (2) of panel B in Table 1.7. The estimated
coefficient βˆ1 is still not statistically different from zero. βˆ2, βˆ3 and βˆ4 are all positive
and statistically significant. βˆ5 is negative and also statistically significant. The mag-
nitudes of the marginal effects are similar to the main results shown in column (1).
These estimation results point in the direction that the passage of TRA97 was likely
to be unexpected, as suggested by Dai, Maydew, Shackelford and Zhang (2006).
The dataset analyzed in this paper contains houses that were sold between 1982
and 2006. If houses that were first sold before TRA97 are systematically different
from houses that were first sold after TRA97, the results shown in the previous section
may be driven by such compositional changes. To deal with this concern, I estimate
the model using houses that were sold at least once before TRA97. This procedure
makes sure that the pre-TRA97 and post-TRA97 observations in the sample are the
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same parcels. Column (3) of panel B in Table 1.7 presents the estimation results.
The estimated marginal effects are remarkably similar to the results obtained using
the original sample, suggesting that it is unlikely that systematic differences exist
between houses whose first observed sales occurred before TRA97 and those whose
first observed sale occurred after TRA97.
In estimating equation (1.4), I control for polynomials of real purchase prices, real
current prices, and time since purchase up to the fourth order. To allow for more
flexibility in these polynomial controls, I include polynomials up to the sixth order
as a robustness check. Column (4) of panel B in Table 1.7 displays the estimation
results of this more flexible specification. The estimated marginal effects of TRA97
are virtually identical to the results obtained when I control for polynomials only to
the fourth order, suggesting that fourth order polynomials provide ample flexibility
for these control variables to affect home sale rates in the main specification.
Dynamic Effect of TRA97
The effect of TRA97 on home sales during the years immediately following 1997 may
be different from the effect of TRA97 many years after the law change. In fact,
Biehl and Hoyt (2008) find intriguing evidence of the dissipating effect of TRA97.
Comparing mobility of homeowners over and under 55 before and after TRA97, they
show that TRA97 reversed the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes for homeowners
under age 55. However, they find that such an impact of TRA97 disappeared in a
few years after 1997, suggesting that the effect of TRA97 was temporary rather than
permanent. To investigate the short-term effect of TRA97, I estimate equation (??)
using only data within a narrow window of the law change.
In column (2) of Table 1.8, I limit the sample to 18 months before and 18 months
after TRA97.17 The estimated marginal effects suggest that home sale rates of parcels
17Note that the variable (TCG ≤ 0) ∗ TRA97 is dropped for collinearity reasons in this smaller
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with capital gains between $0 and $500,000 increased within 18 months of the law
change. The magnitudes of these effects are similar to the main findings shown in
column (1). Home sale rates of parcels with capital gains above $500,000 also appear
to increase, but the effects are not statistically significant. In column (3), I limit the
sample to 3 years before and 3 years after TRA97. For parcels with capital gains
between $0 and $500,000, the estimated marginal effects of TRA97 are very similar
to the results obtained using the 18-month window. However, the estimated effect
of TRA97 on parcels with capital gains over $500,000 becomes essentially zero when
using the 3-year window. In summary, it appears that the unlocking-effect of TRA97
on parcels with capital gains between $0 and $500,000 manifested shortly after the
law change. In contrast, the short-run effect of TRA97 on parcels with capital gains
over $500,000 seems to be insignificant.
To further investigate the long-term versus short-term effect of TRA97 on home
sales, I estimate the following model where the long-term effect of TRA97 is allowed
to be different from the short-term effect of TRA97.
Prob(Saleict) = Φ
(
α0 +
23∑
k=1
αk · 1(TCGict ∈ Ck) + βearly1 · 1(TCGict ≤ 0) · Earlyt
+βlater1 · 1(TCGict ≤ 0) · Latert + βearly2 · 1(0 < TCGict ≤ 125K) · Earlyt
+βlater2 · 1(0 < TCGict ≤ 125K) · Latert + βearly3 · 1(125K < TCGict ≤ 250K) · Earlyt
+βlater3 · 1(125K < TCGict ≤ 250K) · Latert + βearly4 · 1(250K < TCGict ≤ 500K) · Earlyt
+βlater4 · 1(250K < TCGict ≤ 500K) · Latert + βearly5 · 1(TCGict > 500K) · Earlyt
+βlater5 · 1(TCGict > 500K) · Latert + γ1hict + γ2log(lotsize)ict + δc + θt
+
4∑
j=1
ρ1j(RPPict)j
4∑
j=1
ρ2j(RCPict)j +
4∑
j=1
ρ3j(Tict)j
 (1.5)
where Earlyt is an indicator variable that equals one if t falls within an initial
period after TRA97, and Latert is an indicator variable that equals one if t falls
sample. Therefore, β1 cannot be estimated in practice.
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out of the initial period after TRA97. If TRA97 unlocked homeowners with capital
gains between $0 and $500,000 but the effect is transitory, then we would expect
(βearlyi , i = 2, 3, 4) to be positive and (β
later
i , i = 2, 3, 4) to be zero. Similarly, if
TRA97 unintentionally locked in homeowners with capital gains over $500,000 but
the effect is transitory, then we would expect βearly5 to be negative and β
later
5 to be
zero.
Column (4) and column (5) of Table 1.8 display the estimation results of equa-
tion (1.5) where the initial period is defined as 18 months and 3 years after TRA97,
respectively.18 The estimates presented in column (4) and column (5) show two inter-
esting patterns. First, the estimated coefficients (βˆearlyi , i = 2, 3, 4) are indeed positive
and statistically significant, whereas the estimated coefficients (βˆlateri , i = 2, 3, 4) are
much smaller in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This pat-
tern suggests that TRA97 raised selling probabilities among homeowners with capital
gains between $0 and $500,000 who were presumably locked in by capital gains taxes
prior to TRA97. Such an unlocking effect of TRA97, however, was achieved within a
short initial period after the passage of TRA97. After this initial period, there was no
evidence that home sale rates under the new tax regime were significantly higher com-
pared to the pre-TRA97 period. Second, the estimates of short-term effect of TRA97
on houses with capital gains above $500,000, βˆearly5 , are statistically insignificant. In
contrast, the estimates of the long-term effect, βˆlater5 , are negative, statistically sig-
nificant, and large in magnitude compared with βˆearly5 . This pattern suggests that
sale rates of houses with massive capital gains responded little to TRA97 right after
1997. In the long-run, however, TRA97 appeared to reduce sale rates of these houses
significantly. Such a delayed effect of TRA97 may be because homeowners were not
fully informed about the implications of TRA97 immediately after the law change.19
18Note that the variables 1(TCGict ≤ 0) · Earlyt and 1(TCGict ≤ 0) · Latert are dropped for
collinearity reasons. Therefore, βearly1 and β
later
1 cannot be estimated in practice.
19Anecdotal evidence suggests that, as of now, many homeowners still do not fully understand the
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In summary, the robustness checks shown in this section lend support to the
main findings that TRA97 increased home sale rates of parcels with capital gains
between $0 and $500,000 and reduced home sale rates of parcels with capital gains
over $500,000. When I allow the effect of TRA97 to vary over time, I find evidence
suggesting that the release effect of TRA97 on parcels with relatively low capital
gains was completed within a short period of time after the law change, suggesting
that this effect was transitory. For parcels with extraordinary capital gains, however,
the effect of TRA97 was initially insignificant but became stronger in later years,
suggesting that the unintended lock-in effect of TRA97 on houses with capital gains
over $500,000 could remain relevant in future years.
1.4.4 Estimate the Tax Elasticity of Home Sales
TRA97 lowered the top tax rate on long-term capital gains from 28% to 20%. In
2001, the top rate was further reduced to 18% for capital gains on assets held for five
years or longer. Since 2003, long-term capital gains have been taxed with a maximum
rate of 15%. In this section, I use the legislative changes in the top capital gains tax
rate during the post-TRA97 period to estimate the tax elasticity of home sales.20
To estimate ∂Prob(Salesict)
∂Taxict
, I need to impute Taxict for every homeowner in the
sample. Since I do not have homeowner characteristics and income data to infer
actual marginal tax rates, some assumption on homeowners’ marginal tax rates is
necessary to impute their housing capital gains tax liabilities. As shown in Table 1.1,
homeowners in the 16 cities and towns studied in this paper are mostly high-income
individuals, so it is reasonable to assume that they face the top capital gains tax rate.
This assumption allows me to calculate the amount of taxes that a homeowner would
$500,000 capital gains exclusion provision.
20Estimating the tax elasticity of home sales for the pre-TRA97 data is very difficult because
capital gains tax liabilities depended on age of the seller and value of the replacement home, neither
of which is observed in my data.
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owe if he were to sell his house within the next six months:
Taxict = Real(τt ·max(0, TCGict − 500, 000)),

τt = 0.20 for 1998 - 2000
τt = 0.18 for 2001 - 2002
τt = 0.15 for 2003 - 2006
where function Real(·) converts nominal dollar amounts into real 2000 dollar amounts.
Panel A in Table 1.9 displays the summary statistics of such imputed Taxict. Because
the first $500,000 capital gains can be excluded at the time of a sale and because
almost 80% of observations during the post-TRA97 period have capital gains below
$500,000, only 20% of observations have non-zero Taxict. The average capital gains
taxes are $8,205 for the full post-TRA97 sample and $39,936 for non-zero observations.
To estimate the elasticity of home sales with respect to capital gains taxes, I use
the Probit model
Prob(Saleict) = Φ
(
α0 +
23∑
k=1
αk · 1(TCGict ∈ Ck) + λTaxict + γ1hict
+γ2log(lotsize)ict + δc + θt +
4∑
j=1
ρ1j(RPPict)
j +
4∑
j=1
ρ2j(RCPict)
j
+
4∑
j=1
ρ3j(Tict)
j
)
(1.6)
where the key parameter to be estimated is λ. Panel B in Table 1.9 presents the
results from estimating equation (1.6). In column (1), I include all observations
in the sample and find the estimated coefficient on capital gains taxes, λˆ, negative
and statistically significant. The estimated marginal effect suggests that a $10,000
increase in capital gains tax liabilities reduces semiannual home sale rates by 0.16
percentage points, representing a 7% decline from the average semiannual sale rate
of 2.4 percentage points. Because legislative changes in top rate do not generate
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variations in tax liabilities if capital gains are below the exclusion level of $500,000,
it is useful to examine the tax elasticity among houses with strictly positive capital
gains taxes. Column (2) reports the estimation result when observations with zero
taxes are dropped. The estimated marginal effect becomes larger. The magnitude
suggests that a $10,000 increase in tax liabilities reduces semiannual sale rates by
0.25 percentage points, a 13% decrease from the average semiannual sale rate of these
houses.
The estimates of the reduced-form tax elasticity of home sale rates allow us to
do policy simulations and to infer the impact of hypothetical changes in housing
capital gains taxation on home sales. For example, according to the 2004 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), 3.26% of homeowners in the U.S. would be subject
to capital gains taxes if they were to sell their homes at the time of survey. Among
these homeowners, the median tax liability is approximately $30,000, assuming a 15%
capital gains tax rate. The estimate shown in column (2) of Table 1.9 suggests that if
we eliminate capital gains taxes on housing altogether, the semiannual home sale rate
would increase by 0.75 percentage points among the 3.26% homeowners who have
positive tax liabilities. Another interesting scenario is when the JGTRRA expires in
2011 and the top capital gains tax rate may increase from the current 15% to 20%.
Using the 2004 SCF statistics, this change in top tax rate would increase tax liabilities
by $10,000 for the median homeowner among the 3.26% homeowners who have capital
gains over $500,000. The estimate shown in column (2) of Table 1.9 suggests that
the semiannual home sale rate would decrease by 0.25 percentage points as a result
among these homeowners. In summary, even though we need to be cautious when
making out-of-sample predictions using the estimates shown this section, it is helpful
to have a tightly estimated elasticity of home sales with respect to housing capital
gains taxes for many back-of-envelope calculations.
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1.5 Conclusion
TRA97 introduced the largest change in decades to the tax treatment of housing cap-
ital gains in the United States. While researchers have started to use it as a policy
instrument to identify the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes in housing markets,
existing empirical studies have rarely looked beyond the age-55 rule due to data limi-
tations. In this paper, I collect data from various sources, including local assessment
records, zip-code level housing price indices, and sales data on single-family houses,
to construct a unique panel of houses where housing capital gains can be imputed
more accurately than possible in most survey datasets. Instead of relying on the
age-55 rule, I identify the tax lock-in effect by exploiting the cross-sectional variation
in accumulated capital gains and the exogenous change in exclusion levels brought
forward by TRA97. This paper is the first study, to my knowledge, to examine the
effect of TRA97 on houses with capital gains over $500,000. It is also the first to
estimate the tax elasticity of home sales using post-TRA97 data.
I find robust evidence suggesting that TRA97 reversed the lock-in effect of cap-
ital gains taxes for houses with capital gains between $0 and $500,000. After 1997,
the semiannual sale rate of these houses increased by 0.33-0.54 percentage points,
representing a 13-22 percent increase from the average semiannual sale rate during
the pre-TRA97 period. However, TRA97 appeared to have generated an unintended
lock-in effect on houses with capital gains above $500,000. The semiannual sale rate of
these houses declined by 0.79 percentage points after 1997, equivalent to a 24 percent
decrease from the average semiannual sale rate during the pre-TRA97 period. This
empirical finding suggests that although TRA97 raised home sale rates by allowing for
a large capital gains exclusion, it also reduced home sale rates of houses with massive
capital gains through the elimination of the roll-over rule. Overall, homeowners who
had accumulated more than $500,000 capital gains became less willing to sell their
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houses after TRA97. Furthermore, the unlocking effect of TRA97 on houses with
relatively low capital gains dissipated shortly after 1997, but the unintended lock-in
effect of TRA97 on houses with massive capital gains appears to be long-lasting. I
also estimated the tax elasticity of home sales during the post-TRA97 period, using
legislative changes in top capital gains tax rates. The estimation results suggest that
a $10,000 increase in tax liability reduces semiannual sale rates by 0.16-0.25 percent-
age points, a 7-13 percent decline from the average level. These estimates are useful
for simulations of hypothetical reforms such as eliminating taxes on housing capital
gains or increasing the top capital gains tax rate.
This paper brings new evidence to the literature on the lock-in effect of capital
gains taxation in housing markets. Nevertheless, the field calls for more research to
fully understand the welfare impact of TRA97. First, this paper does not take into
account any general equilibrium effect potentially generated by TRA97. By reducing
taxes on housing capital gains, TRA97 reduced the user cost in the housing mar-
ket, which could have increased housing investment at the expense of non-housing
investment. In addition, anecdotal evidence has suggested that TRA97 might be
responsible for the rapid growth of second home markets in recent years. Such in-
teresting and important topics await future research. Second, the dataset analyzed
in this paper is a panel of houses instead of a panel of households. Thus, I do not
observe where people moved to once they sold their houses. We need high quality
longitudinal data on households to quantify the distortion of capital gains taxation
in the pre-TRA97 tax regime and to understand the extent to which TRA97 reversed
the lock-in effect of housing capital gains.
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of the 16 MA Cities/Towns
Graduate or Median HH Ownership
City/Town Bachelor’s Professional Income 1999 Percentage
MA 19.5% 13.7% 50,502 62
Belmont 26.4% 36.7% 80,295 61
Brookline 31.7% 45.3% 66,711 45
Cambridge 26.7% 38.5% 47,979 32
Carlisle 44.3% 39.1% 129,811 94
Cohasset 40.0% 20.7% 84,156 85
Concord 31.4% 34.7% 95,897 81
Dover 43.5% 34.3% 141,818 95
Lexington 26.8% 42.2% 96,825 83
Lincoln 28.5% 40.7% 79,003 61
Needham 31.3% 33.5% 88,079 81
Newton 29.1% 38.9% 86,052 70
Sherborn 39.0% 36.7% 121,693 93
Sudbury 34.4% 37.5% 118,579 92
Wellesley 34.7% 41.2% 113,686 83
Weston 30.1% 45.0% 153,918 86
Winchester 32.2% 32.7% 94,049 81
Notes: Data are from MA Stata Data Center. Bachelor’s and Gradu-
ate or Professional refer to educational attainment for the population
25 years and older in 2000. Ownership Percentage is owner-occupied
housing units as a percentage of all occupied housing units in 2000.
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Table 1.2: Number of Single-Family Houses over Years
City/Town FY1992 FY2000 FY2007
Belmont 4,484 4,519 4,520
Brookline 4,320 4,410 4,534
Cambridge 3,434 3,550 3,732
Carlisle 1,364 1,533 1,627
Cohasset 2,080 2,165 2,243
Concord 4,427 4,626 4,640
Dover 1,572 1,712 1,741
Lexington 8,682 8,821 8,917
Lincoln 1,415 1,492 1,510
Needham 8,045 8,252 8,326
Newton 16,876 16,891 16,909
Sherborn 1,272 1,331 1,320
Sudbury 4,566 5,141 5,341
Wellesley 7,101 7,206 7,254
Weston 3,113 3,301 3,340
Winchester 5,308 5,467 5,581
Notes: Data are from MA Department of Revenue.
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Table 1.3: Percent of Single-Family Houses in the Sales Data
Total Number Number of Houses % of Houses
City/Town of Houses in Sales Data in Sample
Belmont 4,520 2,669 59
Brookline 4,534 2,813 62
Cambridge 3,710 2,256 61
Carlisle 1,561 1,034 66
Cohasset 2,243 1,381 62
Concord 4,445 2,756 62
Dover 1,740 1,221 70
Lexington 8,902 5,437 61
Lincoln 1,510 880 58
Needham 8,098 4,851 60
Newton 16,910 10,131 60
Sherborn 1,320 894 68
Sudbury 5,321 3,839 72
Wellesley 7,254 4,770 66
Weston 3,339 2,080 62
Winchester 5,580 3,357 60
Total 80,987 50,369 62
Notes: Data on total number of single-family houses are constructed
from local assessment records.
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Table 1.4: Sale Prices and Number of Sales by Year
Year Mean Median N
1982 137,084 123,500 1,405
1983 152,902 135,000 2,444
1984 186,019 164,900 2,405
1985 240,716 217,000 2,365
1986 308,295 272,000 2,345
1987 332,980 285,000 3,542
1988 361,837 300,000 3,160
1989 357,911 300,000 2,936
1990 342,556 287,500 2,612
1991 315,569 267,000 3,601
1992 322,201 275,000 3,955
1993 337,797 290,000 3,906
1994 359,474 311,250 3,960
1995 386,454 330,000 3,517
1996 407,836 348,000 3,845
1997 443,288 374,850 4,016
1998 487,614 410,000 4,246
1999 541,459 450,000 4,333
2000 659,927 532,125 3,848
2001 728,247 587,000 3,144
2002 747,042 615,000 3,650
2003 806,318 665,000 3,469
2004 893,483 720,500 3,990
2005 969,502 785,000 3,569
2006 969,513 781,000 2,621
Total 82,884
Notes: Sale prices are shown in nominal terms. The num-
ber of sales in 2006 is low because I drop Newton sales in
2006. The number of sales between 1982 and 1986 is low
because the 1982-1986 sales data may not be exhaustive.
See the Data section for details.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Pre-TRA97 Post-TRA97
(N=507,424) (N=654,474)
Mean SD Mean SD
Semiannual Sale Dummy 0.024 0.153 0.024 0.153
Taxable Capital Gains (TCG) 49,616 88,931 344,707 278,541
Real Purchase Price 346,159 201,876 366,904 241,624
Real Current Price 435,740 228,898 733,265 423,058
Real Housing Appreciation Rate 0.010 0.046 0.031 0.037
Log(lot size) 9.678 0.968 9.734 0.986
(TCG≤0) 0.313 0.464 0.001 0.036
(0<TCG≤125K) 0.525 0.499 0.192 0.394
(125K<TCG≤250K) 0.125 0.331 0.259 0.438
(250K<TCG≤500K) 0.035 0.184 0.342 0.474
(TCG>500K) 0.002 0.049 0.205 0.404
Notes: Taxable Capital Gains (TCG) are measured in nominal terms. Lot
size is measured in unit of square footage. Housing appreciation rates refer to
semiannual appreciation rates. Real dollars refer to 2000 dollars.
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Table 1.6: Effect of TRA97 on Home Sales - Main Results
(1) (2) (3)
(TCG≤0)*TRA97 1.20 0.53 0.60
(0.75) (0.62) (0.64)
(0<TCG≤25K)*TRA97 0.71*** 0.54*** 0.54***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
(125K<TCG≤250K)*TRA97 0.62*** 0.44** 0.45**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
(250K<TCG≤500K)*TRA97 0.39* 0.29 0.33
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
(TCG>500K)*TRA97 -0.83** -0.82** -0.79**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
Housing Appreciation Rate -1.89** -1.99**
(0.58) (0.64)
Log(lot size) -0.43*** -0.44***
(0.03) (0.03)
23 TCG Category Dummies Y Y Y
Real Purchase Price Polynomials N Y Y
Real Current Price Polynomials N Y Y
Time since Purchase Polynomials N Y Y
Year Dummies Y Y N
City Dummies N Y N
City*Year Dummies N N Y
N 1,161,442 1,161,442 1,152,127
Pseudo-R2 0.006 0.013 0.013
Notes: All columns are Probit regressions with outcome variable equal to
1 if the house was sold in the next half-year. Marginal effects are expressed
in percentage for ease of exposition. Polynomials are controlled to the 4th
order. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at house level.
* significant at 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at
0.001 level.
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Table 1.7: Effect of TRA97 on Home Sales - Robustness Checks
A. Measurement Errors in TCG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original Difference Difference Cut-off
Sample < 100% < 50% at 450K
(TCG≤0)*TRA97 0.53 0.39 0.25 0.53
(0.62) (0.62) (0.65) (0.62)
(0<TCG≤125K)*TRA97 0.54*** 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.54***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
(125K<TCG≤250K)*TRA97 0.44** 0.42** 0.36* 0.44**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15)
(250K<TCG≤500K)*TRA97 0.29 0.23 0.02 0.33
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)
(TCG>500K)*TRA97 -0.82** -0.79* -1.08** -0.64*
(0.29) (0.33) (0.35) (0.27)
N 1,161,442 1,105,591 972,902 1,161,442
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.013
B. Alternative Sample and Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original Drop House Sold 6th Order
Sample 1996 Before 1997 Polynomials
(TCG≤0)*TRA97 0.53 0.52 1.79 0.50
(0.62) (0.62) (1.10) (0.62)
(0<TCG≤125K)*TRA97 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.52***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
(125K<TCG≤250K)*TRA97 0.44** 0.45** 0.43** 0.44**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
(250K<TCG≤500K)*TRA97 0.29 0.47* 0.28 0.34
(0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
(TCG>500K)*TRA97 -0.82** -0.76* -0.77** -0.81**
(0.29) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29)
N 1,161,442 1,097,625 1,063,510 1,161,442
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013
Notes: All columns are Probit regressions with outcome variable equal to 1 if the house
was sold in the next half-year. Marginal effects are expressed in percentage for ease of
exposition. Other control variables are housing appreciation rate, log of lot size, 23 TCG
category dummies, purchase price polynomials, current price polynomials, time since
purchase polynomials, city dummies, and year dummies. Polynomials are controlled
to the 4th order unless indicated otherwise. Standard errors shown in parentheses are
clustered at house level. * significant at 0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, ***
significant at 0.001 level.
67
Table 1.8: Effect of TRA97 on Home Sales - Extensions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Original 18-Month 3-Year Early = Early =
Sample Window Window 18 Months 3 Years
(TCG≤0)*TRA97 0.53 - -
(0.62) - -
(0<TCG≤125K)*TRA97 0.54*** 0.66*** 0.59***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
(125K<TCG≤250K)*TRA97 0.44** 0.58* 0.41*
(0.15) (0.28) (0.20)
(250K<TCG≤500K)*TRA97 0.29 0.28 0.39
(0.19) (0.38) (0.28)
(TCG>500K)*TRA97 -0.82** 0.50 -0.01
(0.29) (1.02) (0.61)
(0<TCG≤125K)*Early 0.52*** 0.51***
(0.14) (0.14)
(0<TCG≤125K)*Later 0.03 0.11
(0.52) (0.53)
(125K<TCG≤250K)*Early 0.37* 0.47**
(0.18) (0.16)
(125K<TCG≤250K)*Later -0.08 -0.11
(0.50) (0.50)
(250K<TCG≤500K)*Early 0.66* 0.54*
(0.28) (0.22)
(250K<TCG≤500K)*Later -0.25 -0.34
(0.50) (0.48)
(TCG>500K)*Early 0.13 -0.36
(0.55) (0.35)
(TCG>500K)*Later -1.21** -1.30***
(0.41) (0.39)
N 1,161,442 181,704 1,161,442 421,457 1,161,442
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.013
Notes: All columns are Probit regressions with outcome variable equal to 1 if the house
was sold in the next half-year. Marginal effects are expressed in percentage for ease of
exposition. Other control variables are housing appreciation rate, log of lot size, 23 TCG
category dummies, purchase price polynomials, current price polynomials, time since pur-
chase polynomials, city dummies, and year dummies. Polynomials are controlled to the 4th
order. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at house level. * significant at
0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level.
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Table 1.9: Estimate the Tax Elasticity of Home Sales using Post-TRA97 Data
A. Summary Statistics
N Mean($) Median($) SD($)
Taxes (including zeros) 654,474 8,205 0 24,914
Taxes (excluding zeros) 134,463 39,936 26,224 41,881
B. Estimation Results
(1) (2)
All Obs Drop Zeros
Capital Gains Taxes (in $10,000s) -0.155* -0.254**
(0.073) (0.091)
N 654,474 134,463
Pseudo-R2 0.011 0.008
Notes: All columns in Panel B are Probit regressions with outcome variable
equal to 1 if the house was sold in the next half-year. Marginal effects are
expressed in percentage for ease of exposition. Other control variables are hous-
ing appreciation rate, log of lot size, 23 TCG category dummies, purchase price
polynomials, current price polynomials, time since purchase polynomials, city
dummies, and year dummies. Polynomials are controlled to the 4th order. Stan-
dard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at house level. * significant at
0.05 level, ** significant at 0.01 level, *** significant at 0.001 level.
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Chapter 2
Property Taxes and Elderly
Mobility1
2.1 Introduction
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the housing market in the United States
experienced a remarkable boom. As housing prices increased, property taxes rose
significantly in many parts of the country. Increases in property taxes have drawn
attention from both the general public and policy makers. The public and politicians
are particularly concerned that elderly homeowners who live on fixed incomes will be
driven out of their homes because they can no longer afford increasing property taxes.
In response, many states are looking for new ways of providing property tax relief
to elderly homeowners. Although policy makers have assumed that rising property
taxes cause elderly homeowners to move, researchers have provided little empirical
evidence of such a link.
Apart from its policy implications, studying property taxes’ effect on elderly mo-
bility is also of great economic importance. The simplest version of the life-cycle
1I thank David Baer for his assistance with property tax relief program data.
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model, which assumes away capital market imperfection, transaction costs, bequest
motives, and uncertainty, predicts that utility-maximizing agents accumulate wealth
while working and deplete wealth after retirement. If elderly homeowners view their
housing wealth as a part of retirement savings to be used for general consumption,
then we would expect elderly homeowners to trade down and consume their housing
wealth after retirement. However, studies including Feinstein and McFadden (1989)
and Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 2001) find little evidence of downsizing behavior
among elderly homeowners in the absence of precipitating shocks such as health de-
cline and loss of spouse. Because residential mobility is directly linked to housing
adjustment and downsizing decisions, studying how factors such as property taxes af-
fect elderly mobility may help us build richer models to describe household life-cycle
saving and consumption patterns.
Despite its policy and economic significance, the question whether property taxes
have caused elderly homeowners to move is difficult to address empirically for two
reasons. First, reliable household-level measures of property tax payments and mobil-
ity outcomes are scarce. Hence, many earlier studies use aggregated measures such as
property tax per capita and state to state or county to county migration flows. These
studies include Cebula (1974), Clark and Hunter (1992), Dresher (1994), Conway and
Houtenville(2001), and Duncombe et al (2003). Second, property taxes are likely to
be endogenous to individuals’ moving decisions. For example, elderly homeowners
who value local public services (e.g. nice parks, low crime rates, and new senior cen-
ters) are likely to live in areas with high property taxes that provide superior services.
Such tastes for local public services are also likely to correlate with mobility outcomes.
Because individual taste is not observable to econometricians, studies such as Seslen
(2005) that fail to instrument for property taxes suffer from omitted variable bias.
In this paper, I use the 1992 to 2004 waves of the Health and Retirement Sur-
vey (HRS) panel data. This dataset has household-level measures of property tax
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payments and mobility outcomes in addition to extensive information on demograph-
ics and socio-economic characteristics. I use two empirical strategies to identify the
causal effect of property taxes on elderly mobility. First, I exploit the variation
in state-provided property tax relief programs and use simulated relief benefits to
instrument for property tax payments. Such simulated relief benefits contain only
the variation in program rules and depend exclusively on state, year, and age of
homeowners. More generous relief programs reduce property tax payments of eligible
homeowners, and these state-provided programs are arguably exogenous to individual
homeowners’ unobserved tendency to move. Therefore, simulated relief benefits serve
as a valid instrument for property taxes in studying elderly mobility.
Second, I use the variation in effective property tax rates and housing value ap-
preciation rates to study whether higher property taxes cause elderly homeowners to
move. The thought experiment is to compare two observably identical homeowners,
one living in a place with a high effective property tax rate and the other living in a
place with a low effective property tax rate. When housing values in both places go
up, the person who lives in the area with a high effective tax rate will experience a
larger increase in property taxes. Thus, he would be more likely to move if property
taxes affect homeowners’ mobility. The key identification assumption here is that in
the absence of a property tax effect, mobility in areas with high effective tax rates
responds to rising property values the same way as mobility in areas with low effective
tax rates, after controlling for observable characteristics. For example, if increases in
housing wealth affect mobility, this identification strategy assumes that such a wealth
effect is symmetric for homeowners in both areas with high effective tax rates and
areas with low effective tax rates.
I find that higher property taxes have a significant impact on elderly homeowners’
moving decisions. My central instrumental variable estimates suggest that a $100
increase in annual property taxes causes the two-year mobility rate to increase by 0.76
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percentage points, which represents an eight percent increase from a baseline two-year
mobility rate of nine percent. The result is robust to various model specifications.
Individuals living in areas where the effective property tax rate is high and housing
values have been appreciating rapidly are the most affected. Moreover, I present
suggestive evidence that liquidity constraints may play a role in the effect of property
taxes on elderly mobility.
I also find that state-provided property tax relief programs reduce eligible home-
owners’ moving probability. Programs that cap annual property tax payments seem
to have the most pronounced effect on elderly mobility. Eligible relief benefits from
homestead exemptions, homestead credits, and circuit-breakers programs needs to
reach certain threshold to generate any impact on elderly mobility. Programs that
are implemented by state personal income tax credits do not appear to reduce mo-
bility. These findings may be useful to policy-makers in designing cost-effective and
efficient relief mechanisms. This paper’s findings also provide indispensable evidence
for normative welfare analysis of the impact of property taxes and property tax relief
programs on elderly homeowners.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the background and
reviews previous research on property taxes and elderly mobility. Section 3 then
describes the data used in this paper. In section 4, I explain the empirical strategies
that I use to identify the effect of property taxes on elderly mobility. I also show
estimation results using these strategies. In section 5, I evaluate various property tax
relief programs from the policy perspective. The last section concludes and provides
directions for future research.
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2.2 Background and Previous Research
In 2004, property tax collections in the U.S. exceeded $300 billion. Property taxes
are responsible for approximately 72% of all local tax revenues, representing the most
important tax revenue source for local governments.2 The housing market boom of
the late 1990s and early 2000s led to significant increases in residential property taxes.
Figure 2-1 shows that from 2000 to 2005, median house value rose by 47% in real
terms and median property tax payments by homeowners increased by 30%.3
Rising property taxes may be particularly burdensome to elderly homeowners.
Following notations in Poterba (1992), the user cost faced by a homeowner under the
current U.S. tax system can be written as
uc =

(1− τinc)[τp + αi+ (1− α)r] +m+ δ − piH for itemizers
τp + αi+ (1− τinc)(1− α)r +m+ δ − piH for non-itemizers
where τinc is the homeowner’s marginal income tax rate, τp is the effective property
tax rate, α is the loan to value ratio on the house, i is the mortgage interest rate, r is
the interest rate on alternative investment opportunities, m is the maintenance cost
rate, δ is the true economic depreciation rate, and piH is the housing value appreciation
rate. One measure of property tax burden on homeowners is the ratio of property
tax rates to user costs. For itemizers and non-itemizers, the ratios are
burden =

(1− τinc)τp
(1− τinc)[τp + αi+ (1− α)r] +m+ δ − piH for itemizers
τp
τp + αi+ (1− τinc)(1− α)r +m+ δ − piH for non-itemizers
2See Bradley (2005) and NCSL (2005).
3A number of factors could have contributed to the increase in residential property tax payments,
including unfunded federal mandates, reduction in state aid to local governments, changes in the cost
of providing local public services, and relative appreciation rates of residential versus non-residential
properties. Although interesting in its own right, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine
which factors explain the property tax increases the most.
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Figure 2-1: Median Property Tax and House Value
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According to the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, the median homeowner of age
65 or above is a non-itemizer who faces a marginal tax rate of 15% and who has
paid off his mortgages. In contrast, the median homeowner of age below 65 is an
itemizer with a marginal tax rate of 25% and a loan to value ratio of 0.5. Assuming
that τp = 0.01, i = 0.08, r = 0.05, m = 0.02, δ = 0.02, and pi
H = 0.03, we have
burdennonelderly = 0.12 and burdenelderly = 0.19. If we assume elderly homeowners
spend less on home maintenance than non-elderly homeowners as suggested by David-
off (2007), the property tax burden on elderly homeowners would appear even higher
than that on non-elderly homeowners.
State and local governments may be concerned that elderly homeowners in the
face of rising property tax burdens decide to relocate to areas with low property taxes.
Given that around half of property tax revenues are used to finance public schools and
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that elderly homeowners usually do not consume school services, elderly homeowners
may find that the local public services that they receive are not worth their costs. In
response, they decide to readjust their demand for housing consumption bundles and
relocate to areas with both fewer public services and lower property taxes. Precisely
because elderly homeowners in general consume fewer public services but expand the
state and local tax base, they are attractive to state and local governments except
when they reach the end of their lives and demand expensive medical care services
through Medicaid. They are even called “pure gold” in Longino and Crown (1989).
As discussed in Mackey and Carter (1994), many states in the U.S. provide a wide
range of tax preferences to entice elderly migrants.
Alternatively, increasing property taxes may raise mobility rates among elderly
homeowners through liquidity constraints. Because the elderly typically rely on fixed
incomes such as Social Security benefits and pension benefits, and because many
of them do not have many liquid assets, rising property taxes may cause elderly
homeowners to be liquidity-constrained. Even if an elderly homeowner has great
psychological attachment to his house and prefers not to move as long as he can
afford it, significant increases in property taxes may eventually cause the homeowner
to liquidate his housing wealth. This liquidity constraint mechanism and the demand
readjustment mechanism mentioned earlier have very different welfare implications
as to whether property tax relief programs should be provided by state and local
governments.
A few papers investigate property taxes and elderly mobility using household-level
data. The studies closest to this paper are Farnham and Sevak (2006) and Seslen
(2005). The former study is a test of a life-cycle Tiebout model using the 1992-2000
HRS data and local fiscal data. It finds that cross-state, empty-nest movers experi-
ence reduced exposure to local school spending and property taxes. Although their
study examines both property taxes and elderly mobility, Farnham and Sevak (2006)
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addresses the question from a different angle than the current study. Their study
focuses on testing whether property tax payments decline after an elderly homeowner
makes a move, whereas my study asks whether rising property taxes induce elderly
homeowners to move. Moreover, their paper presents a correlation study, while my
paper tackles the causality question using instrumental variable strategies.
Seslen (2005) examines the effect of property taxes on elderly homeowners’ down-
sizing decisions in a competing risk framework. Using the Retirement History Survey
from 1969 to 1979, she finds little evidence that property taxes affect elderly home-
owners’ decisions to move and to liquidate their housing wealth. Thus, she concludes
that property tax relief programs are likely to solely transfer resources to the wealthy
without achieving the goal of protecting the needy. Although Seslen (2005) employs
sophisticated econometric tools, the data she studies were collected about 30 years
ago, and they may not bear on the current situation. She uses self-reported property
tax payments as the key explanatory variable, but she ignores the potential endo-
geneity problem where some unobserved factor drives both property tax payments
and mobility decisions. Finally, Seslen (2005) has neither geographic information nor
relief program details, so she cannot evaluate the impact of these state-provided relief
programs.
My paper advances the prior literature in several ways. First, I use the HRS
data, a nationally representative panel of elderly households that contains rich infor-
mation on individual and household characteristics, including actual annual property
tax payments. The panel structure also provides an opportunity for me to look at
the dynamic relationship between the last period’s property tax payments and the
next period’s mobility outcomes, which is impossible to do with cross-sectional data.
Second, during my sample period, the United States experienced significant increases
in property taxes. The recent trend of rising property taxes provides a good oppor-
tunity to study the effect of property taxes on elderly homeowners’ moving decisions.
78
Third, I obtained access to the HRS restricted geographic identifiers and collected
data on state-provided property tax relief programs for the past 15 years. With these
data, I am able to calculate the amount of eligible property tax relief benefits for
each household in each survey year. Lastly, I address the potential endogeneity prob-
lem using instrumental variable approaches. To my knowledge, this is the first study
to examine the causal effect of property taxes on elderly mobility and to measure
property tax relief benefits at the household level. The innovations in both data and
estimation methodology allow this paper to present more compelling evidence than
currently exists on the effect of property taxes on elderly mobility.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 HRS Household Level Panel Data
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is biannual panel data of the elderly and
near-elderly in the United States. At present, seven waves of the survey (1992-2004)
have been released to researchers. HRS includes households from four different co-
horts.4 The original HRS cohort consists of individuals born between 1931 and 1941.
They appear in all seven waves of my sample. The AHEAD cohort (born before 1924)
was interviewed in 1993 first and then in 1995. Since 1998, the AHEAD cohort has
been interviewed concurrently with the HRS cohort biannually. In 1998, two other
cohorts were added to the sample: the “Children of the Depression” (CODA) cohort
(born between 1924 and 1930), and the “War Baby” (WB) cohort (born between 1942
and 1947). Hence, these two cohorts appear only in the last four waves (1998-2004)
in my sample.
4In 2004, a fifth cohort, Early Boomers (born between 1948 and 1953), was added to HRS.
Because households in this cohort have only been interviewed once and I need at least two adjacent
surveys to study whether the last period’s property taxes affect mobility in the next period, I exclude
them from my analysis.
79
In addition to the publicly available HRS data, I obtained restricted access to
household level geographic identifiers. These identifiers allow me to identify the state
of residence for each household at each survey interview time. The state identifier is
crucial in my analysis because it links households with the state-provided property tax
relief programs for which they are eligible. Because of the ambiguity associated with
mobility for people living in mobile homes, I exclude them from my analysis. Because
farms and ranches may be treated as agricultural rather than residential properties
for property tax purposes, I also exclude people living on farms or ranches from my
sample. Households residing in mobile homes or on farms and ranches combined
constitute around 10 percent of the entire HRS sample. I also dropped individuals
who are newly separated or divorced because mobility becomes complicated for these
individuals. Newly separated or divorced homeowners represent less than 1 percent
of the sample.
Except for the very first survey conducted on each household, every subsequent
survey asks respondents whether they have moved since their last survey interview. I
use respondents’ answers as my mobility measure. I contacted HRS staff to confirm
that this mobility measure is a valid and consistent measure across waves. Panel
A of Table 2.1 displays the two-year mobility rates of the HRS cohort households
from 1992 to 2004. In earlier years when those respondents were relatively young,
their two-year moving probability was around 7%. Toward the end of the panel, the
probability increases to 12%. In contrast, the average one-year mobility rate among
homeowners of age below 65 is about 10% during the 1990s and early 2000s.5 Panel
B of Table 2.1 shows that homeownership rates of HRS cohort households stay steady
at around 80% during the 12-year sample period. Panel C of Table 2.1 presents a
tenure transition matrix for all moves made by HRS cohort households between 1992
and 2004. Over 80% of homeowners remain homeowners after they relocate, and
5Author’s calculation using the PSID data.
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70% of renters stay renters after they move. In summary, Table 2.1 shows evidence
consistent with the conclusion drawn by Venti and Wise (2001) that mobility rates
among elderly homeowners are very low, and that elderly homeowners do not seem to
trade down and consume their housing wealth in the absence of precipitating shocks.
In all seven waves, respondents were requested to report the amount of property
taxes paid on their primary residence during the past year. I assume the self-reported
property tax payments are the actual payments after all relevant exemptions, rebates
or refunds provided by relief programs have been applied. Such an assumption is cru-
cial for the first-stage regression in my IV strategy. For programs where participation
is automatic and property tax bills are mailed to homeowners after benefits have been
netted out, this assumption seems justified. For programs where homeowners receive
rebate checks soon after paying property taxes, it is unclear whether respondents re-
port their before-relief property tax payments or after-relief property tax payments.
For programs that are implemented by state personal income tax credits, respondents
are likely to report their before-relief benefits for two reasons. First, relief benefits are
usually received long after homeowners have paid their property taxes. Second, prop-
erty tax relief benefits may appear less salient on state personal income tax returns.
For example, filers may view property tax credits that they claim against income tax
liabilities as income tax relief benefits rather than property tax relief benefits. Recent
studies including Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007) and Finkelstein (2007) suggest
that tax salience could have a significant impact on behavior. Regression analysis
shown later in this paper confirms that respondents in states that use income tax
credits to grant property tax relief benefits do not report lower property tax pay-
ments when they are eligible for more generous relief benefits. Therefore, I exclude in
my main regression analysis states where relief benefits are granted by tax credits on
state personal income tax returns.6 The dropped observations represent about 25%
6These states are District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
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of the sample.
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of demographic and socio-economic
variables. Note that only about 17% of moves in the sample are cross-state moves,
which implies a 3.8% five-year cross-state mobility rate (i.e. 9× 0.17× (5/2) = 3.8).
This rate is very similar to what other studies on elderly migration find.7 Given
that the majority of moves are within-state relocations, results produced by studies
focusing on cross-state mobilities could be misleading.
2.3.2 Data on Property Tax Relief Programs
Background on Property Tax Relief Programs
As of 2005, all 50 states and District of Columbia have some form of property tax
relief programs for homeowners, especially for low-income and elderly homeowners.
Many of these programs were first established well before my sample period started.8
Broadly speaking, there are four categories of relief programs. The first includes
Homestead Exemptions and Credits. This is the most widely used form of property
tax relief. Homestead exemption programs usually reduce assessed property value by
a certain amount.9 Homestead credit programs either refund a certain percentage
of taxes due or provide a fixed credit to qualifying homeowners.10 These homestead
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. I do not exclude states
that use rebate checks to implement relief programs because the sample size would drop significantly
and asymptotic theory no longer applies when there are only a few states left in the sample and
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
7Woo (2005) states that the five-year cross-state mobility rate among elderly homeowners is 4.2%
in the Census data and 4.0% in the Current Population Survey data.
8Homestead exemptions are believed to be a by-product of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Circuit-breakers were first legislated in the 1960s and 1970s. Limits were put in place in the late
1970s and early 1980s when high inflation rates caused property tax bills to spiral out of control and
eventually resulted in property tax revolts.
9For example, a homeowner of age 65 or above in Kentucky was allowed to exclude $29,400 from
the assessed value of his main residence for property tax purposes in 2005.
10For example, Massachusetts state statue Clause 17D and 41C grant a $175 homestead credit and
a $500 homestead credit respectively to homeowners of age 70 or above who satisfy certain income,
assets, and residence requirements.
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exemption and credit programs usually require homeowners to file an application to
local property tax authorities.
The second category is Circuit-Breakers. Some of these programs are for home-
owners only, and others are for homeowners as well as renters. Since these programs
are designed to help people who need assistance, benefits are typically a decreasing
function of income. Circuit-breaker programs can work either on a sliding scale or
through a threshold mechanism. For example, District of Columbia has a circuit-
breaker program where homeowners whose income is $20,000 or less can receive up
to a $750 tax credit using a threshold mechanism. In 2007, Idaho’s circuit-breaker
program refunded up to $1320 for homeowners of age 65 or above with income below
$28,000 using a sliding scale mechanism.11
The third category is Property Tax Deferral Programs. These programs allow
qualified homeowners, typically low-income elderly homeowners, to defer property
tax payments at a low interest rate. Effectively, they become a lien against the
taxpayer’s house. When the homeowner sells the house or dies, deferred taxes must
be paid when the estate is settled. Deferral programs are considered by academics the
most targeted and cost-effective way of providing property tax relief. Nevertheless,
very few qualified homeowners take up such programs in practice. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that elderly homeowners are reluctant to put a lien on their houses. This
is consistent with the observation that very few elderly homeowners purchase reverse
mortgages in the United States.
The last broad category is Property Tax Limits. Property tax limits include rate
limits, assessment limits, revenue rollbacks, expenditure limits, and property tax
freezes. Depending on the state, any one or a combination of the above limits can be
11The key difference between homestead credit programs and circuit-breakers is that although
homestead credit programs may use income as a qualification criterion, their benefit levels do not
vary with income. On the other hand, benefits are explicitly a decreasing function of income for
circuit-breakers. For this reason, circuit-breakers are considered better targeted at low and moderate-
income individuals.
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used. Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2.5 in Massachusetts are among
the most prominent examples of property tax limits. Although almost all states
have property tax limits of one kind or another, many of these programs do not
guarantee that individual homeowners’ property tax bills will not go up significantly
from year to year. Because property taxes are the product of taxable values and tax
rates, the amount of property taxes homeowners pay will be limited only when both
assessment values and tax rates are limited. Rate limits or assessment limits alone
are insufficient in curbing property tax growths. Moreover, states usually allow for
override and bonded indebtedness so that local governments can still increase property
taxes. For example, if non-elderly homeowners want to spend more on schools, they
may approve an override, in which event the elderly will face rising property taxes.
However, two kinds of limits apply to individual homeowners: “assessment value
freezes” and “property tax freezes.”12
Participation rates of property tax relief programs vary across states and pro-
grams. In mid-1990s, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) obtained
numbers of program participants from various state administering offices and esti-
mated participation rates for these programs.13 The median estimated participation
rate among the eligible is the highest for homestead exemptions - around 90%. In
contrast, the median estimated participation rate is only about 40% for homestead
credits and circuit-breakers and less than 1% for deferral programs. It is puzzling
why participation rates for homestead credits and circuit-breakers are so low among
elderly households. Some have suggested that social stigma and program complexity
may play a role.14
12For example, in Illinois, homeowners of age 65 and older with income less than $40,000 may
receive a freeze on their equalized assessed real property value. In Texas, school property taxes do
not increase once a homeowner reaches age 65. The former is classified as an assessment value freeze
and the latter is classified as a property tax freeze.
13See Baer (1998).
14See ACIR (1975).
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Since state-provided property tax relief programs are extremely complicated and
vary tremendously across states, I focus on three types of relief programs in this pa-
per.15 The first type includes homestead exemptions, homestead credits, and circuit-
breakers. Relief benefits from these programs can be quantified for individual home-
owners. The second and the third types refer to assessment value freezes and property
tax freezes, respectively. For these two types, it is difficult to quantify their bene-
fits for individual homeowners. Hence, I use dummy variables to indicate whether a
homeowner is eligible for “assessment value freezes” or “property tax freezes.”
Data Collection on Property Tax Relief Programs
First, I collected descriptive information from a range of publications by the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the American Associ-
ation of Retired Persons (AARP) and the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) from 1990 to 2005. Then I compiled and organized such information by state
and year. In my effort to confirm changes in these state programs over years and to
resolve inconsistencies reported in various ACIR, AARP, and NCSL publications, I
read state statutes that define these programs in legal terms. I searched for historical
local news on property tax relief program changes. I studied program application
forms, homeowners’ brochures, and Q&As on state and/or local government web-
sites. I contacted Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming state and/or local governments for
further explanation and confirmation of program details.
After obtaining accurate program descriptions, I calculated eligible benefits as a
15I do not consider programs that provide exactly the same amount of benefits to everyone because
of the lack of within-state variation. Deferral programs are ignored because participation rates
are too low. Limits that affect a jurisdiction but not necessarily individual homeowners are not
considered. I also exclude local option programs that vary significantly across localities due to data
collection difficulties.
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function of state of residence, year, age, income, house value, Social Security income,
marital status, household size, and wealth. This calculation generates three output
variables: the amount of benefits from homestead exemption, homestead credit, and
circuit-breaker programs that a homeowner is eligible for, whether eligible for an
“assessment value freeze” program, and whether eligible for an “property tax freeze”
program. Such output parameters can be calculated for any homeowner in the U.S.
in any year between 1990 and 2004.
Table 2.3 shows year 2000 formulas used in calculating property tax relief benefits
for the ten states with the most observations in my sample. The amount of eligible
benefits are calculated for a hypothetical married homeowner of age 65 with an annual
total household income of $20,000, Social Security income of $10,000, and house value
of $100,000. The amount of eligible benefits for this hypothetical homeowner varies
from zero in Pennsylvania to $1,000 in New Jersey. The formulas shown in Table 2.3
suggest that eligible benefits vary considerably across states, and they are sensitive
to individual characteristics such as income and house value.
The first two columns in Table 2.4 show the percentage of homeowners eligible for
relief benefits and the average benefits conditional on eligibility by age groups, income
quintiles, and house value quintiles. A number of interesting patterns emerge. The
percentage of homeowners eligible for relief benefits increases monotonically in age
and decreases monotonically in income and housing value. Conditional on eligibility,
average benefits decrease in income. Given that property taxes relief programs target
low-income and elderly homeowners, such patterns are expected. The conditional
average benefits increases monotonically in housing value. This pattern is likely due
to the threshold design of circuit-breakers. For example, if a circuit-breaker refunds
property taxes exceeding 3% of a homeowner’s income, then homeowners living in
more expensive houses would receive higher refunds ceteris paribus. The conditional
average benefits do not appear to change monotonically in age. This pattern is likely
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Figure 2-2: Conditional Average Benefits by State
Benefits based on Simulations
Benefits Imputed using Individual Characteristics
0 - 100
101 - 200
201 - 300
301 - 500
501 - 1046
Note: States shown with stripes means that either no households in my
sample comes from these states or the total number of households from
that state in my sample is below 10. Since state identifiers are data with
restricted access, I cannot show them for confidentiality reasons.
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caused by complicated correlations between age and household characteristics. For
example, the younger elderly homeowners tend to have higher income, which leads
to lower relief benefits. The younger elderly homeowners also tend to live in more
expensive houses, which leads to higher relief benefits.
The first part of Figure 2-2 plots conditional average benefits by state. South
Dakota and Utah are missing from the map because no homeowners in the sample
are from these two states. Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana, and Vermont each
have fewer than 10 households in the sample. Because access to state identifiers is
restricted, I cannot show them on this map for confidentiality reasons. This map also
shows that District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Washington
and Wisconsin have the highest average conditional benefits.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, I present the empirical models and estimation results in studying the
effect of property taxes on elderly mobility. Specifically, I first use property tax relief
benefits as instruments to identify the impact of property taxes on elderly mobility.
Then I use variations in housing value appreciation rates across geographic areas and
years to identify such impact. I also explore whether liquidity constraints play a role
in property taxes’ effect on elderly homeowners’ moving decisions.
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2.4.1 Using Relief Benefits as Instruments
Probit and IV Probit Estimation
To investigate whether property taxes have an impact on elderly mobility, I start with
the following probit model:16
Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(β1Taxist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt) (2.1)
whereMoveist is a binary indicator for whether household i in state s moved between
time t and t + 1, ζs denotes state fixed effects, δt denotes year fixed effects, and the
covariate vector Xist includes income quintile indicators, house value quintile indi-
cators, financial wealth quintile indicators, gender, race, household size, number of
living children, whether married, whether newly widowed, education categories (i.e.
less than high school, high school graduates, some college, and college graduates),
whether currently working, whether newly retired, whether spouse is currently work-
ing, whether spouse is newly retired, whether hospitalized between the last interview
and the current interview,17 age dummies, and spouse age dummies. The key variable
of interest in equation (2.1) is Taxist, property tax payments by household i in state s
at time t. If higher property taxes cause elderly homeowners to move, then we expect
β1 to be positive.
The first column in Table 2.5 displays estimation results of equation (2.1). To
make the results interpretable, I show marginal effects of independent variables by
calculating the marginal effect for each household and then averaging them across
all households. To be consistent with results presented later in this section, standard
16I use a probit model here because the mean of the dependent variable is far from 0.5. A linear
probability model (LPM) may be biased when the dependent variable is close to zero or one, and
will produce predictions beyond the range of zero to one. Results shown later suggest that both
probit and LPM generate similar estimation results.
17For the first wave in 1992, HRS asked whether the individual was hospitalized in the past year.
From the second wave on, HRS asked whether the individual was hospitalized since the last interview.
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errors shown in parenthesis are bootstrapped by 500 random draws with replacement.
I implement a block-bootstrap scheme to make certain that observations are clustered
at state level in estimating standard errors.18
The estimated effect of property taxes is positive but insignificant both statis-
tically and economically. The magnitude suggests that a $100 increase in property
taxes is associated with a mere 0.0065 percentage points increase in two-year mobility
rates. It is unsurprising that the probit estimate of β1 is small and insignificant since
property taxes are likely to be endogenous to elderly homeowners’ moving decisions.
For instance, if there exists heterogeneity among elderly homeowners in their tastes
for local public services, then homeowners who desire good local public services may
choose to stay in areas that provide excellent local public services. Since such ser-
vices are financed partially by property taxes, homeowners in these areas also pay
high property taxes. Therefore, the unobserved tastes for local public services are
correlated with both property tax payments and mobility outcomes, which causes the
probit estimate of β1 to be biased. An appropriate instrumental variable strategy has
to be used to circumvent such an endogeneity problem and to generate an consistent
estimate of β1.
Since eligibility for higher relief benefits means lower property tax payments, one
potential candidate as an instrument for property taxes is eligible benefits for property
18Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) point out that estimated standard errors would be too
small without recognizing such correlations in regression analysis. Such underestimated standard
errors often lead to incorrect rejections of the null hypothesis. Two sources of correlation exist in
the data studied in this paper: the correlation between observations of the same household over
time and the correlation between different households in the same state. Because some households
move across state borders, clustering at the state level alone may not produce consistent estimates of
standard errors. Without imposing an arbitrary and restrictive structure on the variance-covariance
matrix of the error term, I experimented with a multi-way clustering method suggested by Colin,
Gelbach and Miller (2006). In practice, the standard errors estimated using multi-way clustering
turn out to be almost identical to the standard errors estimated by clustering only at the state level.
Given that implementing the multi-way clustering method in a bootstrapping framework is very
computationally demanding and that the multi-way clustering method does not seem to produce
any noticeable differences, I cluster standard errors only at the state level in all results presented in
this paper.
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tax relief programs. Recall that my property tax relief program Benefit Calculator
imputes Benefitist (i.e. the amount of eligible benefits from homestead exemptions,
homestead credits, and circuit-breakers) for each household in each survey year.
Benefitist, however, is a nonlinear function of state, age, year, household income,
house value, marital status, Social Security benefits, pension benefits, household size,
and total assets. To the extent that any of these factors influences elderly homeown-
ers’ moving decisions through channels other than property taxes, Benefitist would
correlate with both property taxes and unobserved moving tendencies, and hence,
would violate the exclusion restriction. For example, homeowners who receive high
Social Security benefits and pension benefits may have strong ties with local labor
markets, which reduces their moving probabilities. In other words, Benefitist has two
sources of variation: the variation caused by relief program rules and the variation
stemming from individual characteristics. The latter source of variation may be en-
dogenous and cause probit estimates to be biased. To deal with such an endogeneity
problem, I use a simulated IV approach.19
To simulate program generosity in state s in year t for homeowners of age a, I
take the national sample of homeowners of age a who responded to HRS in year t and
run them through state s’s relief programs. The weighted average eligible benefits for
these homeowners becomes the simulated measure of program generosity for state s
in year t for homeowners of age a. Essentially, I measure state program generosity
using a national representative sample that does not correlate with any individual
homeowner’s characteristics, but only with the exogenous variation in state, age, and
19The idea of simulated IV can be dated back to Hausman and Wise (1976), Rosen (1976), and
Hausman (1981) in labor supply studies. Currie and Gruber (1996a, b) and Cutler and Gruber
(1996) build on this idea and name it the “simulated IV approach”. Since then, this empirical
strategy has become increasingly popular among empirical studies. Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004)
and Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) are recent applications of the simulated IV approach.
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year. Mathematically, B˜enefitist is constructed as follows:
B˜enefitist =
∑
k 6=i
Bst(Wkt, Zkt)1(Zkt = Zit)∑
k 6=i
1(Zkt = Zit)
(2.2)
where Zkt is the age of individual k at time t. Wkt consists of relief program eligibility
determinants, some of which may be endogenous. Bst(·) is the benefit formula specific
to state s at time t. 1(·) is a binary function that returns one if the statement in
the parentheses is true and zero otherwise. The above equation essentially takes
everyone who shares the same age as individual i at time t, calculates their eligible
benefits assuming that they all live in the state where individual i lives, and averages
eligible benefits across all these people. To improve small sample properties, I exclude
individual i when calculating ˜Benefitsist.
˜Benefitsist isolates the exogenous variation due to relief program rules from the
potentially endogenous variation due to individual homeowners’ socio-economic char-
acteristics. Comparing column (2) with column (4) of Table 2.4 illustrates this point.
Even though the conditional average benefit calculated using individual character-
istics has no clear relationship with age, the simulated conditional average benefit
increases monotonically in age, reflecting the fact that property tax relief programs
are more generous for the oldest homeowners. In addition, column (2) shows that
the conditional average benefit calculated using individual characteristics decreases
monotonically in income and increases monotonically in house value. In contrast, the
simulated conditional average benefit does not exhibit any relationship with either
income or house value, suggesting that the simulated benefit measure ˜Benefitsist is
rid of variations stemming from individual characteristics. In summary, the simulated
benefits contain only the variation in program rules and depend exclusively on state,
age, and year by construction. Even though a homeowner’s unobserved tendencies to
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move can be correlated with factors that determine his benefit eligibility, such unob-
served tendencies to move are orthogonal to relief program rules and thus, orthogonal
to simulated benefits.
The second map in Figure 2-2 plots simulated conditional average benefits by
state. South Dakota and Utah are missing from the map because no homeowners
in the sample are from these two states. Comparing the two maps in Figure 2-2,
we observe that simulated eligible benefits are highly correlated with eligible benefits
calculated using individual characteristics. Nevertheless, they are noticeably different
from each other. For example, the conditional average benefits based on individual
characteristics are higher in Colorado than in Minnesota and North Dakota, while the
simulated conditional average benefits are higher in Minnesota and North Dakota than
in Colorado. Benefitist is measured using residents in state s, whereas B˜enefitist
is measured using a national representative sample. To the extent that residents in
state s is different from the national representative sample, it is unsurprising for the
two maps in Figure 2-2 to exhibit different patterns.
I also use two other relief benefit eligibility measures, V alueFreezeist (i.e. whether
eligible for an assessment value freeze program) and TaxFreezeist (i.e. whether el-
igible for a property tax freeze program) to instrument for property tax payments.
Because eligibilities for assessment value freeze programs and property tax freeze pro-
grams depend only on state, age, year, and household income, and because state, age,
year, and household income are arguably exogenous covariates, V alueFreezeist and
TaxFreezeist satisfy the exclusion restriction and may be used as valid instruments
for property tax payments.20
To implement the simulated IV strategy in a probit framework, I use the two-step
estimator suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988).21 Beside computational ease, the
20I also tried simulating V alueFreezeist and TaxFreezeist and using the simulated eligibility
measures as instruments for property taxes. The estimation results remain the same.
21The Rivers-Vuong two-step approach is a limited information procedure. Thus, it is less efficient
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Rivers-Vuong two-step IV approach has another appealing feature. The usual probit
t-test on vˆ, which is a consistent estimate of the first-stage error term, is a valid test of
the null hypothesis that Taxist is exogenous. Such a test is equivalent to the Hausman
specification test suggested by Hausman (1978). Because I use a two-step procedure
to estimate the IV probit model, standard errors need to be adjusted accordingly.
I choose to obtain consistent estimates of standard errors by bootstrapping in lieu
of the delta-method for two reasons. First, bootstrapping is computationally easier
to implement. Second, bootstrapping provides higher-order refinements while the
delta-method is only a first-order approximation (Horowitz (2001)).
Column (2) of Table 2.5 shows the IV probit estimation results. The estimated
marginal effect of property taxes is both statistically and economically significant.
The point estimate suggests that a $100 increase in annual property tax payments
induces the two-year mobility rate to increase by 0.76 percentage points. Given that
the baseline two-year mobility rate among elderly homeowners is 9%, the IV probit
estimate implies that a $100 increase in annual property taxes induces mobility to
rise by 8 percent. Moreover, the coefficient on vˆ is statistically different from zero at
0.01 level, rejecting the null hypothesis that Taxist is exogenous and confirming the
necessity of an IV strategy.
Table 2.5 also shows that the instruments used here - ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist,
and TaxFreeze - are quite strong in the first-stage regression. The first-stage F-
stat is 43 and the concentration parameter is 126. Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)
suggest that the rule of thumb for detecting weak instruments is to check whether
the first-stage F-stat exceeds 10. Hansen, Hausman and Newey (2006) conclude that
a concentration parameter of 30 or above suggests that there is no weak instruments
problem. By either standard, ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreeze are strong
than the conditional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In practice, I find MLE computationally
difficult, and iterations do not converge.
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instruments for Taxist.
The estimated marginal effects of other covariates are mostly consistent with our
expectation and the previous literature’s findings. For instance, homeowners who are
currently working are less likely to move. Homeowners who are recently widowed
have higher moving probabilities. Large families are less prone to move, supposedly
due to high moving costs. Negative health shocks and number of living children are
associated with higher mobility rates, which echoes the finding by Silverstein and
Angelelli (1998) that older parents engage in return migration in order to live closer
to children from whom they receive care.
Allowing for Household Heterogeneity - Random Effects Probit Model
An advantage of using panel data is that we can take into account unobserved in-
dividual heterogeneity. To simplify notations, I denote yit as the mobility outcome,
xit as a vector of all explanatory variables, and ci as the time-constant unobserved
household effects. The probit model assumes
P (yit = 1|xit, ci) = Φ(xitθ + ci), t = 1, ..., T
The density of (yi1, ..., yiT ) can be written as
f(yi1, ..., yiT |xi, ci; θ) =
T∏
t=1
f(yit|xit, ci; θ)
=
T∏
t=1
Φ(xitθ + ci)
yit [1− Φ(xitθ + ci)]1−yit
Ideally, we would prefer estimating a fixed effects probit model where no assumption
is made about the distribution of ci, and ci are estimated as parameters along with
θ. Unfortunately, the data used in this paper have a small T and a large N . The
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fixed effects probit model fails to produce a consistent estimate of θ due to the inci-
dental parameters problem. Nevertheless, if we are willing to assume the conditional
distribution of ci, we can still estimate a random effects probit model.
The traditional random effects probit model imposes the assumption that ci are
normally distributed conditional on xi:
ci|xi ∼ Normal(0, σ2c )
Because {ci} are unobserved, they cannot appear in the likelihood function explicitly.
Instead, we find the joint distribution of (yi1, ..., yiT ) by integrating out ci. Under the
conditional normality assumption of ci,
f(yi1, ..., yiT |xi; θ, σc) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[
T∏
t=1
f(yit|xit, ci, θ)
]
1
σc
φ
(
c
σc
)
dc
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[
T∏
t=1
Φ(xitθ + ci)
yit [1− Φ(xitθ + ci)]1−yit
]
1
σc
φ
(
c
σc
)
dc
The log-likelihood function for the entire sample of N households can be maximized
with respect to θ and σc.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.6 present the estimation results of the random
effects probit model and that of the two-step IV random effects probit model. The
marginal effects are very close to those estimated by the probit and IV probit models.
The point estimate of the IV random effects probit model suggests that a $100 increase
in annual property tax payments causes the two-year mobility rate to go up by 0.73
percentage points. The estimated coefficient on vˆ is statistically different from zero at
0.01 level, suggesting that Taxist is endogenous to mobility outcomes. As a robustness
check, OLS and 2SLS estimation results are shown in columns (5) and (6). The LPM
also generates similar results.
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Robustness Checks across Sub-samples and Specifications
In this section, I estimate the effect of property taxes on elderly mobility using differ-
ent sub-samples and different model specifications. The purpose of this exercise is to
check whether my findings are driven by some peculiar sub-population and whether
the estimated results are robust to various regression specifications. I first exclude
the AHEAD cohort. The AHEAD cohort were born before 1924 and are the oldest
cohort in the sample. Even though I have included in the main specification a full set
of age dummies and year dummies, which effectively controls for cohort fixed effects,
coefficients on all covariates have been restricted to be the same across cohorts. If the
oldest elderly move for reasons completely different from those of the younger elderly,
they may respond to property taxes and relief programs distinctively from other co-
horts. The regression results excluding the AHEAD cohort are shown in columns (3)
and (4) of panel A in Table 2.7. The IV probit point estimate is similar to the one
obtained when the AHEAD cohort is included.
Next, I drop households living in California because Proposition 13 creates a very
unusual institutional setting. Proposition 13 in California was adopted in 1978. It
limits property tax rate at 1% and requires assessment values grow no more than 2%
per year unless the house is sold and re-assessment is carried out. Wasi and White
(2005) find that Proposition 13 has a lock-in effect on homeowners in California.
In the late 1980s, two amendments to Proposition 13 were passed. They allow any
homeowner of age 55 or above who move to another house of equal or less market
value within the same county to pay property taxes on the previous house’ assessment
value. Ferreira (2005) use a regression discontinuity strategy to show that mobility
rates of 55-year-old homeowners are 25% higher than those of 54-year-old homeowners
in California after those amendments were enacted. Proposition 13 may cause elderly
homeowners in California to respond differently to property taxes and relief programs
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than elderly homeowners in other states. The regression results without California
observations are shown in columns (5) and (6) of panel A in Table 2.7. They appear
to be very similar to the results obtained for the entire sample.
I then investigate whether the results I find are driven by a small fraction of house-
holds who made multiple moves during the sample period. Specifically, I drop house-
holds who moved three or more times between 1992 and 2004.22 Columns (7) and
(8) of panel A in Table 2.7 present the probit and IV probit estimation results. The
reported marginal effects remain unchanged, suggesting that the estimated marginal
effect of property taxes on elderly mobility is not driven by frequent movers.
By construction, the variation in the simulated benefits comes from state, age,
and year. To ascertain that the results I have found in my main regressions do not
originate from uncontrolled two-way interactions between state, age and year, I add
two-way interaction fixed effects in the property tax regression. The first two columns
of panel B in Table 2.7 display the original estimation results without controlling for
any two-way interactions. In columns (3) and (4), I add controls for state×year fixed
effects. In columns (5) and (6), I add controls for year×age fixed effects. In columns
(7) and (8), I add controls for state×age fixed effects.
In the case of adding state×age fixed effects, around 1,500 additional fixed effects
are controlled for in the regression model. Not surprisingly, estimated standard error
becomes considerably larger and the marginal effect is significant only at 0.10 level.
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficient on property tax payments always remains pos-
itive and of roughly the same magnitude.
In summary, estimation results from the probit model, the random effects probit
model, and the LPM all suggest that property taxes play an important role in elderly
homeowners’ moving decisions. The results do not appear to be driven by some
22I am aware that this procedure selects the sample based on the dependent variable. The sole
purpose of this exercise is to check whether the estimated marginal effect of property taxes on elderly
mobility changes significantly once we exclude frequent movers.
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peculiar sub-sample and are robust to adding two-way interaction fixed effects. These
estimation results also demonstrate that it is essential to recognize that property taxes
are endogenous to the probability of moving. The central IV estimate suggests that
a $100 increase in property taxes induces the two-year mobility rate to rise by 0.76
percentage points, representing a 8% increase from the baseline average two-year
mobility rate of 9 percent. Such a large estimated impact of property taxes may be a
manifestation of the local average treatment effects (LATE) formulated by Imbens and
Angrist (1994). The instruments used to identify the causal effect of property taxes -
simulated benefits, eligibility for assessment value freeze program, and eligibility for
property tax freeze program - affect property taxes only of homeowners who both
are eligible for and actually take up property tax relief. Because property tax relief
programs are designed to assist low-income and elderly homeowners, and because
people who actually take up these programs tend to be more sensitive to property
taxes, it is not surprising that the IV estimates are large in magnitude. The estimates
shown here measure the mobility response to property taxes among the compliers (i.e.
eligible homeowners who actually receive benefits from property tax relief programs),
so one must be cautious when generalizing these results to the overall population.
2.4.2 Using Variations in Housing Appreciation Rates
In the previous section, I used eligible benefits for property tax relief programs as
instruments and find that higher property taxes induce elderly homeowners to move.
To the extent that these instruments affect property tax payments only of homeowners
who are both eligible for and actually enroll in property tax relief programs, the
effect found may be specific to such homeowners. In this section, I use a different
empirical strategy to identify the effect of property taxes on mobility rates of all
elderly homeowners. Specifically, I make use of the intuition that homeowners living
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in places with high Effective Tax Rates (i.e. the property tax payment to house value
ratio) and high housing appreciation rates will be the most affected by rising property
taxes. If increasing property taxes induce elderly homeowners to move, individuals
subject to high ETRist × hmt are more likely to move than those subject to low
ETRist×hmt, where hmt is the housing appreciation rate for Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) m at time t.23 In particular, I estimate the following probit model:
Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(γ1ETRist×hmt+γ2ETRist+γ3hmt+XistΠ+αs+δt) (2.3)
If property taxes are important in elderly homeowners’ moving decisions, then we
would expect γ1 to be positive. The identification assumption underlying this difference-
in-differences framework is that, in the absence of a property tax effect, increases in
housing prices have the same effect on low-ETR areas as on high-ETR areas. This
assumption is very strong because it assumes that ETR varies across places for rea-
sons exogenous to individual homeowners. It precludes situations where increases in
property tax revenues are driven purely by homeowners’ demand for more and better
local services.
Note that individual level variables ETRist may be endogenous for the same rea-
sons that property tax payments may be endogenous. Hence, estimates of equation
(2.3) are inconsistent without an appropriate instrumental variable strategy. I use
state-year level median effective tax rates ETRst, and the interaction between ETRst
and hmt to instrument for their individual level counterparts.
24 The regression out-
23For homeowners who do not live in MSAs, I use state-level housing appreciation rates instead.
About 75% of the sample live in MSAs.
24The housing appreciation rates hmt are from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO). OFHEO publishes quarterly House Price Index (HPI) by state and by MSA. I adjust
HPI for inflation using CPI to obtain real housing appreciation rates hmt. The data I used to
construct state level median effective tax rates ETRst are from two sources. The first is the 2000
Census, which provides median effective tax rate by state. The second is the “Residential Property
Tax Rates in the Largest City in Each State” published in the census Statistical Abstract series.
Assuming the time trend of ETR in these largest cities coincides with the time trend of median ETR
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comes are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.8.
The results in Table 2.8 show a number of interesting patterns. The estimated
marginal effect of ETRist × hmt in the IV probit model is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that higher property taxes induces elderly homeowners to re-
locate.25 The estimated marginal effect of hmt is negative and marginally significant.
The variable hmt measures how much housing values have changed from last year to
this year. If homeowners extrapolate housing price movements, they would expect
housing value to continue increasing in a housing market boom and to continue declin-
ing in a housing market bust. γ3 being negative implies that in times when housing
prices keep rising, homeowners decide to delay moving and cash in the expected cap-
ital gains later. The Hausman test appears to reject the exogeneity assumption and
suggests that an instrumental variable approach is necessary for consistent estimates.
In addition, the LPM generates very similar results.
I interpret the estimated marginal effects using the following example: Take
ETRist to be 0.01 and hmt to be 5% as the benchmark scenario. These numbers
are chosen because they are close to the sample medians. Consider an increase in
annual housing appreciation rate from 5% to 10%. The direct housing appreciation
effect, γ3hmt, implies a decrease in the two-year mobility rate by 1.3 (= −0.262×0.05)
percentage points. The indirect property-tax-increase effect, γ1ETRist×hmt, suggests
a rise in the mobility rate by 1.2 (= 0.235 × 0.05 × 0.01 × 100) percentage points.
Therefore, the net effect of an increase in housing appreciation rate from 5% to 10%
is a decrease of 0.1 (= −1.3 − 1.2) percentage points in the two-year mobility rate.
Now take ETRist to be 0.02 and consider the same increase in hmt from 5% to 10%.
The direct housing appreciation effect is still a 1.3 percentage point decrease in the
two-year mobility rate. The indirect property-tax-increase effect, however, will in-
in states, I use the 2000 Census data as a baseline and construct the state-year specific ETRst.
25I multiplied the ETRist and ETRst by 100 to obtain easy-to-read estimated coefficients.
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crease mobility by 2.4 (= 0.235×0.05×0.02×100) percentage points. Therefore, the
net effect is a 1.1 (= −1.3 + 2.4) percentage point increase in the two-year mobility
rate.
The IV probit estimation results suggest that homeowners living in places with
both high effective property tax rates and rapid housing value appreciation are the
most affected by rising property taxes. Exploiting variations in housing value appre-
ciation rates rather than in state-provided property tax relief programs, the results
shown in this section complement and reinforce the previous finding that property
taxes play an important role in elderly homeowners’ moving decisions. Furthermore,
finding a large and statistically significant effect of ETRist × hmt on elderly mobil-
ity suggests that increasing demand for local public services cannot fully explain the
sharp increases in property taxes during the recent years, at least not for elderly
homeowners. If property tax increases are entirely driven by elderly homeowners’
demand for more and better local public services, then we would not expect elderly
mobility to rise in areas with high ETR and fast housing price appreciation.
2.4.3 Do Liquidity Constraints Matter?
There are two potential explanations for why elderly homeowners move when property
taxes increase. The first focuses on liquidity constraints. Under the assumption that
elderly homeowners have substantial emotional and psychological attachment to their
homes, they do not wish to move unless they become liquidity-constrained and have
to trade down. This explanation implies that elderly homeowners do not perceive
their housing wealth in the same way they perceive their financial wealth. It also
suggests that providing property tax relief programs may be welfare-improving for
elderly homeowners with difficulties accessing the credit market and cashing out their
housing wealth.
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The second explanation is a demand adjustment story. When homeowners were
in their prime-age living with school-aged children, they were willing to pay high
property taxes and receive local services including public schools. As homeowners
grow older, they no longer have school-age children and consequently, they do not
value school services as much. When property taxes increase, elderly homeowners
may decide to relocate to places with lower property taxes and fewer, or different
public services. This explanation suggests that property tax relief programs may have
distorted elderly homeowners’ mobility decisions and locked in people who optimally
should have moved.
The liquidity constraint explanation and demand adjustment explanation have
distinct policy implications. Pioneered by Zeldes (1989), a sizable literature shows
both theoretically and empirically that liquidity constraints may have a significant
impact on household consumption and saving trajectories. If there exist impediments
in the credit market that prevents elderly homeowners from borrowing against their
housing wealth, providing property tax relief to them may help to smooth consump-
tion and to enhance welfare. On the other hand, if moving from a place with high
property taxes to a place with low property taxes gives elderly homeowners higher
utility, then property tax relief may artificially lock elderly homeowners into their
long-time home. To explore whether liquidity constraints explain the effect of prop-
erty taxes on elderly mobility, I estimate
Prob(Moveist) = Φ(η1Taxist × LowIncomeist + η2Taxist ×HighIncomeist
+ XistΠ+ ζs + δt) (2.4)
where LowIncomeist is an indicator variable that equals one if household i is in the
bottom income quintile at time t, and HighIncomeist indicates whether household i
is in the top four income quintiles at time t. If liquidity constraints are the reason why
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higher property taxes induce elderly homeowners to move, then we would expect that
low-income individuals are more affected by property taxes. Thus, we would expect
η1 > η2. Using eligible benefits for property tax relief programs as instruments for
Taxist × LowIncomeist and Taxist × HighIncomeist, I find that for households in
the bottom income quintile, a $100 increase in property taxes induces the two-year
mobility rate to increase by 1.25 percentage points. In contrast, a $100 increase in
property taxes induces the two-year mobility rate to increase by only 0.61 percentage
points. Unfortunately, standard errors of the estimated marginal effects are large
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that η1 ≤ η2. Nevertheless, the estimation
results provide suggestive evidence that liquidity constraints may have played a role
in property taxes’ impact on elderly homeowners’ moving decisions.
2.5 Program Evaluations
In this section, I investigate policy aspects of property tax relief programs. More
specifically, I examine how program types, program generosity, and implementation
strategies affect the impact of property tax relief programs on elderly mobility. Recall
that there are three categories of property tax relief programs: homestead exemptions,
homestead credits, and circuit-breakers; assessment value freeze programs; and prop-
erty tax freeze programs. To investigate whether different types of programs have
different impact on elderly mobility, I estimate
Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(α1Benefitist + α2V alueFreezeist + α3TaxFreezeist
+XistΠ+ ζs + δt) (2.5)
where Benefitist, V alueFreezeist, TaxFreezeist are measures of eligibility for the
three categories of property tax relief programs. If property tax relief programs reduce
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elderly mobility, We expect α1, α2, and α3 to be all negative. Larger magnitudes of
these coefficients suggest stronger impact of the corresponding programs.
Since Benefitist contains variations in a range of individual characteristics and
some of these characteristics may be correlated with unobserved tendencies to move,
I use simulated benefits B˜enefitist to instrument for it. The estimation results are
presented in panel A of Table 2.9. The estimated marginal effects of all program
types are negative, suggesting that eligibility for property tax relief programs reduces
mobility. The IV probit point estimates suggest that a $100 increase in eligible
benefits for homestead exemptions, homestead credits, and circuit-breakers decreases
the two-year mobility rate by almost 1 percentage point. The eligibility for assessment
value freeze programs reduces the two-year mobility rate by 0.7 percentage points,
and the eligibility for property tax freeze programs reduces the two-year mobility rate
by 2 percentage points. Panel A of Table 2.9 also shows that across specifications, the
marginal effect of eligibility for property tax freeze programs is statistically significant
at 0.01 level. Overall, property tax freeze programs appear to have the largest impact
on elderly homeowners’ moving decisions.
Policy-makers may ask whether, given a policy objective of reducing mobility
among elderly homeowners in the face of rising property taxes, should they give
everyone at least some benefits or should they give a great deal of benefits to a
well-targeted group? Knowing whether eligibility or benefit level is more effective
in decreasing mobility can help us design more cost-effective property tax relief pro-
grams. To capture the difference between eligibility and benefit level, I focus on two
variables: an indicator variable that equals one if the individual is eligible for a pos-
itive amount of benefits, and a continuous variable measuring the dollar amount of
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eligible benefits conditional on eligibility. More specifically, I estimate
Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ
(
ρ11(Benefitist > 0) + ρ21(Benefitist > 0)×Benefitist
+ρ3V alueFreezeist + ρ4TaxFreezeist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt
)
(2.6)
The estimated marginal effects are shown in panel B of Table 2.9. Unfortunately, the
data do not have enough statistical power to identify the effect of eligibility and benefit
level precisely. The estimated marginal effect of eligibility appears to be positive and
small in magnitude; the estimated marginal effect of conditional benefits appears to
be negative and large in magnitude, although neither is statistically significant. The
data seem to suggest that the amount of benefits has to reach a critical level in order
to have any noticeable effects on mobility.
Property tax relief programs in the U.S. are implemented in three ways: directly
incorporated in property tax bills, a rebate check sent to the homeowners after the
bill is paid, or income tax credits on state personal income tax returns. Anecdotal
evidence seems to suggest that homeowners may not perceive a relief program that is
implemented by income tax credits as property tax reliefs. One possible explanation
for such perception is that income tax returns are filed at a time distant from the
time when property taxes are paid. In contrast, programs implemented by direct
incorporation in property tax bills provide immediate relief. Homeowners can typi-
cally file rebate applications and receive their rebate checks right after they pay tax
bills. Another potential explanation is that homeowners may perceive such income
tax credits as income tax reliefs rather than property tax reliefs.
If relief granted in the form of income tax credits is not perceived by beneficiaries
as property tax relief, then the negative correlation between simulated benefits and
reported property taxes may disappear. Therefore, simulated benefits cannot be used
as valid instruments in regression analysis due to the lack of a first-stage relationship.
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To avoid such a problem, I have excluded states that use income tax credits to provide
property tax relief in my estimations so far. These states are District of Columbia,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin.
To test whether implementation strategies affect property tax relief programs’
effect on elderly mobility, I estimate
Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ
(
λ1ITCs ×Benefitist + λ2(1− ITCs)×Benefitist
+λ3V alueFreezeist + λ4TaxFreezeist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt
)
(2.7)
where ITCs is an indicator variable that equals one if state s has property tax relief
programs implemented by income tax credits. If implementation strategy does not
matter, we would expect that both λ1 and λ2 to be negative and of roughly the same
magnitude.
The estimation results are shown in panel C of Table 2.9. Instrumenting ITCs ×
Benefitist and (1 − ITCs) × Benefitist using their simulated counterparts, I find
that higher eligible benefits implemented by income tax credits are associated with
higher mobility rates, and higher eligible benefits implemented in ways other than
income tax credits are associated with lower mobility rates. Although the estimated
marginal effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels, these results
suggest that implementation methods of relief programs have significant influence on
people’s moving behaviors. This finding echoes the recent literature on tax salience
such as Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007) and Finkelstein (2007). If reducing mobility
among elderly homeowners at times of rising property taxes is the policy objective,
then using state personal income tax credits to provide property tax reliefs does not
appear to be very effective.
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2.6 Conclusion
Property taxes are the most important tax revenue source for local governments. The
recent housing market boom led to significant increases in homeowners’ property tax
liabilities. Both policy-makers and the general public are concerned by the prospect
that house-rich but income-poor elderly homeowners are overburdened by rising prop-
erty taxes. The goal of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on whether property
taxes play an important role in elderly homeowners’ moving decisions.
Using instrumental variable approaches, this paper finds that property taxes are
important in elderly homeowners’ moving decisions. The central point estimates sug-
gest that a $100 increase in annual property taxes leads to a 0.76 percentage point
increase on average in two-year mobility rates. The median annual property tax
payment in my sample is $1200, and the average two-year mobility rate of elderly
homeowners is 9 percent. My point estimates suggest that the impact of property
taxes on elderly mobility is economically significant. In addition, the effect of prop-
erty taxes is most pronounced for homeowners living in areas that rely heavily on
property taxes and that experience remarkable housing value appreciation. A variety
of robustness checks are performed to test the stability of the found effects. More-
over, eligibility for property tax relief programs reduces the probability of moving.
In designing property tax relief programs, program types, program generosity, and
program implementation all need to be considered to achieve policy objectives. For
instance, targeting a small population of homeowners in great need of assistance seems
more effective than broadening eligibility. Property tax freezes, although costly, re-
duce mobility the most. Benefits granted through state personal income tax credits
are not perceived by homeowners as property tax relief and do not appear to reduce
mobility among the eligible homeowners.
According to the 2004 data, property tax relief programs cost about $10 billion a
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year in the United States.26 In some states, these relief programs are provided at a
great expense of lost revenues. For example, circuit-breakers in Vermont cost about
10% of total property tax revenues every year. Is the money well spent? Does the
benefit of having these programs justify their cost? If the effect of property taxes
on mobility is driven by demand adjustment, property tax relief programs would
keep elderly homeowners from relocating to places where the marginal price of local
services matches the marginal benefit. Thus, we essentially spend valuable resources
locking homeowners in their houses and preventing them from following an optimal
housing consumption path. In contrast, if the effect is due to liquidity constraints,
providing generous property tax relief programs would alleviate such constraints and
allow people who value the house the most to stay in it. This paper offers suggestive
evidence that liquidity constraints may have been a driving force behind the effect of
increasing property taxes on elderly mobility, but we need to conduct more empirical
studies before assessing the welfare implication of property tax relief programs.
Many intriguing and important questions remain unexplored with regard to the
mobility decision of the elderly. At present, little empirical analysis has been con-
ducted to address the question why effective tax rates did not decline in proportion
to the increases in housing prices. Dye and Reschovsky (2007) suggests that cuts in
state school aid caused by state fiscal crisis may be partially responsible for rising
property taxes in recent years. Furthermore, virtually no evidence has been pre-
sented to rationalize the prevalence of property tax relief programs and the political
popularity associated with expanding these programs. Do elderly homeowners enjoy
more political power by voting more often than non-elderly homeowners? Do state
and local governments use property tax relief programs to entice retiree migrants?
Do population aging and baby-boomers’ entering retirement age imply diminishing
support for public-school spending? Poterba (1998) discusses issues related to demo-
26Author’s estimation using 2004 circuit-breaker cost data reported in Lyons et al (2007).
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graphic change and the political economy of public education. More research is called
for to address such questions.
The second set of research questions includes investigating the best way of pro-
viding property tax relief. Economists believe that reverse mortgages are an efficient
mechanism for elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth and to achieve
consumption smoothing toward the end of their life-cycle. The fact that very few
eligible elderly homeowners take up property tax deferral programs is consistent with
the observation that the reverse mortgage market in the U.S. is tiny. Studying why
property tax deferral programs are unpopular among elderly homeowners could help
us better understand how elderly perceive their housing wealth and whether the ab-
sence of a thriving reverse mortgage market is due to a lack of demand. Given the
similarities between reverse mortgages and annuity products, such research endeavors
will also contribute to our knowledge on the demand for annuity products among the
elderly.
The third set of questions extends beyond mobility. If rising property taxes strain
the elderly, there may be other interesting behavioral responses. I am studying the
impact of property taxes on elderly homeowners’ labor supply and retirement deci-
sions to explore the mechanism through which rising property taxes induce elderly
homeowners mobility and asset decummulation decisions.
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Table 2.1: Mobility and Homeownership of HRS Households
A. Mobility Rate Among Homeowners
Mean SE N
1992-1994 0.063 0.004 3641
1994-1996 0.082 0.005 2764
1996-1998 0.075 0.005 3264
1998-2000 0.092 0.005 3084
2000-2002 0.133 0.006 2851
2002-2004 0.119 0.006 2643
B. Tenure Distribution
Homeowner Renter Other N
1992 0.771 0.194 0.035 6726
1994 0.788 0.180 0.031 5999
1996 0.800 0.177 0.024 5712
1998 0.804 0.164 0.032 5432
2000 0.809 0.157 0.034 5071
2002 0.817 0.148 0.035 4826
2004 0.807 0.147 0.046 4645
C. Tenure Transition Matrix
To Own(%) To Rent(%) To Other(%) N
From Own 80.66 14.37 4.97 1909
From Rent 21.98 70.68 7.34 1266
From Other 22.87 44.58 32.54 206
Notes: This table refers to HRS cohort (born between 1931 and
1941) households only. Household weights are used.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Mean Median SD
Moved between Waves 0.09 0.29
Fraction of Cross-State Moves 0.17 0.38
Property Tax 1,756 1,200 2,693
House Value 149,811 110,849 179,146
Income 63,776 41,900 102,144
Financial Wealth 126,526 26,000 528,838
Having Mortgage or Home Loan 0.46 0.50
Age 64.5 9.8
Male 0.52 0.50
White 0.91 0.29
Household Size 2.25 1.15
Number of Children 3.06 1.93
Less than High School 0.22 0.41
High School Graduates 0.32 0.47
Some College 0.22 0.42
College Graduates 0.24 0.43
Currently Working 0.43 0.49
Currently Retired 0.48 0.50
Currently Disabled 0.02 0.13
Newly Retired 0.08 0.28
Married 0.66 0.47
Separated or Divorced 0.12 0.32
Widowed 0.20 0.40
Newly Widowed 0.02 0.14
Recently Hospitalized 0.30 0.46
Notes: N = 29, 213. The sample is restricted to households
who were homeowners in the current wave and who have valid
data for all variables. Property tax, income, house value, and
financial wealth are in 2000 dollars. Household weights are used.
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Table 2.4: Property Tax Relief Program Benefits
Eligible Benefits Simulated Benefits
Percentage Conditional Percentage Conditional
Eligible Avg Benefit Eligible Avg Benefit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. By Age Groups
age<55 5% 363 6% 248
55-59 6% 382 7% 262
60-64 13% 332 14% 274
65-74 45% 313 45% 305
≥75 53% 350 53% 319
B. By Income Quintiles
Lowest 55% 359 34% 275
2nd Quintile 33% 338 31% 294
3rd Quintile 18% 330 26% 287
4th Quintile 11% 300 20% 283
Highest 5% 158 16% 281
C. By House Value Quintiles
Lowest 34% 187 29% 253
2nd Quintile 25% 272 25% 272
3rd Quintile 23% 380 25% 230
4th Quintile 22% 427 24% 302
Highest 15% 458 23% 285
Notes: All dollar amounts are in 2000 dollars. Eligible benefits are
calculated based on individual homeowners’ characteristics. Simulated
benefits are calculated by simulation for each state-age-year cell. Per-
centage Eligible is the percentage of homeowners who are eligible for
homestead exemptions, homestead credits, or circuit-breakers. Condi-
tional Avg Benefit is the average benefit from homestead exemptions,
homestead credits, and circuit-breakers conditional on being eligible for
these programs. Household weights are used.
118
Table 2.5: Effect of Property Taxes on Mobility - Probit Model
Probit IV Probit
(1) (2)
Property Taxes (in 10,000) 0.0065 0.7624***
(0.0115) (0.2692)
Male 0.0021 -0.0010
(0.0060) (0.0067)
White 0.0458*** 0.0385***
(0.0086) (0.0101)
Household Size -0.0105*** -0.0104***
(0.0026) (0.0028)
Number of Children 0.0070*** 0.0070***
(0.0013) (0.0014)
Married -0.0363 -0.0413
(0.0370) (0.0394)
Newly Widowed 0.0391*** 0.0453***
(0.0131) (0.0140)
Currently Working -0.0186*** -0.0264***
(0.0064) (0.0076)
Newly Retired 0.0236*** 0.0129
(0.0076) (0.0114)
Spouse Currently Working -0.0196** -0.0188*
(0.0077) (0.0101)
Spouse Newly Retired -0.0013 0.0052
(0.0098) (0.0109)
Recently Hospitalized 0.0108** 0.0096
(0.0051) (0.0060)
Hausman Test -4.1179***
(Coef on first-stage residual vˆ) (1.3602)
First Stage F-Stat 43
Concentration Parameter 126
Notes: The regression model is Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(β1Taxist + XistΠ + ζs +
δt). N = 22, 250. Other than the variables shown in the table, Xist also includes
income quintile dummies, house value quintile dummies, financial wealth quintile
dummies, age dummies, and spouse age dummies. ζs is states fixed effects. δt is
year fixed effects. The simulated benefit measure ˜Benefitist and binary variables
V alueFreezeist and TaxFreezeist are used as instruments in the IV specification.
Marginal effects shown are weighted averages across the population. Standard errors
are bootstrapped by 500 random draws with replacement clustered at state level.
Household weights are used in estimation. * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant
at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level.
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Table 2.8: Interaction between ETR and House Price Appreciation Rates
Probit IV Probit OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETRist × hmt 0.031 0.235** 0.026 0.234**
0.053 (0.107) (0.082) (0.093)
ETRist 0.181 2.81 0.169 2.93
(0.303) (2.70) (0.276) (2.90)
hmt -0.042 -0.262* -0.036 -0.260**
(0.087) (0.137) (0.142) (0.102)
Coef on first-stage residual vˆ1 -1.67***
(0.52)
Coef on first-stage residual vˆ2 -15.5
(19.0)
N 29,102 29,102 29,102 29,102
Notes: The regression model is Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(γ1ETRist × hmt +
γ2ETRist + γ3hmt + XistΠ + ζs + δt). Xist includes income quintile dummies,
house value quintile dummies, financial wealth quintiles, male, white, household
size, number of children, whether married, whether newly widowed, education cat-
egories, whether currently working, whether newly retired, whether spouse is cur-
rently working, whether spouse is newly retired, whether hospitalized, age dummies
and spouse age dummies. hmt is MSA level housing value appreciation rates. State
effective tax rate ETRst and the interaction between ETRst and hmt are used as
instruments for ETRist and ETRist × hmt in the IV specification of both regres-
sion models. Marginal effects shown are weighted averages across the population.
Standard errors in column (1) and (2) are bootstrapped by 500 random draws with
replacement clustered at state level. Standard errors in column (3) and (4) are clus-
tered at state level. Household weights are used in estimation. * significant at 0.10
level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level.
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Table 2.9: Program Evaluation: Effect of Property Tax Relief Programs on Mobility
Probit IV Probit OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Program Types (N=22,520)
Eligible Benefits (in 10,000) -0.0671 -1.3048** -0.0746 -0.9957*
(0.1753) (0.5169) (0.2139) (0.5761)
Value Freeze Dummy -0.0132 -0.0101 -0.0085 -0.0059
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0098)
Tax Freeze Dummy -0.0323*** -0.0290*** -0.0248*** -0.0215***
(0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0071) (0.0071)
B. Program Generosity (N=22,520)
Eligibility Dummy 0.0045 0.0145 0.0022 0.0143
(0.0093) (0.0474) (0.0116) (0.0750)
Benefits Conditional on -0.1369 -1.6205 -0.1087 -1.4453
Eligibility (in 10,000) (0.2493) (2.4595) (0.3136) (3.2640)
C. Program Implementation (N=29,210)
ITC*Eligible Benefits 0.2089 0.3746 0.2193 0.4362*
(in 10,000) (0.1377) (0.3460) (0.1387) (0.2231)
(1-ITC)*Eligible Benefits -0.0472 -0.7882 -0.0677 -0.7529
(in 10,000) (0.1853) (0.5162) (0.2164) (0.6064)
Notes: The regression model in Panel A is Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(α1Benefitist +
α2V alueFreezeist + α3TaxFreezeist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt). The regression model in Panel
B is Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(ρ11(Benefitist > 0) + ρ21(Benefitist > 0)×Benefitist +
ρ3V alueFreezeist + ρ4TaxFreezeist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt). The regression model in Panel
C is Prob(Moveist = 1) = Φ(λ1ITCs × Benefitist + λ2(1 − ITCs) × Benefitist +
λ3V alueFreezeist + λ4TaxFreezeist +XistΠ + ζs + δt). Xist includes income quintile
dummies, house value quintile dummies, financial wealth quintile dummies, male, white,
household size, number of children, whether married, whether newly widowed, education
categories, whether currently working, whether newly retired, whether spouse is currently
working, whether spouse is newly retired, whether hospitalized, age dummies and spouse
age dummies. Simulated measures are used to instrument for eligible benefits in IV
specifications. Marginal effects shown in column (1) and (2) are weighted averages
across the population. Standard errors in column (1) and (2) are bootstrapped with 500
random draws with replacement clustered at state level. Standard errors in column (3)
and (4) are clustered at state level. Household weights are used. * significant at 0.10
level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level.
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Chapter 3
Property Taxes and Elderly Labor
Supply
3.1 Introduction
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. housing market experienced a remark-
able boom, which led to sharp increases in residential property taxes. The census data
indicate that from 2000 to 2005, median housing values went up by 50% and median
property taxes rose by 30% in real terms. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such
unexpected rises in property taxes may induce elderly homeowners, especially those
housing-rich but income-poor elderly homeowners, to increase their labor supply by
delaying retirement. Unfortunately, there have been no systematic studies investigat-
ing the link between property taxes and elderly labor supply. This paper serves as
the first attempt to study this link.
Property taxes may potentially influence elderly labor supply through two chan-
nels: wealth effects and liquidity constraints. Economists have long recognized that
unexpected changes in wealth may induce individuals to adjust their labor supply.
Previous research that employs various data and identification strategies to estimate
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such wealth effects in general supports the theoretical prediction. Because increases
in property taxes are equivalent to declines in wealth, they may lead elderly home-
owners to consume less leisure and supply more labor. Property taxes may also cause
elderly homeowners to increase their labor supply because of liquidity constraints.
For example, according to the 1992-2004 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) sam-
ple, , 10% of the homeowners between age 50 and 75 reported paying 9% or more of
their income for property taxes. For 25% of these homeowners, annual property tax
payments represented at least 40% of household financial assets. The lack of liquid
assets among many elderly homeowners make them vulnerable to increases in prop-
erty taxes. Therefore, they may resort to delaying retirement, reentering the labor
force, and/or working longer hours in order to stay in their homes.
On the other hand, property taxes may not have a significant impact on elderly
labor supply for two reasons. First, the reduction in wealth caused by rising property
taxes may be small relative to elderly homeowners’ total wealth. For example, con-
sider a 60 year old who expects to live in his house for another 20 years. Even if annual
property taxes increase permanently by $500, it only translates into a $6,731 wealth
decline in present discounted value (PDV) assuming a 5% discount rate. Previous
studies on wealth effects find that on average, a $100,000 increase in wealth causes
retirement rates to decline by 10%. A reduction of several thousand dollars in wealth
simply may not be enough to trigger noticeable changes in retirement and labor force
reentry behavior. Second, elderly homeowners may respond to rising property taxes
by relocating to low-tax areas or by downsizing to smaller houses rather than by
increasing labor supply. In fact, Shan (2008) finds evidence suggesting that property
taxes raise the mobility rate among elderly homeowners. If elderly homeowners have
already lowered their property tax burdens by moving to low-tax areas or smaller
houses, it may no longer be necessary for them to increase their labor supply at the
same time.
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In this paper, I empirically test the relationship between property taxes and elderly
labor supply. Specifically, I use panel data from the 1992-2004 Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and newly-collected data on state-provided property tax relief programs
to estimate the property tax effect on the labor supply of homeowners aged 50-75. In
particular, I focus on three labor supply outcome variables in my regression analysis:
retirement, reentry to the labor market, and working hours. Because property tax
payments may be endogenous to individuals’ labor supply decisions, I exploit the
variation in state-provided property tax relief programs and construct simulated relief
benefits as instruments for property taxes. Such simulated relief benefits measure the
generosity of property tax relief programs and thus, are negatively correlated with
property tax payments. The simulation procedure makes sure that these instruments
contain only the variation in program rules and depend exclusively on state, age,
and year. To the extent that state, age, and year are exogenous, these simulated
instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. The central IV estimation results cannot
reject that property taxes have no significant impact on elderly homeowners’ decisions
to retire, to reenter the labor force, or to increase working hours. Such findings imply
that incidences reported in news articles where elderly homeowners have been delaying
retirement to keep up with rising property taxes are unlikely to be widespread. Elderly
homeowners may have chosen to move rather than to increase labor supply in their
effort to reduce property tax burdens.
This paper contributes to the property tax literature and the wealth effect liter-
ature in several ways. First, to my knowledge, it is the first study to look at how
property taxes affect labor supply. Property taxes are the most important tax revenue
source for local governments, and property tax relief programs cost about $10 billion
annually in the United States.1 Studying the behavioral impact of property taxes on
elderly homeowners is indispensible for any normative analysis of property taxes and
1Author’s estimation using 2004 data reported in Lyons, Farkas and Johnson (2007).
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property tax relief programs. Second, previous research studying the wealth effect
on retirement behavior has exploited variations in Social Security and pension ben-
efits, stock market booms and busts, housing market movements, inheritances, and
lottery winnings. This paper complements the existing literature by using property
taxes and property tax relief programs as a novel source of variation. Third, while
most existing studies focus only on retirement behavior, this paper examines both
the extensive margin - whether rising property taxes induce elderly homeowners to
delay retirement or reenter the labor force, and the intensive margin - whether elderly
homeowners work longer hours when property taxes increase. By looking beyond re-
tirement decisions, this paper provides more comprehensive evidence on how wealth
shocks affect elderly labor supply.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews the existing litera-
ture on the wealth effect and introduces the background on property taxes. In section
3, I describe the HRS data used in this paper. I explain my empirical strategy, discuss
the estimation results, and present robustness checks and extensions in section 4. The
last section concludes and points out some caveats of this paper.
3.2 Background
A sizable literature exists on the wealth effect and retirement behavior. As mentioned
above, previous studies have relied on variations in Social Security and pension bene-
fits, stock market movements, housing market movements, inheritances, and lotteries
for identification. Earlier works on retirement incentives of Social Security bene-
fits, including Diamond and Hausman (1984), Burtless (1986), Krueger and Pischke
(1992), and Blau (1994), generally find that even though the effect of Social Security
is statistically significant, it is small relative to the trend toward early labor force exit
among older men. More recent works adopt the “option value” approach developed
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by Stock and Wise (1990) and estimate the dynamic effect of Social Security and
pensions on retirement decisions. Samwick (1998), Chan and Stevens (2004), and
Coile and Gruber (2007) implement such dynamic models and show that forward-
looking incentive measures for Social Security and private pensions are significant
determinants of retirement.
The stock market boom and bust as well as the remarkable housing value run-up
in recent years have provided researchers arguably exogenous sources of variation for
studying the wealth effect on retirement behavior. Using the HRS data, Coronado and
Perozek (2003) find that individuals who held corporate equity immediately before
the bull market of the 1990s on average retired earlier than those who did not. Sevak
(2005) compares individuals with defined contribution pension plans and individuals
with defined benefit pension plans. She finds that unexpected gains in wealth during
the 1990s bull market induced earlier retirement. Using the HRS, Current Population
Survey (CPS), and Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Coile and Levine (2006)
exploited both the stock market boom in the late 1990s and the stock market bust
in the early 2000s to study the impact of wealth shocks on retirement decisions.
They find that the stock market has very little influence on aggregate labor market
behavior. Farnham and Sevak (2007) and Goodstein (2008) use cross-MSA variation
in housing price movements to identify the wealth effect on retirement timing. They
find that increases in housing wealth raise the probability of retirement significantly.
In search for exogenous sources of variation to measure the wealth effect, re-
searchers have also estimated the effect of inheritance receipt and lottery winning on
labor supply. Brown, Coile and Weisbenner (2006) show that inheritance receipt is
associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement, and the effect
is stronger when the inheritance is unexpected. Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (2001)
use an original survey of people playing the lottery in Massachusetts in the mid-1980s
and find that wealth shocks reduce labor supply.
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In summary, the existing literature generally supports the theoretical prediction
that labor supply responds to wealth shocks. Nevertheless, the evidence shown in the
literature is far from conclusive. Studies that employ difference-in-differences frame-
works rely heavily on the assumption that in absence of the wealth effect, treatment
groups and control groups would have the same propensity to retire conditional on
covariates. Such an assumption may be too strong in many cases. Even for stud-
ies that have reasonably tight identification strategies, the magnitudes of estimated
wealth effects vary considerably from one study to another. As tens of millions of
baby-boomers approach retirement age in coming years, the field calls for more re-
search to provide new evidence on this important subject. This paper uses variations
in property taxes and property tax relief programs to estimate the wealth effect on
elderly labor supply.
Property taxes are responsible for approximately 72% of all local tax revenues,
representing the most important tax revenue source for local governments. In 2004,
property tax collections in the U.S. exceeded $300 billion.2 The housing market
boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s led to significant increases in residential
property taxes. Such steep rises in property taxes may be more burdensome to elderly
homeowners than to non-elderly homeowners for two reasons. First, the current U.S.
tax system allows taxpayers who choose to itemize their deductions on federal income
tax returns to deduct property tax payments. Because mortgage interest payments are
usually the main reason for choosing itemized deductions over standard deductions,
and because elderly homeowners are likely to have paid off their mortgages and take
standard deductions, the marginal cost of paying an extra dollar in property tax is
usually higher for elderly homeowners than for non-elderly homeowners. As a result,
elderly homeowners may have to increase their labor supply in order to stay in their
homes.
2See Bradley (2005) and NCSL (2005).
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Second, many elderly homeowners do not have substantial liquid assets to cover
rising property taxes. Table 3.1 displays the present discounted values (PDV) of
hypothetical property tax increases for homeowners at different age and discount
rate. For simplicity, I assume away longevity risks and impose that everyone lives
to age 80 exactly. The PDV as a percentage of median household financial wealth
is shown in parenthesis. The top panel illustrates the case where annual property
taxes experience a permanent increase of $300. For example, if the homeowner paid
$2,000 for property taxes last year, he would be paying $2,300 for property taxes
every year from now on. Even though the PDV of such an increase in property
taxes is only a few thousand dollars, it represents 16-47% of the median household
financial wealth. The bottom panel of Table 3.1 illustrates the case where property
taxes increase by $300 annually. Using the previous example, the homeowner who
paid $2,000 for property taxes last year would pay $2,300 this year, $2,600 next year,
and so on. The PDV of such an increase in property taxes overwhelms the median
household financial wealth. Thus, for elderly homeowners who have little financial
wealth and are liquidity constrained, increases in property taxes may induce labor
supply responses.
However, there are also reasons to be skeptical that increasing property taxes have
generated a large impact on elderly homeowners’ labor supply. First, the wealth effect
alone may not induce noticeable changes in labor supply behavior. The top panel of
Table 3.1 shows that even for a homeowner of age 50 with a low discount rate of 0.02,
a hypothetical property tax increase of $300 only amounts to a $7,019 reduction in
wealth. Given that previous studies on wealth effects suggest that a $100,000 increase
in wealth raises retirement rates by roughly 10%, a one-time permanent increase in
property taxes is unlikely to generate much wealth effect on elderly homeowners.
Elderly homeowners may respond to rising property taxes by increasing labor supply
only if they expect property taxes continue to rise in coming years as illustrated in
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the bottom panel of Table 3.1.
The second reason why the relationship between property taxes and elderly la-
bor supply may not be empirically detectable is that elderly homeowners have an
alternative strategy to reduce their property tax payments, namely, by moving to
low-tax area or by downsizing. As noted above, Shan (2008) finds evidence suggest-
ing that rising property taxes induce higher mobility among elderly homeowners. If
the disutility from delaying retirement, reentering labor force, or working longer hours
outweighs the transaction cost associated with moving and downsizing, we may not
find a significant impact of property taxes on elderly labor supply. For these reasons,
the theoretical prediction of the degree to which property taxes may affect elderly
labor supply is ambiguous, and we have to rely on empirical studies to determine the
relationship between property taxes and elderly labor supply.
3.3 Data Description
The data used in this paper has two components: the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) and the newly-collected data on property tax relief programs. HRS is a bian-
nual panel of a nationally representative sample of elderly and near-elderly individuals
in the United States. At present, seven waves of the survey (1992-2004) have been re-
leased to researchers. HRS includes households from four different cohorts: the HRS
cohort (born between 1931 and 1941), the AHEAD cohort (born before 1924), the
“Children of the Depression” (CODA) cohort (born between 1924 and 1930), and the
“War Baby” (WB) cohort (born between 1942 and 1947).3 The HRS cohort appear
in all seven waves. The AHEAD cohort was first interviewed in 1993 and then in
3In 2004, a fifth cohort, Early Boomers (born between 1948 and 1953), was added to HRS.
Because households in this cohort have only been interviewed once and I need at least two adjacent
surveys to study whether this period’s property taxes affect labor supply between this period and
the next period, I exclude them from my analysis.
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1995. Since 1998, the AHEAD cohort has been interviewed concurrently with the
HRS cohort biannually. The CODA and WB cohorts appear only in the last four
waves (1998-2004). The raw dataset has 26,867 individuals and 126,104 person-wave
observations.
The HRS data have detailed information on demographics, health, labor supply,
and finances. Whenever possible, I use the RAND HRS Data File, a user-friendly
version that contains a subset of HRS variables.4 Because this paper examines the
wealth effect on elderly labor supply, I limit the sample to individuals of age between
50 and 75. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 display the relationship between age and labor force
status for male and female HRS respondents, respectively. At age 50, around 85%
of males were in the labor force and only 10% of males were out of the labor force.5
In contrast, almost 30% of females were out of the labor force at age 50. As people
grew older, the fraction of respondents remaining in the labor force declined. Females
appeared to exit the labor force earlier than males. For both males and females, the
biggest jump in retirement occurred at age 62. This is probably because 62 is the
early retirement age at which beneficiaries can claim Social Security benefits. At age
75, only 5% of females remained in the labor force, whereas over 10% of males were
still in the labor force. Because of these apparent differences in male and female
labor supply behavior, I perform regression analysis for older men and older women
separately. Figure 3-3 plots the empirical retirement hazard rate for homeowners
between age 50 and 75. Conditional on being in the labor force, the probability that
one retires within the next two years goes up with age. For both males and females,
the hazard rate increases sharply around age 60 and again around age 70.
To measure changes in labor supply, I use three outcome variables: retirement,
reentry to the labor force, and working hours. I define retirement as a transition from
4See St.Clair et al (2006) for more information on the RAND HRS Data File.
5The other 5% of male respondents were disabled or had missing labor force status.
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Figure 3-1: Labor Force Participation of Male Homeowners
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working or being unemployed to being retired or out of the labor force. Similarly, a
transition from being retired or out of the labor force to working or being unemployed
is defined as reentry to the labor force. Working hours refer to the self-reported total
number of hours worked during the past year. Table 3.2 shows that on average, the
two-year retirement rate is 18.3% for males and 20.4% for females in the sample. The
average two-year reentry rate is much lower: 5.8% for males and 5.2% for females.
Conditional on being in the labor force, male respondents report an average of 2,283
annual working hours, and female respondents report an average of 1,880 annual
working hours.
The key independent variable in this paper is property taxes. In all seven waves,
respondents were asked to report the amount of property taxes paid on their primary
residence during the past year. I assume these self-reported property tax payments are
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Figure 3-2: Labor Force Participation of Female Homeowners
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the actual payments after all relevant property tax exemptions, rebates or refunds
have been applied. Such an assumption is crucial for the first-stage regression in
my IV strategy. For programs where participation is automatic and property tax
bills are mailed to homeowners after benefits have been netted out, this assumption
seems justified. For programs where homeowners receive rebate checks soon after
paying property taxes, it is unclear whether respondents report their before-relief
property tax payments or after-relief property tax payments. For programs that are
implemented by state personal income tax credits, respondents are likely to report
their before-relief benefits for two reasons. First, relief benefits are usually received
long after homeowners have paid their property taxes. Second, property tax relief
benefits may appear less salient on state personal income tax returns. For example,
filers may view property tax credits that they claim against income tax liabilities
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Figure 3-3: Empirical Retirement Hazard Rate of Homeowners
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as income tax relief benefits rather than property tax relief benefits. Recent studies
including Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007) and Finkelstein (2007) suggest that tax
salience could have a significant impact on behavior. Therefore, I exclude in my
regression analysis states where relief benefits are granted by tax credits on state
personal income tax returns.6 The dropped observations represent about 25% of the
sample. I also drop individuals living in mobile homes and individuals living on farms
or ranches because these properties may be treated differently from other residential
properties for tax purposes.
Table 3.2 displays summary statistics of key demographic and socio-economic
6These states are District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. I do not exclude states
that use rebate checks to implement relief programs because the sample size would drop significantly
and asymptotic theory no longer applies when there are only a few states left in the sample and
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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variables for the retirement, reentry, and working-hour samples. Unsurprisingly, in-
dividuals in the retirement and working-hour samples are younger, healthier, better-
educated, and have significantly higher household income than individuals in the
reentry sample. Individuals in the retirement and working-hour samples also live in
more expensive houses and pay higher property taxes than individuals in the reentry
sample. On the other hand, they have lower financial wealth than their counter-
parts in the reentry sample. Such a pattern in housing wealth and financial wealth
may suggest that homeowners transform their housing wealth into financial wealth
by downsizing as they age and exit the labor force.
In addition to the publicly available HRS data, I obtained restricted access to
household level geographic identifiers in each survey year, including state, county,
census tract, and zip code. The state identifier is crucial in my analysis because
it links households with the state-provided property tax relief programs for which
they are eligible. The county identifier allows me to control for county-year specific
unemployment rate published by the Census Bureau in my regression analysis.
The second component of the data used in this paper is the data on property
tax relief programs. As of present, all 50 states and District of Columbia have some
form of property tax relief programs for homeowners, especially for low-income and
elderly homeowners. Many of these programs were first established well before my
sample period started. Broadly speaking, there are four categories of relief programs:
Homestead Exemptions and Credits, Circuit-Breakers, Deferral Programs, and Limi-
tations. Shan (2008) has detailed descriptions on how these programs work, how the
data were collected, and how these programs are codified. At the end of the process,
a computer program is written to produce three output variables: the amount of
benefits from homestead exemption, homestead credit, and circuit-breaker programs
that a homeowner is eligible for, whether eligible for an “assessment value freeze”
program, and whether eligible for an “property tax freeze” program. Such output
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variables can be generated for any homeowner in the U.S. in any year between 1990
and 2004 provided that input parameters, including state of residence, year, age, in-
come, house value, Social Security income, marital status, household size and wealth,
are non-missing.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Estimation Results
In this section, I present the empirical model and estimation results in studying the
effect of property taxes on elderly homeowners’ decisions to retire, to reenter the labor
force, and to increase working hours. Estimations are performed for men and women
separately. Robustness checks and extensions are carried out and discussed at the
end of this section.
3.4.1 Property Taxes and Retirement Decisions
To investigate whether property taxes have an impact on retirement behavior, I start
with a simple probit model7
Prob(Retireist = 1) = Φ(β1Taxist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt) (3.1)
where Retireist indicates whether household i in state s retired between time t and
t + 1, ζs denotes state fixed effects, δt denotes year fixed effects, and the covariate
vector Xist includes a constant, income quintile indicators, house value quintile in-
dicators, financial wealth quintile indicators, race/ethnicity (i.e. White, black, and
Hispanic), whether married, education categories (i.e. less than high school, high
school graduates, some college, and college graduates), whether hospitalized between
7I use a probit model in this paper because the mean of dependent variables is not near 0.5. A
linear probability model may be biased when the dependent variable is close to zero or one, and will
produce predictions beyond the range of zero to one.
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the last interview and the current interview, whether have pension coverage, whether
have retiree health insurance coverage, county unemployment rate, industry dummies,
occupation dummies, and age dummies.8 The key variable of interest in equation (3.1)
is Taxist, property tax payments by household i in state s at time t. If higher property
taxes cause elderly homeowners to delay retirement, then we expect β1 < 0.
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 3.3 present estimation results of equation (3.1) for
males and females, respectively. To make the results interpretable, I show marginal
effects of independent variables by calculating the predicted marginal effect for each
observation and then averaging them across all observations. To be consistent with
results presented later in this section, standard errors shown in parentheses are boot-
strapped by 500 random draws with replacement. I implement a block-bootstrap
scheme to make certain that observations are clustered at state level in estimating
standard errors. The estimated effects of property taxes are negative as expected, but
statistically insignificant. The magnitudes of the marginal effects are small, suggest-
ing that a $100 increase in annual property taxes is associated with a 0.03 percentage
point decrease in two-year retirement rate for men and 0.09 percentage point decrease
for women.
There are three reasons why such estimates of β1 may be inconsistent. First,
property taxes are products of tax rates and house values. At a given tax rate, higher
house values lead to higher property taxes. If house values affect elderly homeown-
ers’ labor supply decisions through channels other than property taxes (e.g. housing
wealth effect), then the probit estimate of β1 will be biased to the extent that house
values are not fully controlled for. Second, property taxes are used to provide local
public services. Higher property taxes often correlate with better local public services.
If local public services such as parks and senior centers are complements to the con-
8For the first wave in 1992, HRS asked whether the individual was hospitalized in the past year.
From the second wave on, HRS asked whether the individual was hospitalized since the last interview.
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sumption of leisure, we will not be able to estimate β1 consistently without controlling
for local public services which are unobservable to econometricians. Lastly, property
tax payments are self-reported in the HRS. To the extent that elderly homeowners
do not know and/or report property taxes accurately, measurement errors will cause
attenuation bias in estimating β1. To deal with these three problems, I use measures
of property tax relief program generosity to instrument for property taxes.
More specifically, I use the set of instruments - ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and
TaxFreezeist - that are described in detail in Shan (2008). Because property tax
relief benefits reduce property tax payments, these measures of program generosity
should be negatively correlated with property tax payments. Such a negative corre-
lation serves as the first stage in this paper. On the other hand, these instruments
essentially capture variations in property tax relief program rules and are rid of vari-
ations stemming from individual characteristics. Thus, they are orthogonal to the
individual level error term ²ist and satisfy the exclusion restriction. Table 3.2 illus-
trates the summary statistics of ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist. In
the retirement sample, 5.0% of males and 9.3% of females are eligible for relief benefits
from homestead exemptions, homestead credits, and circuit-breakers. Conditional on
eligibility, the average benefits from these programs are $144 for males and $202 for
females. In addition, 7.5% of both males and females are eligible for assessment value
freeze programs. 13.4% of males and 14.7% of females are eligible for property tax
freeze programs.
To implement the simulated IV strategy in a probit framework, I use the two-step
estimator suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988).9 Beside computational ease, the
Rivers-Vuong two-step IV approach has another appealing feature. The usual probit
t-test on vˆ, which is a consistent estimate of the first-stage error term, is a valid test of
9The Rivers-Vuong two-step approach is a limited information procedure. Thus, it is less efficient
than the conditional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In practice, I find MLE computationally
difficult, and iterations do not converge.
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the null hypothesis that Taxist is exogenous. Such a test is equivalent to the Hausman
specification test suggested by Hausman (1978). Because I use a two-step procedure
to estimate the IV-probit model, standard errors need to be adjusted accordingly.
I choose to obtain consistent estimates of standard errors by bootstrapping in lieu
of the delta-method for two reasons. First, bootstrapping is computationally easier
to implement. Second, bootstrapping provides higher-order refinements while the
delta-method is only a first-order approximation (Horowitz (2001)).
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3.3 show the IV-probit estimation results using
˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist as instruments. The estimated marginal
effects of property taxes remain negative and statistically insignificant. The magni-
tudes of these marginal effects become much larger than the probit results. They
suggest that a $100 increase in annual property tax payments reduces the two-year
retirement rate by 0.71 percentage points for men and 1.35 percentage points for
women. Given the average two-year retirement rate of 18.3% for men and 20.4% for
women, these represent a 3.9 percent decline in retirement rate for men and 6.6 per-
cent decline for women. Although the point estimates imply a sizable property tax
effect on retirement behavior, the standard errors are large and we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that property taxes do not affect retirement. Note that the first-stage
F-statistic is only 2.10 for the male sample and 14.28 for the female sample. The
reason why the instruments do not strongly correlate with property tax payments for
males is probably that male respondents in the retirement sample tend to have sig-
nificantly higher household income than females. In addition, males tend to be older
than their spouses. Since the age requirement in property tax relief programs often
refers to the oldest person in the household, male homeowners are less likely to qualify
for relief benefits than female homeowners of the same age. High incomes and not
having older spouses may have prevented male homeowners from taking advantages
of property tax relief programs which often have income and age as qualification crite-
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ria. Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) suggest that the rule of thumb for detecting weak
instruments is to check whether the first-stage F-stat exceeds 10. By this standard,
the male sample may have a weak instrument problem and the IV-probit estimates
may be biased in the direction of the probit estimates. Moreover, the Hausman test
rejects the null hypothesis that property tax payments are exogenous in the female
sample but not in the male sample.
The estimated marginal effects of other covariates are mostly consistent with our
expectation and previous literature’s findings. For example, health shocks, approxi-
mated by the indicator variable “whether the respondent was recently hospitalized,”
raise the two-year retirement rate by 5 percentage points for both men and women,
or a 25 percent increase from the baseline level. Financial wealth is correlated with
higher probability of retirement. However, such a correlation should not be inter-
preted as causal since individuals who have strong desires to retire early may have
saved more aggressively over their life-cycle. In addition, male respondents who have
retiree health insurance coverage are more likely to retire than those who do not, but
the effect is insignificant for females. Female respondents who have pension coverage
are less likely to retire than those who do not, but the effect is insignificant for males.
Black and Hispanic women are more likely to retire than white women, although
race/ethnicity does not appear to matter among male respondents. Such differences
between males and females highlight the importance of analyzing male and female
individuals separately in studying labor supply behavior.
3.4.2 Property Taxes and Reentry Decisions
In the previous section, I estimate a retirement regression model and the results
cannot reject the null hypothesis that property taxes do not have a significant effect
on elderly homeowners’ retirement decisions. In this section, I explore the impact
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of property taxes on labor force reentry behavior in a similar regression analysis by
estimating the following probit model:
Prob(Reentryist = 1) = Φ(β2Taxist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt) (3.2)
where Reentryist indicates whether individual i who is out of the labor force at time
t reenters the labor force between time t and t + 1. If higher property taxes cause
retired elderly homeowners to reenter the labor force, then we expect β2 > 0.
Because property tax payments, Taxist may be endogenous to elderly homeown-
ers’ labor supply decisions, I use ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist as
instruments for property taxes to obtain consistent estimates of β2. As shown in Table
3.2, individuals in the reentry sample are relatively older and have lower household
income because they have to be out the labor force to be in this sample. As a result,
they are more likely to be eligible for property tax relief programs that target low-
income and elderly homeowners. On average, 22.5% of males and 27.2% of females
in the reentry sample are eligible for homestead exemptions, homestead credits, or
circuit-breakers. 10.1% of males and 10.8% of females are eligible for assessment value
freeze programs, and 17.6% of males and 18.1% of females are eligible for property
tax freeze programs. The average two-year reentry rate among homeowners age 50-75
is low, 5.8% for males and 5.2% for females.
Table 3.4 presents estimation results of both probit and IV-probit specifications
for males and females separately. For the male sample, the estimated marginal effect
of property taxes is positive but statistically insignificant in the probit specification.
The marginal effect doubles in the IV-probit specification, but remains statistically
indistinguishable from zero. For the female sample, both the probit and IV-probit
specifications produce negative estimates of β2, and the marginal effects of property
taxes on reentry behavior are also statistically insignificant. The first-stage relation-
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ship between property taxes and the instruments are strong, with a F-statistic of
138.47 for the male sample and 11.09 for the female sample. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence is inconsistent with the claim that homeowners who face higher property taxes
are more likely to reenter the labor force.
Estimation results displayed in Table 3.4 also suggest that both male and female
Hispanic homeowners are more likely to reenter the labor force than white and black
elderly homeowners. When county unemployment rate is high, older men and women
are less likely to reenter the labor force. Higher income is correlated with higher
probability of reentry behavior, especially among male homeowners. Among female
homeowners, individuals who live in more expensive houses are more likely to reenter
the labor force. Among male homeowners, individuals with more financial wealth
are less likely to reenter the labor force. Moreover, negative health shocks appear to
prevent older men from reentering the labor force. Married women are less likely to
reenter the labor force than their unmarried counterparts.
3.4.3 Property Taxes and Working Hours
The previous two sections have examined the property tax effect on the extensive
margin of elderly labor supply, namely, whether to exit or reenter the labor market.
In this section, I investigate the intensive margin of labor supply by estimating the
effect of property taxes on whether elderly homeowners’ working hours. I employ a
regression model in the following form:
Hoursist = β3Taxist +XistΠ+ ζs + δt + ²ist (3.3)
where Hoursist is the total number of hours individual i reports working at time t
conditional on being in the labor force. If higher property taxes indeed induce elderly
homeowners to work longer hours, we expect β3 > 0.
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As explained before, Taxist may be endogenous to individuals’ labor supply de-
cisions and cause bias in estimating β3. To deal with such concerns, I use mea-
sures of property tax relief program generosity, ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and
TaxFreezeist, to instrument for Taxist. Because elderly homeowners have to be in the
labor force at time t to be considered in this analysis, individuals in the working-hour
sample are relatively young and have high household income. Such characteristics
imply that they also tend to be ineligible for property tax relief programs that are
designed to help low-income and older homeowners. Table 3.2 shows that on average
only 4.7% of males and 9.0% of females in the working-hour sample are eligible for
homestead exemptions, homestead credits, and circuit-breakers. 7.3% of male and
7.3% of females are eligible for assessment value freeze programs, and 13.3% of males
and 14.6% of females are eligible for property tax freeze programs. On average, the
male respondents report to work 2,283 hours annually and the female respondents
report to work 1,880 hours annually.
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results of the OLS and 2SLS specifications for
males and females separately. In the male samples, the OLS estimate suggests that
property taxes have a positive, small, and statistically insignificant effect on work-
ing hours. In the female sample, however, the OLS estimate suggests that property
taxes have a negative and statistically significant effect on working hours. Such a
counterintuitive result may reflect that property taxes are endogenous to labor sup-
ply decisions. Once property taxes are instrumented using relief program generosity
measures, the effect of property taxes on working hours appears to be negative and
statistically insignificant for both the male and female sample. The estimated co-
efficients are large, but the standard errors are also large and I cannot reject the
null hypothesis that property taxes have no impact on elderly homeowners’ work-
ing hours. Similar to the retirement analysis, the first-stage relationship between
property taxes and the instruments is weak for males in the working-hour sample,
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probably because they have high incomes and they tend to have younger spouses. On
the other hand, the first stage F-statistic is 18.31 for the females, suggesting that I do
not have a weak-instrument problem in the female sample. Nevertheless, the 2SLS
estimate of the coefficient on property taxes is inconsistent with the hypothesis that
higher property taxes induce elderly homeowners to work longer hours.
Results shown in Table 3.5 also suggest that income is highly correlated with
working hours. In the male sample, black homeowners work fewer hours than white
and Hispanic homeowners. In the female sample, homeowners with higher financial
wealth appear to work fewer hours. Married women work fewer hours than women
with other marital status. Women with college degrees work more hours than women
with less education. Female homeowners living in counties with high unemployment
rates work slightly fewer hours compared with those in counties with low unemploy-
ment rates.
3.4.4 Robustness Checks and Extensions
In previous sections, I have used a simulated IV strategy to identify the potential
effect of property taxes on elderly homeowners’ labor supply decisions both on the
extensive margin and the intensive margin. The estimation results suggest that prop-
erty taxes may have no significant impact on elderly homeowners’ decision to retire,
to reenter the labor force, or to increase working hours. In this section, I first carry
out robustness checks by using various sub-samples. Then I extend the regression
models and allow property taxes to differentially affect the labor supply decisions of
homeowners at different ages. Because the weak-instrument problem may exist in
the male retirement sample and the male working-hour sample, I focus on females
when analyzing retirement and working-hour responses, and I look at both males and
females when studying reentry behavior.
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As shown in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2, most elderly homeowners exit the labor
market between age 55 and 70. In the first robustness check, I limit the sample to
homeowners of age 55-70 and investigate whether the estimates change once home-
owners younger than 55 or older than 70 are dropped. In the second robustness check,
I exclude elderly homeowners who live in California because Proposition 13 may have
created a very unusual institutional setting. Proposition 13 was adopted in California
in 1978. It limits property tax rates at 1% and requires assessment values to grow no
more than 2% per year unless the house is sold and re-assessment is carried out. In
the third robustness check, I drop individuals who claim to be self-employed because
self-employed individuals may face higher or lower costs than others when adjusting
their labor supply. Lastly, I exclude elderly homeowners who report to have moved
between time t and t+1 and focus on individuals who stay in the same house in both
periods.
Table 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 present the estimation results using these sub-samples in
the retirement, reentry, and working-hour regressions, respectively. In the retirement
analysis, the estimated marginal effect of property taxes is negative across sub-samples
for female respondents, which is consistent with the hypothesis that rising property
taxes induce elderly homeowners to delay retirement. However, none of the estimates
is statistically different from zero at conventional confidence level, and thus, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that property taxes have no significant impact on retire-
ment behavior. In the reentry analysis, the estimated coefficient on property taxes is
positive in some cases and negative in others. In addition, they are all statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, there appears to be little evidence that el-
derly homeowners who are out of the labor force actually reenter the labor force in
order to boost their incomes and pay for rising property taxes. In the working-hour
analysis, most estimates of the property tax effect are negative, which is inconsistent
with the notion that higher property taxes may have caused elderly homeowners to
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work longer hours. Additionally, none of the estimates are statistically significant.
Next, I allow for heterogeneity in the property tax effect for individuals of different
ages. If the reason why I do not find evidence of significant property tax effect on
elderly labor supply is that I have restricted the coefficients on property taxes to be
the same for individuals of different ages, then this extension should be able to identify
the age groups at which property taxes may have a noticeable impact on labor supply
decisions. Because Figure 3-3 shows that retirement hazard rate increases sharply at
age 60, and because age 62 and 65 are the Social Security early retirement age and
normal retirement age respectively, I allow the coefficients on property taxes to differ
across five age groups: 50-59, 60, 61-62, 63-65, and 66-75. Specifically, I estimate the
following probit models:
Prob(Retireist = 1) = Φ(α1Taxist · 1(Age < 60) + α2Taxist · 1(Age = 60) (3.4)
+ α3Taxist · 1(Age = 61− 62) + α4Taxist · 1(Age = 63− 65)
+ α5Taxist · 1(Age > 65) +XistΠ+ ζs + δt)
Prob(Reentryist = 1) = Φ(γ1Taxist · 1(Age < 60) + γ2Taxist · 1(Age = 60) (3.5)
+ γ3Taxist · 1(Age = 61− 62) + γ4Taxist · 1(Age = 63− 65)
+ γ5Taxist · 1(Age > 65) +XistΠ+ ζs + δt)
Hoursist = λ1Taxist · 1(Age < 60) + λ2Taxist · 1(Age = 60) (3.6)
+ λ3Taxist · 1(Age = 61− 62) + λ4Taxist · 1(Age = 63− 65)
+ λ5Taxist · 1(Age > 65) +XistΠ+ ζs + δt + ²ist
where 1(·) returns one if the expression in parenthesis holds true and zero other-
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wise. Since Taxist is endogenous to individual i’s labor supply decisions, I use the
interactions between the five age group dummies and the three program generosity
measures, ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist, to instrument for the in-
teractions between the five age group dummies and Taxist. Thus, I have 5 endogenous
explanatory variables and 15 instruments in each equation.
Table 3.9 shows the estimation results of IV-probit and 2SLS specifications. Many
of the estimated coefficients on property taxes have signs inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis that rising property taxes induce elderly homeowners to increase their labor
supply. Among the ones that have the expected signs, none of the IV estimates is
statistically different from zero at conventional significance level. Overall, the above
extension, where heterogenous property tax effects are allowed, does not detect a
systematic relationship between property taxes and elderly labor supply.
In summary, despite efforts to identify the link between property taxes and elderly
labor supply using various sub-samples and allowing for heterogeneous effects across
age groups, there appears to be little evidence suggesting that property taxes play a
significant role in elderly homeowners’ labor supply decisions. Note that the instru-
ments used in this paper to identify the causal effect of property taxes - simulated
relief benefits from homestead exemptions, homestead credits, and circuit-breakers,
eligibility for assessment value freeze programs, and eligibility for property tax freeze
programs - affect property taxes of only homeowners who are eligible for property
tax relief programs and actually take up these programs. To the extent that these
people are more sensitive and responsive to property taxes, the estimates presented
here may provide the upper bound of the property tax impact on elderly labor supply
due to the local average treatment effect (LATE) formulated by Imbens and Angrist
(1994). Therefore, finding little evidence supporting the claim that elderly homeown-
ers respond to rising property taxes by increasing labor supply in this paper implies
that property taxes probably play an insignificant role in labor supply decisions of
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the general public.
3.5 Conclusion
Property taxes are the most important tax revenue source of local governments in the
United States. The recent housing market boom led to drastic increases in property
taxes which in turn has caught the attention of both policy makers and the general
public. Despite news articles reporting anecdotes where elderly homeowners have been
delaying retirement in the face of rising property taxes, there has been no empirical
study on the relationship between property taxes and elderly labor supply. Exploiting
the arguably exogenous variation in state-provided property tax relief programs, this
paper is the first study examining the role property taxes play in elderly homeowners’
labor supply decisions. I examine both the extensive and intensive margins of labor
supply behavior. Various sub-samples are analyzed and the property tax effect is
allowed to differ across age groups. Overall, I find little evidence supporting the
claim that elderly homeowners have been delaying retirement, reentering the labor
force, or working longer hours to deal with increasing property taxes. In addition to
being the first study to investigate the behavioral impact of property taxes on elderly
labor supply, this paper also contributes to the existing literature on the wealth effect
by using property taxes and property tax relief programs as a novel source of variation.
There are two caveats worth mentioning. First, I have to focus on people who
are in the labor force in order to study their retirement and working-hour behavior
in this paper. This limits the power of my instruments significantly in the retirement
and working-hour regressions among male respondents because these people are often
too young and their incomes tend to be too high for them to be eligible for property
tax relief programs. Since weak instruments may bias the IV estimates, not finding
retirement and working-hour responses to property taxes in the male sample in the
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IV-probit specification cannot completely rule out the possibility that property taxes
play an important role in older men’s retirement and working-hour decisions. On the
other hand, the first-stage is quite strong in the reentry analysis. Nevertheless, there
appears to be little evidence of labor force reentry response to property taxes.
Second, even though this paper find evidence suggesting that the wealth shock
generated by unexpected increases in property taxes may not have a significant effect
on elderly labor supply, it does not necessarily mean that the wealth effects on elderly
labor supply are in general insignificant. Perhaps increases in property taxes do not
translate into a large enough reduction in wealth and therefore, do not induce a
detectable effect on labor supply. Furthermore, even if homeowners truly do not
respond to the negative wealth shock produced by rising property taxes, they may
still be very responsive to other forms of wealth shocks such as stock market and
housing market booms and busts. The field calls for more research on whether and
to what degree different types of wealth affect elderly labor supply differently.
Taken together with Shan (2008), the findings of this paper have important pol-
icy implications. Shan (2008) shows evidence suggesting that higher property taxes
induce higher mobility rate among elderly homeowners. Property taxes may affect
elderly mobility through various channels: the wealth effect, the liquidity constraint
effect, and the substitution effect. The wealth effect exists because increases in prop-
erty taxes are equivalent to declines in total wealth. The liquidity constraint effect
means that elderly homeowners would have preferred staying in their homes if they
were able to afford rising property taxes. The only reason that they move in response
to higher property taxes is that they have no incomes or liquid assets to pay for
increases in property taxes. The substitution effect refers to the fact that elderly
homeowners, who typically do not have school-age children living in the house, often
find the marginal cost of paying high property taxes exceeds the marginal benefit of
consuming local public services such as schools. Thus, increases in property taxes
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may trigger an adjustment in their choice of housing consumption bundles, and such
an adjustment is usually accomplished by moving. These different mechanisms have
different welfare implications. Although Shan (2008) shows the relationship between
property taxes and elderly mobility, she does not identify whether this relationship
is driven by the wealth effect, the liquidity constraint effect, or the substitution ef-
fect. On the other hand, property taxes affect elderly labor supply only through the
wealth effect and the liquidity constraint effect. Finding little evidence supporting
that property taxes play a significant role in elderly homeowners’ labor supply de-
cisions, this paper points in the direction that property taxes may have influenced
elderly mobility through the substitution effect. If this is true, property tax relief
programs may have kept elderly homeowners who optimally should have moved to
areas with lower property taxes and fewer public services in their homes.
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Table 3.1: PDV of Hypothetical Property Tax Increases
A Level Increase of $300
Discount Rate Age=50 Age=60 Age=70
0.02 7,019 4,912 3,677
(47%) (33%) (25%)
0.05 5,205 4,039 3,245
(35%) (27%) (22%)
0.08 2,995 2,617 2,313
(20%) (18%) (16%)
Annual Increase of $300
Discount Rate Age=50 Age=60 Age=70
0.02 101,253 60,110 38,091
(685%) (406%) (258%)
0.05 53,491 37,324 26,918
(362%) (252%) (182%)
0.08 17,376 14,429 12,119
(117%) (98%) (82%)
Notes: I Assume the individual lives to age 80. Numbers in parenthesis
represent the PDV as a percentage of median household financial wealth
among homeowners of that age. Based on the 1992-2004 HRS data, the
median household financial wealth is $14,790 for homeowners of age 50,
$27,472 for homeowners of age 60, and $29,171 for homeowners of age 70.
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Table 3.3: Retirement Estimation Results
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
Property Taxes (in 10,000) -0.0264 -0.7057 -0.0905 -1.3460
(0.0342) (0.9739) (0.0580) (1.1622)
Income Quintile 2 -0.0407* -0.0319 -0.0505** -0.0499**
(0.0230) (0.0274) (0.0237) (0.0236)
Income Quintile 3 -0.0375* -0.0332 -0.0166 -0.0080
(0.0215) (0.0231) (0.0249) (0.0263)
Income Quintile 4 -0.0191 -0.0206 -0.0031 0.0037
(0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0275) (0.0277)
Income Quintile 5 -0.0444* -0.0205 -0.0081 0.0288
(0.0237) (0.0401) (0.0301) (0.0478)
House Value Quintile 2 0.0141 0.0285 0.0054 0.0414
(0.0165) (0.0233) (0.0211) (0.0385)
House Value Quintile 3 -0.0174 0.0151 -0.0020 0.0738
(0.0183) (0.485) (0.0217) (0.0714)
House Value Quintile 4 -0.0053 0.0535 -0.0031 0.1123
(0.0204) (0.0841) (0.0244) (0.1082)
House Value Quintile 5 -0.0253 0.1270 -0.0179 0.2221
(0.0230) (0.2216) (0.0277) (0.2222)
Financial Wealth Quintile 2 0.0198 0.0157 0.0418** 0.0296
(0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0211)
Financial Wealth Quintile 3 0.0289* 0.0289 0.0748*** 0.0652***
(0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0202) (0.0228)
Financial Wealth Quintile 4 0.0535*** 0.0510** 0.0914*** 0.0805***
(0.0174) (0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0239)
Financial Wealth Quintile 5 0.0930*** 0.1268** 0.1249*** 0.1494***
(0.0194) (0.0548) (0.0229) (0.0417)
Black 0.0169 0.0112 0.0619*** 0.0562**
(0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0202) (0.0225)
Hispanic -0.0562** -0.0505 0.0378 0.0471*
(0.0248) (0.0313) (0.0270) (0.0273)
Married -0.0309* -0.0315 0.0194 0.0057
(0.0184) (0.0267) (0.0161) (0.0231)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3: Retirement Estimation Results (Continued)
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
High School Graduate -0.0220 -0.0200 -0.0240 -0.0151
(0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0163) (0.0181)
Some College -0.0177 -0.0165 -0.0300 -0.0146
(0.0179) (0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0235)
College Graduate -0.0237 -0.0038 -0.0307 0.0051
(0.0203) (0.0392) (0.0225) (0.0389)
Recently Hospitalized 0.0479*** 0.0507*** 0.0527*** 0.0522**
(0.0138) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0203)
Pension Coverage -0.0147 -0.0036 -0.0606*** -0.0721***
(0.0118) (0.0191) (0.0140) (0.0240)
Retiree Health Insurance 0.0487*** 0.0502*** 0.0085 0.0036
(0.0103) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0149)
County Unemployment Rate 0.0015 0.0013 0.0000 -0.0025
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0039)
First Stage F-stat 2.10 14.28
Hausman Test 3.0650 5.4105***
(coeff on first-stage residuals) (5.8850) (1.5272)
N 6,388 6,388 5,657 5,657
Pseudo R2 0.1489 . 0.1093 .
Note: The regression model is Prob(Retireist = 1) = Φ(β1Taxist + XistΠ + ζs + δt).
Other than the variables shown in the table, Xist also includes a constant, age dummies,
industry dummies, and occupation dummies. ζs is state fixed effects. δt is year fixed effects.
˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist are used as instruments for Taxist in the
IV-probit specifications. The numbers shown in the table are marginal effects averaged
across observations. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped by 500 random draws
with replacement clustered at state level. Individual weights from HRS are applied. *
significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level.
161
Table 3.4: Reentry Estimation Results
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
Property Taxes (in 10,000) 0.0263 0.0581 -0.0030 -0.7037
(0.0188) (0.4371) (0.0155) (0.4619)
Income Quintile 2 0.0253** 0.0255** 0.0156* 0.0156
(0.0103) (0.0112) (0.0081) (0.0134)
Income Quintile 3 0.0422*** 0.0427*** 0.0238*** 0.0240
(0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0086) (0.0166)
Income Quintile 4 0.0334*** 0.0338** 0.0222** 0.0213
(0.0120) (0.0134) (0.0090) (0.0173)
Income Quintile 5 0.0870*** 0.0859*** 0.0284*** 0.0519**
(0.0130) (0.0250) (0.0102) (0.0224)
House Value Quintile 2 0.0032 0.0026 0.0077 0.0288*
(0.0109) (0.0151) (0.0089) (0.0152)
House Value Quintile 3 0.0025 0.0007 0.0151 0.0578**
(0.0115) (0.0254) (0.0093) (0.0248)
House Value Quintile 4 -0.0201 -0.0231 0.0073 0.0775*
(0.0125) (0.0393) (0.0102) (0.0469)
House Value Quintile 5 0.0021 -0.0045 0.0110 0.1512*
(0.0135) (0.0747) (0.0111) (0.0860)
Financial Wealth Quintile 2 0.0048 0.0049 0.0082 0.0111
(0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0086) (0.0113)
Financial Wealth Quintile 3 -0.0213* -0.0216* 0.0068 0.0149
(0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0088) (0.0123)
Financial Wealth Quintile 4 -0.0393*** -0.0395*** -0.0017 0.0063
(0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0093) (0.0166)
Financial Wealth Quintile 5 -0.0465*** -0.0479*** -0.0243** -0.0126
(0.0127) (0.0172) (0.0101) (0.0183)
Black -0.0107 -0.0103 0.0111 0.0115
(0.0127) (0.0145) (0.0091) (0.0125)
Hispanic 0.0323** 0.0322** 0.0188* 0.0338**
(0.0131) (0.0147) (0.0109) (0.0153)
Married 0.0106 0.0104 -0.0227*** -0.0305***
(0.0097) (0.0115) (0.0071) (0.0103)
Continued on next page
162
Table 3.4: Reentry Estimation Results (Continued)
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit
High School Graduate -0.0102 -0.0104 -0.0093 -0.0106
(0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0070) (0.0097)
Some College 0.0022 0.0020 0.0015 0.0079
(0.0097) (0.0115) (0.0074) (0.0116)
College Graduate -0.0122 -0.0133 0.0004 0.0222
(0.0104) (0.0195) (0.0092) (0.0206)
Recently Hospitalized -0.0285*** -0.0283*** -0.0023 0.0015
(0.0087) (0.0097) (0.0062) (0.0107)
County Unemployment Rate -0.0031* -0.0032* -0.0023** -0.0039**
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0017)
First Stage F-stat 138.47 11.09
Hausman Test -0.3136 5.2854
(coeff on first-stage residuals) (2.4302) (3.6295)
N 6,475 6,475 9,406 9,406
Pseudo R2 0.1538 . 0.1391 .
Note: The regression model is Prob(Reentryist = 1) = Φ(β2Taxist+XistΠ+ζs+δt). Other
than the variables shown in the table, Xist also includes a constant and age dummies. ζs is
state fixed effects. δt is year fixed effects. ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist
are used as instruments for Taxist in the IV-probit specifications. The numbers shown in
the table are marginal effects averaged across observations. Standard errors in parentheses
are bootstrapped by 500 random draws with replacement clustered at state level. Individual
weights from HRS are applied. * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, ***
significant at 0.01 level.
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Table 3.5: Working Hour Estimation Results
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Property Taxes (in 10,000) 36.4 -776.7 -164.9** -3069.7
(23.9) (2044.0) (80.8) (2967.2)
Income Quintile 2 116.0*** 98.2 142.7*** 146.3**
(24.9) (62.6) (44.2) (53.7)
Income Quintile 3 168.9*** 139.6* 178.3*** 195.6***
(29.6) (81.2) (46.0) (63.0)
Income Quintile 4 198.6*** 161.3 230.3*** 241.2***
(28.7) (109.9) (51.2) (63.9)
Income Quintile 5 262.7*** 262.3** 271.6*** 348.6***
(34.9) (65.1) (51.9) (112.4)
House Value Quintile 2 -20.6 -2.5 -47.6 29.1
(31.7) (69.8) (42.5) (100.6)
House Value Quintile 3 -43.5* 16.1 -9.7 155.5
(21.9) (160.0) (42.3) (197.5)
House Value Quintile 4 -23.6 74.7 -45.8 212.9
(31.1) (270.3) (37.4) (289.5)
House Value Quintile 5 30.0 227.8 -78.3* 462.0
(43.9) (529.2) (40.5) (557.7)
Financial Wealth Quintile 2 - 35.2 25.9 -8.4 -28.3
(22.9) (37.5) (31.4) (35.8)
Financial Wealth Quintile 3 - 36.1 43.1 -25.6 -28.8
(28.5) (32.5) (30.7) (36.0)
Financial Wealth Quintile 4 26.5 32.0 -78.1** -84.3**
(34.0) (37.3) (31.7) (39.0)
Financial Wealth Quintile 5 -0.5 45.4 -123.0** -32.3
(34.8) (110.0) (45.2) (107.1)
Black -86.8** -94.7** -30.6 -10.7
(34.5) (44.2) (28.9) (44.0)
Hispanic -58.9 -62.9 -35.8 6.3
(44.5) (50.2) (41.5) (65.3)
Married -22.8 -17.5 -201.7*** -219.1***
(32.4) (34.9) (18.4) (27.8)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5: Working Hour Estimation Results (Continued)
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
High School Graduate -17.0 -2.7 -15.0 3.9
(24.3) (33.2) (37.1) (37.0)
Some College -6.4 -2.0 -13.0 17.8
(31.1) (27.1) (47.0) (55.6)
College Graduate -35.2 -6.8 114.5** 194.4**
(37.6) (64.7) (52.5) (87.0)
Recently Hospitalized -36.1 -46.6 5.2 4.1
(25.2) (43.6) (29.9) (38.5)
County Unemployment Rate 4.6 6.6 -8.9** -15.3*
(4.2) (9.3) (3.8) (7.6)
First Stage F-stat 0.90 18.31
Hausman Test 813 2906
(coeff on first-stage residuals) (1851) (2713)
N 7,442 7,442 6,552 6,552
Pseudo R2 0.3289 . 0.3009 .
Notes: The regression model is Hoursist = β3Taxist +XistΠ + ζs + δt + ²ist. Other than
the variables shown in the table, Xist also includes a constant and age dummies. ζs is state
fixed effects. δt is year fixed effects. ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist are
used as instruments for Taxist in the IV-probit specifications. The numbers shown in the
table are marginal effects averaged across observations. Standard errors in parentheses are
bootstrapped by 500 random draws with replacement clustered at state level. Individual
weights from HRS are applied. * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, ***
significant at 0.01 level.
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Table 3.9: Property Tax Effect on Homeowners of Different Age Groups
Retirement Reentry Reentry Hours
Female Male Female Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV-Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit 2SLS
PropTax*(Age<60) 0.0422 0.1188 0.9829 -219.2
(0 .9843) (0.6499) (0.7588) (2093.0)
PropTax*(Age=60) 2.1577 -0.2512 -1.2467 -2989.1
(1.5298) (1.3140) (4.0628) (3275.2)
PropTax*(Age=61-62) -0.6278 0.4428 -2.8188** -3230.7
( 1.0570) (1.4484) (1.3672) (3567.4)
PropTax*(Age=63-65) 1.2753 0.6301 0.1007 1648.4
(1.7913) (1.6568) (1.3454) (2679.0)
PropTax*(Age>65) -0.5854 0.1884 -0.4449 254.6
(0.7493) (0.7787) (0.9967) (1054.7)
N 5,657 6,475 9,406 6,552
Note: Other controls include a constant, income quintile indicators, house value quintile
indicators, financial wealth quintile indicators, race/ethnicity dummies, whether married,
education categories, whether recently hospitalized, whether have pension coverage, whether
have retiree health insurance coverage, county unemployment rate, industry dummies, oc-
cupation dummies, and age dummies, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The inter-
actions between the five age groups and ˜Benefitsist, V alueFreezeist, and TaxFreezeist
are used as instruments for the interactions between the five age groups and property taxes.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at state level. Individual weights from HRS
are applied. * significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01
level.
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